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
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PHYSICAL THEORY OF ANOTHER LIFE

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Taylor

PHYSICAL THEORY OF

Another Life

BY ISAAC TAYLOR

LONDON
BELL AND DALDY FLEET STREET
1858

ΕΛΠΙΖΩ ΣΟΙ ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕ ΑΙΤΙΑΝ ΕΠΙΔΕΙΞΕΙΝ
ΚΑΙ ΑΝΕΥΡΗΣΕΝ, ὡΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ Η ΨΥΧΗ.

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Preface to the Firſt Edition.

DURING the years that have elapſed ſince the author projected his literary courſe, a great change has taken place in the relative poſition and the reciprocal feelings of the religious parties that divide the country. Eight or ten years ago, and even later, many auſpicious indications of peace and union met the eye; and an enterprize might ſeem hopeful which had for its object the removal of obſolete cauſes of diſagreement. It then ſeemed as if, at laſt, ancient miſconceptions might ſafely and ſucceſsfully be dealt with.

But an unlooked for courſe of events has diſſipated, for the preſent, theſe happy preſages, and has given a vehement excitement to ſentiments which the lovers of peace had fondly believed were faſt diſappearing; ſo that it would now be idle to hope for a diſpaſſionate hearing

upon ſubjects that touch the differences between party and party.

In its bearing upon his own literary projects and engagements, the author has felt, every day with freſh force, that the revolution of public feeling to which he has alluded muſt render the proſecution of the plan he had deviſed, and which he has announced, and in part executed, peculiarly difficult, if not impracticable; as well as hopeleſs of a beneficial iſſue. The ſubjects included in his plan have become the very themes of eager contention; nor could he believe that, while ſatisfying his own convictions of truth, he ſhould be able to avoid the taking a ſide, and the ranging—or the being ranged—with one body of Chriſtians, againſt others. In fact he has found himſelf nearing the abyſs of ſtrife; and he ſteps back in haſte.

The preſent ſtate of eccleſiaſtical excitement will however, no doubt, in a few years, ſubſide, and a calmer ſeaſon once again ſmile upon the Chriſtian commonwealth. Should he live to ſee the happy days of tranquillity and good-will, the author would gladly reſume the difficult, and, as he believes, important ſubjects, which at preſent he lays down.

He now returns to the favourite and peaceful themes of his earlier meditations and ſtudies;

and is moſt happy to find himſelf in a region not expoſed to ſtorms.

There are two perfectly diſtinct modes in which the influence of the higheſt truths may be increaſed: the one is to remove, ſo far as it may be done, the prejudices and perverſions that have been amaſſed around them. The other method is, forgetting any incidental cauſes of obſtruction, to hold forth, in its native brightneſs, the ſubſtance of thoſe truths. The author, in his deſire—he believes a ſincere deſire—to promote, to the utmoſt of his power, theſe ineſtimable principles, at firſt attempted to accompliſh his object in the former method: he now attempts it in the ſecond.

Preface to the Third Edition.

THE author hopes that no reader will ſo far miſunderſtand his intention, in the preſent inſtance, as to ſuppoſe that a train of thought profeſſedly *theoretic*, or hypothetical, and on a ſubject connected with which we have no direct information beyond what the Scriptures incidentally convey, is to be allowed to interfere with, or to ſuperſede, any article of our religious belief. An attempt *ſo* to theorize, would be in an equal degree reprehenſible and abſurd. The author hopes, and believes, that the following pages do not contain a ſingle ſentence, which, fairly interpreted, can lay him open to blame on this ground. At any rate, the very diſtinct profeſſion which he is now making of his reverent regard to the Inſpired Teſtimony, may be admitted to carry him clear of all juſt exceptions.

As to the actual tendency of the conjectures, and the analogical reaſoning, which this volume

compriſes, the author has now ſome good reaſon to believe that it is altogether favourable to piety, with modeſt, meditative, and ſerious minds. It is impoſſible to provide againſt the incidental harm that may accrue to thoſe who are wanting in right diſpoſitions.

So far as the ſpeculations and conjectures propounded in this volume touch upon the philoſophy of human nature, whether in its phyſiological or intellectual branches, the author continues to believe that the hints he has ſuggeſted, if purſued, would lead to conſequences of ſome importance, and eſpecially that they would open ſuch views of the WORLD OF MIND as muſt deciſively exclude certain modern doctrines, of injurious tendency. Should he find leiſure to do ſo, the author would be glad to develop, a little further, his opinions on theſe ſubjects, and to confirm them by an appeal to facts. How gladly would he walk awhile in the peaceful and unconteſted paths of philoſophy —eſpecially when philoſophy offers, or ſeems to offer, her aid in deepening our convictions of the higheſt truths!

Stanford Rivers,
July 1, 1839.

Advertiſement to the Preſent Edition.

IN committing this Eſſay again to the Preſs, the author has not attempted to make more than a few verbal corrections: the book has been before the public now one-and-twenty years; and in the courſe of that time it has undergone careful reviſions; eſpecially ſo in the edition of 1839. As to the opinions profeſſed ſo long ago, and the conjectures hazarded, he finds very little which he ſhould care to alter, and nothing to retract.

The concluding paragraph of the preface to the edition above referred to, conveys the expreſſion of a wiſh and intention which, throughout this lapſe of years, he has not ceaſed to keep in proſpect; and it is a coincidence he may be allowed to mention that, while reading the ſheets of this reprint, he has been employed alſo

in realizing a purpoſe ſo long entertained, and then announced, to give utterance to his views concerning the WORLD OF MIND.

I. T.

Stanford Rivers,
May, 1857.

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PHYSICAL THEORY OF ANOTHER LIFE

PHYSICAL THEORY OF ANOTHER LIFE.

CHAPTER I.

Preliminary Cautions, and Statement of the Subject.

WE may eaſily imagine the knowledge of a future life to have been conveyed to us through ſome other channel than that of the Chriſtian writings. In that caſe we ſhould have felt to have been in no danger of culpable preſumption while ſeeking further information, concerning the deſtiny of the human family, in any mode which might have come within our reach; and if the means of our obtaining this further knowledge had been natural and ordinary, we ſhould, without ſcruple, have proſecuted our inquiries in the very ſpirit, and with all the freedom, that belong to other phyſical reſearches.

But if, indeed, the human family is to live

anew, it cannot be denied that the future ſtage of its exiſtence may excite our curioſity as a proper branch of the phyſiology of the ſpecies; and it then only remains to be aſked, whether we are actually in poſſeſſion of any ſufficient materials for proſecuting ſuch an inquiry; if we be, the circumſtance that our expectation of immortality forms a part of our belief as Chriſtians, and that it is ſuſtained by the ſanction of divine authority, need not be held to bar our reſearches, or to prevent our doing what otherwiſe we ſhould certainly attempt, if there were ground to ſuppoſe that a careful analyſis of human nature might enable us to form an idea of the functions and prerogatives of our approaching mode of exiſtence.

What is to be guarded againſt, as well in reſpect to the ſanctity of religion, as in deference to the principles of good ſenſe and ſound philoſophy, is, in the firſt place, the mere indulgence of the imagination; for it is aſſuredly not from that quarter we can expect ſubſtantial aid; and in the ſecond place, we ſhould reject the ſuppoſition that any hypotheſis, formed on a ſubject of this kind, how plauſible ſoever it may ſeem, is, or can be, more than a rational conjecture; or that it can rightfully have any force in diſturbing our religious convictions. On the path we are about to purſue, no practical evil can ariſe ſo long as we carefully abſtain from the error of

confounding the deductions of reaſon with the teſtimony of the inſpired writers; nor ever allow any part of the authority, or of the ſerious and ſacred import that attach to the latter, to be extended to the former. To intrude into "things not ſeen," under the influence of a "fleſhly mind," is a grave fault, and eſpecially ſo if, on the ſtrength of even the moſt reaſonable theory, we are led to bring into queſtion a particle of that which the text of Scripture, duly interpreted, requires us to believe.

Yet there is a path, as I humbly think, which runs clear of both the errors above mentioned, and in following it awhile, as I propoſe to do, I ſhall endeavour to diſcard the gay dreams of the fancy, fraught with the images of earth; and ſhall hold everything light which countervails, or which will not readily conſiſt with, the ſure words of Chriſt and his apoſtles. Our conjectures are conjectures merely; or even if in any inſtance they might challenge a ſomewhat higher value, they are to be conſidered as matters of ſcience, not of piety; nor is our faith in any way implicated in them; nor can our Chriſtianity be compromiſed in the remoteſt manner by the eſtabliſhment, or by the refutation of any ſuch ſpeculations. Whether they be confirmed, or whether they be confuted, ſtill, as expectants of that "life and immortality" which is brought to light by the goſpel, we look on with no ſoli-

citude while reaſon attempts the arduous path that is opened to her efforts.

It is very true that Chriſtianity has ſuffered damage by vain and preſumptuous intruſions into its myſteries; but it may alſo be injured, and perhaps in a more fatal, although a more ſilent manner, by the cold withdrawment of all attention and of all curioſity from the high themes of meditation which it involves. In fact this is the very danger to which our religion is now expoſed; and a too eager regard to things unſeen is certainly not the fault of the times we live in. There may then be a ſeaſonableneſs in the endeavour to engage attention upon the tranquil but vivifying anticipation of another life; and it muſt always be true that a diſtinct and familiar conception of it is likely to aid us, as well in reſiſting the ſeductions of the preſent life, as in ſuſtaining its pains and ſorrows; nor does all the help we can obtain of this kind prove enough to enſure a due repoſe of mind amid thoſe agitating alternations of hope and fear that attend our path.

If it be true that human nature, in its preſent form, is only the rudiment of a more extended and deſirable mode of exiſtence, we can hardly do otherwiſe than aſſume that the future being muſt ſo lie involved in our preſent conſtitution as to be diſcernible therein; and that a careful

examination of this ſtructure, both bodily and mental, with a view to the ſuppoſed reconſtruction of the whole, will furniſh ſome means of conjecturing what that future life will be, at leaſt as to its principal elements. It remains then to be ſeen whether ſomething of this ſort may not actually be effected; and in attempting it we are not left totally at large, or without hints of the path we ſhould attempt; for if the inſpired writings be always liſtened to where they give any diſtinct teſtimony, and are narrowly ſcrutinized alſo in every inſtance of a caſual alluſion to facts not explicitly revealed, they furniſh a guidance ſuch as may ſave endleſs wanderings in a falſe direction. Nevertheleſs in uſing this guidance, the conditions that belong to it ſhould be borne in mind, leſt we ſhould be led aſtray by taking it for what it is not. Theſe conditions muſt then be briefly adverted to before we advance further.

Nothing, it is manifeſt, remains to be deſired in philoſophy beyond the attainment of abſolute truth; and therefore, as the inſpired writings, within their province, convey truth, and truth only, it might ſeem that, on every ſubject to which their evidence extends, we have but to admit it, and there to reſt. Yet it muſt not be forgotten that truth, in the Scriptures, is always preſented under ſome ſpecial aſpect; or ſo as if

it were ſeen from a particular poſition, or as it bears upon ſome definite human affection, or immediate duty: it is not truth in the abſtract: it is indeed a pure element, but it is a particle only of that element; and therefore it will not arreſt the inquiries of minds of philoſophic caſt, which, by inſtinct, aſcend from what is partial to what is general, and are impelled to purſue the univerſal wherever they touch particulars. Such minds may indeed (and if found they often will) ſee good reaſon for ſtopping ſhort where they find the means of acquiring further knowledge to be totally wanting; nor will they be ſlow to confeſs their ignorance in all ſuch inſtances. Nevertheleſs they cannot but reſiſt the interdiction of thoſe who would require them to profeſs that ſuch detached particles are actually the whole truth, and all that could poſſibly be known.

There is to be obſerved a manifeſt diſtinction between what immediately concerns us in relation to the divine government, and which it is indiſpenſable we ſhould well underſtand; and what relates to the conſtitution of the inviſible world, to other orders of being, or to the future phyſical condition of the human race. It is to ſubjects of the former ſort, chiefly, that the inſpired writers direct our attention; while they only glance, incidentally and very haſtily, at ſubjects ofthe latter claſs. Not only do they abſtain

from conveying truth in univerſal and abſtract terms, but they very rarely touch at all any theme that can be conſidered as a proper object of ſcientific curioſity. This is now well underſtood, and therefore the attempt is no longer made to diſcover latent ſyſtems of phyſical ſcience in the language of the Bible; and it is agreed on all hands that although Moſes and the prophets contradict nothing which our modern ſcience has demonſtrated, it formed no part of their commiſſion to embed a ſcheme of the univerſe in the Hebrew text. And if phyſics and aſtronomy are not to be ſought there, neither are metaphyſics, nor pſychology, nor pneumatology to be inquired for from the inſpired writers, notwithſtanding that theſe ſubjects are much more nearly related to the principles of religion than are the former. What we may fairly rely upon is this, that, in their incidental alluſions to the conſtitution or the deſtinies of the great intellectual ſyſtem, and while they are paſſing over ground where we have no other direct means of information, the inſpired writers never lead us aſtray; or, when fairly interpreted, give riſe to ſuppoſitions that are altogether unfounded, and contrary to fact. And more than this we may well believe that, ſo far as they go, they furniſh us with an incidental guidance, of which we may ſafely avail ourſelves while purſuing inquiries of a ſcientific kind. In relation to the unſeen world,

Scripture is to be liſtened to much as we might liſten to an ambaſſador from a diſtant country, who, while earneſtly diſcharging the ſpecial duties of his miſſion, and while urging at large the political and commercial intereſts of his ſovereign, might make many alluſions and employ many phraſes, which, when collected and attentively conſidered, would ſerve to convey ſome general notion of the climate, uſages, and wealth of his native land.

It is thus then that we propoſe to keep an ear open to the apoſtolic voice, while endeavouring, by another proceſs than that of biblical interpretation, to unfold the rudiments of the future life; —always reſpecting the ſacred canon, and ever and again reverting to it as an infallible means of keeping ourſelves near to the true path of inquiry. And with the very hope of making an auſpicious commencement, and with the view of ſtarting from ſolid ground, ſo that our firſt ſteps at leaſt may be ſure, we ſhall devote a page to an apoſtolic affirmation, which indeed might ſerve as the text of our diſſertation—'There is,' ſays St. Paul, 'a natural body, and there is a SPIRITUAL BODY:'—the natural, or animal firſt, and then the ſpiritual; and theſe, while agreeing in certain general conditions, are contraſted in ſome important reſpects; yet both ſerve as the vehicle and inſtrument of the higher principle of our nature.

The animated argument carried on through the fifteenth chapter of the firſt epiſtle to the Corinthians, ſtands alone, or nearly ſo, in the body of Scripture, as well as to its ſubject, as its ſtyle; for we meet with nothing elſewhere within the inſpired pages ſo much reſembling a phyſiological diſquiſition, or anything that goes ſo far in ſetting before us, at one view, the natural hiſtory of man, conſidered as deſtined to immortality. And yet this argument does not depart ſo widely from the cuſtomary ſtyle of Scripture, as to be otherwiſe than tropical in its terms, and popular, rather than ſcientific, in its mode of reaſoning and in its illuſtrations. While, therefore, it may ſuggeſt the courſe we ſhould purſue, and prevent our ſetting out in a wrong direction, it cannot be held to ſuperſede the ſort of inquiry which we have now before us.

The leading affirmation of St. Paul's argument we may conſider to be the one juſt quoted, and the import of which we may properly inquire into, as a preliminary to the ſtatement of our theory of another life.

'THERE IS A SPIRITUAL BODY.' It is then BODY, and not ſpirit, to which the reaſoning of the apoſtle, in this inſtance, relates. He is treating of the tranſition which human nature is deſtined to paſs through, from one condition of corporeal exiſtence to another; and he ſpeaks of

the laying down a body that is groſs, or at leaſt infirm, periſhable, and ignoble, and the taking up a body that ſhall be potent, illuſtrious, and permanent. For aught we know, there may be, in the univerſe, pure immateriality, or a ſtate of abſolute ſeparation from matter; and moreover, ſuch a ſtate of ſheer incorporeity may perhaps await the human race in ſome ſtage of its progreſs towards its ultimate condition; but, clearly, no abſtraction of this kind is either affirmed or implied in the paſſage before us; nor does it enter into St. Paul's argument, even by ſo much as a paſſing alluſion, or a ſolitary phraſe, thrown in to ſave a collateral truth. We ſhould indeed be far from thence inferring that an immaterial ſtate, in the fulleſt ſenſe of the term, is not in itſelf poſſible, or may not actually have to be paſſed through by mankind; for arguments drawn from negative evidence are at all times extremely fallacious. Nevertheleſs, ſo far as this paſſage goes, the doctrine of an abſolute incorporeity, as poſſible to human nature, may be true, or it may not. The diſtinctive, or the foremoſt principle of Chriſtianity—namely, the reſurrection of the dead—demands no ſuch doctrine, nor does the apoſtle (who was perſonally well qualified to judge of the hidden, yet real connexion of principles) deem it neceſſary to his concluſion, or at all pertinent to his ſubject to affirm it. If queſtioned on the point, whether the human ſoul is

ever actually and entirely ſeparated from matter, it is not improbable that he would have diſmiſſed the inquiry as altogether irrelevant to religion, and as a theme proper to be diſcuſſed among the profeſſors of abſtruſe ſcience, with which he, as a teacher of Chriſtianity, had nothing to do.

That which Chriſtianity requires us to believe is the actual ſurvivance of our perſonal conſciouſneſs *embodied*, and the perpetuity of our ſenſe of good and evil, and our continued ſenſibility to pain and pleaſure, and the unbroken recollection, in another life, of the events and affections of the preſent ſtate. What Chriſtianity deciſively affirms is to this effect, that the LIFE—moral, intellectual, and active, or corporeal—is not commenſurate with, or dependent upon, the preſent animal organization; but that it may, and that it will, ſpring up anew from the ruins of its earthly habitation. 'Deſtroy *this* body,' and the man ſtill lives: but whether he might live immaterially, is a mere queſtion of philoſophy, which the inſpired writers do not care to decide. In almoſt all inſtances it is with facts, rather than with abſtruſe principles, that they have to do; and in relation to our preſent ſubject, after having peremptorily affirmed that human nature is to ſurvive in another ſtate, and that it is to riſe embodied from the aſhes of its preſent animal organization, St. Paul leaves ſpeculation at large, neither denying nor affirming any hypotheſis

that may conſiſt with the facts which alone are important to our religious belief.

Let it then be diſtinctly kept in view, that although the eſſential independence of mind and matter, or the abſtract poſſibility of the former exiſting apart from corporeal life, may well be conſidered as tacitly implied in the Chriſtian ſcheme, yet that an *actual* incorporeal ſtate of the human ſoul, at any period of its courſe, is not neceſſarily involved in the principles of our faith, any more than it is explicitly aſſerted. This doctrine, concerning what is called the immateriality of the ſoul, ſhould ever be treated ſimply as a philoſophical ſpeculation, and as unimportant to our Chriſtian profeſſion. The queſtion then, concerning pure immateriality, we regard as having been paſſed, untouched, by St. Paul; nor do we conſider it as in any ſpecific manner important to the inquiries upon which we are about to enter. Nevertheleſs, there may be an advantage in conciſely ſtating what ſeems to be the preſent relative poſition of the two parties in the old controverſy concerning matter and mind:—a controverſy now very likely to die away for ever.

The antagoniſt principles then are thus balanced.—Two claſſes of facts, readily diſtinguiſhable, preſent themſelves to our conſciouſneſs:—thoſe of the one claſs we involuntarily attribute to an external world, and think of as the conſe-

quences of our connexion with matter, or as the effects which its properties produce upon our minds. But those of the other class we as invariably regard as belonging more immediately to the mind, and as arising from itself; and they are, many of them at least, of a sort which we may easily imagine to have place, if there were no external world, or if the mind had no sentient knowledge of its existence. Theory and speculation apart, the entire mass of our consciousness resolves itself, naturally and easily, into these two elements; and it is only by the temporary force of some arbitrary system of philosophy, that we can be brought to regard the two elements as essentially one and the same; and, by the very constitution of our minds, we reluctate every moment at the violence done them by any such means.

But notwithstanding the remonstrances of common sense, the attempt has in every age been renewed, on the one side by the materialist, and on the other by the spiritualist (if we may so use the term) to melt down these two elements into a mass, or to annul the distinction between them; —the one by affirming that mind is mere organization, or a product of matter; and the other, by alleging that those varied sensations or states of the mind which, by a 'natural prejudice,' we attribute to an external material world, are in fact nothing more than peculiar conditions of the

mind itſelf; and that there neither is an external world, nor could be; or that, even if there were, no ſubſtantial proof of its exiſtence could poſſibly reach us.

Now the two parties, if indeed two ſuch parties may ſtill be ſaid to be extant, have nearly come to an agreement on one point, namely, that our belief of the reality of matter and of mind can never be made to ſtand together as collateral truths, equal in authority, and reſting upon the ſame ſort of evidence, and aſcertained by the ſame proceſs of reaſoning. If at laſt they are to conſiſt one with the other, the one muſt be aſſumed as intuitively certain, and as incapable of proof by reaſoning; while the other muſt thence be derived in the way of inference, and muſt, however well proved, yet take a ſecondary place in the order of things known. Which of the two then ſhall we aſſume as needing no proof, and employ as a fulcrum of argument in proving the other, or in diſproving it?

The materialiſt—and in this argument the materialiſt muſt take the atheiſt as his companion—the materialiſt ſays, 'It is impoſſible for me to doubt the exiſtence of matter; for it is under my touch, it is before my eyes, and its properties are the ſubject of the only ſciences that are abſolute in their methods of reaſoning, and infallible in their reſults. But as to mind, otherwiſe than as it is merely a function of animal organization,

or a product of cerebral ſecretions, I know nothing, and can know nothing of it, and the inquiry concerning it ever has been, and muſt always remain, obſcure and unſatisfactory.'

But the ſpiritualiſt contemns this ſummary treatment of the argument by his antagoniſt, as crude, and as altogether illogical, and ſuch as can ſatisfy none who are competent ſtrictly to analyſe their own conſciouſneſs. He affirms that this ſtatement of the caſe by his opponent takes for granted the very facts that are to be proved; and in reply to the materialiſt, he ſays—' All that I contend for, and which I affirm to be intuitively certain, and to be known without proof, you firſt tacitly aſſume, and then formally deny. What, I aſk, are all theſe ſenſations of touch and ſight, and what are theſe demonſtrations of mathematical ſcience, of which you ſpeak, but ſo many *ſtates of the mind*—ſo many mental phenomena, as I may term them, which, while they neceſſarily imply the exiſtence of mind, do but render the exiſtence of matter probable; or at beſt demonſtrate its reality by a circuit of reaſoning. I will grant you that an external world may exiſt, and I believe that it does exiſt: but this very belief, let it riſe as high as it may, together with the argument that ſuſtains it, are ſtill only ſo many elements of my mental conſciouſneſs, and can never nullify or annihilate that of which they are parts.' This ſcepticiſm

concerning the reality of matter, and an external world, which is of a far more ſubtile and ſweeping kind than that of the materialiſt concerning mind, he finds it is impoſſible to ſupplant; and he feels himſelf undermined in his aſſault upon ſpiritualiſm, his foot ſinking whichever way he endeavours to advance. His opponent therefore leaves him with this defiance—'Prove the exiſtence of an external world, if you pleaſe, or if you can;—and I too believe it to exiſt; but I believe it by inference; and therefore hold it as a truth, if not inferior in certainty, yet aſſuredly as ſubordinate to that primary truth—the exiſtence of mind.'

Now even if it were granted that a due regard to the conſtitution of the human mind—its phyſiology—obliges us to receive its inſtinctive and involuntary conviction of the reality of an external world as a proper evidence of its exiſtence, and as ſuperſeding all reaſoning on the ſubject, ſo that the two truths ſhould be conſidered as alike intuitively known, ſtill the ſpiritualiſt will retain the advantage he has gained over his opponent; for it is manifeſt that, if there be room at all for any heſitation or ſcepticiſm in relation to either truth, it is matter, not mind, that is in jeopardy. The very ground of the aſſumption that the exiſtence of an external world ought to be admitted as certain, without reaſoning, is nothing elſe but a conſideration of the laws or con-

ſtitution of the mind. Mind therefore, and its elementary principles, ſtands firſt in logical order; and the exiſtence of matter follows, if not as an inference, yet as a truth not to be affirmed until after another has been granted.

The bearing of this controverſy upon Chriſtianity may thus be ſtated.—The doctrine of the materialiſt, if it were followed out to its extreme conſequences, and conſiſtently held, is plainly atheiſtic, and is therefore incompatible with any and with every form of religious belief. It is ſo becauſe, in affirming that mind is nothing more than the product of animal organization, it excludes the belief of a pure and uncreated mind —the cauſe of all things; for if there be a ſupreme mind, abſolutely independent of matter, then, unqueſtionably, there may be created minds, alſo independent of matter. But if the materialiſt is ready to admit, as he uſually does, the divine exiſtence, and the pure ſpirituality of the divine nature, and if he profeſſes to mean nothing more than that created minds are in fact always embodied, and that, apart from ſome material ſtructure or animal organization, there is no conſciouſneſs or activity, then, and in this ſenſe underſtood, materialiſm becomes a doctrine of little or no importance to our faith as Chriſtians, for it may conſiſt well enough with what is affirmed in the Scriptures concerning the immortality of man, the reſurrection, the interme-

diate ſtate, and the exiſtence and agency of inviſible orders. On the other hand, although the great principles of theology are ſaved and reſpected by the ſpiritualiſt, yet, if he goes ſo far as to call in queſtion the reality of the external world, and the material univerſe, it will not be without having recourſe to very ſubtile modes of reaſoning, and to abſtruſe diſtinctions, that he can reconcile this ſort of ſcepticiſm with the plain ſenſe and explicit affirmations of the inſpired volume. Moreover, as Chriſtianity, by its characteriſtic temper, diſtaſtes philoſophic refinements of all ſorts, it will reject a theory which tends to introduce a ſpecies of myſticiſm, ſcarcely leſs atheiſtic than the bolder doctrine of the materialiſt. To bring into doubt, in any way (and it is of little moment in what way, or on what pretext), that which the common ſenſe of mankind has always aſſumed to be certain, is—if not to ſhake the evidence of all truth, yet to paralyſe the faculty by which evidence of any kind is ſeized and held. Whether you rob a man of his treaſure, or diſable the hand that graſps it, you do him an equal injury; or perhaps we ſhould ſay that the latter is the worſe wrong of the two.

Our preſent paſſing reference to this controverſy may be diſmiſſed with affirming the probability that it will ere long become totally extinct; for as the atheiſtic materialiſt finds him-

ſelf diſlodged from his too haſtily aſſumed poſition, by a ſcepticiſm more profound and refined than his own, he is not likely again to provoke diſcuſſion on the ſubject; while, on the other hand, the ſpiritualiſt, who would never have entertained or advanced his ſcepticiſm, concerning the external world, if he had not been incited to do ſo, as a ſummary means of dealing with the atheiſt, will no longer have any urgent motive for reviving the argument, after it has been generally confeſſed that philoſophic atheiſm is indefenſible. Thus, as we may fairly hope, the two worlds of matter and mind will henceforward be permitted quietly to coexiſt, as good neighbours and allies.

But be this as it may, the doctrine of the Scriptures concerning the deſtiny of man ſtands untouched:—or, to revert to the argument of St. Paul on the ſubject of the reſurrection, it is altogether independent of any ſuch abſtruſe queſtions, inaſmuch as it is BODY, and not ſpirit about which he is reaſoning. His interrogatories and his replies may be reduced to theſe—Have the dead ceaſed to exiſt? Have thoſe who are fallen aſleep periſhed? No;—for there is a ſpiritual body, and another vehicle of human nature, as well as a natural body; and therefore the diſſolution of this animal ſtructure leaves the LIFE untouched. The animal body is not itſelf the life, nor is it the cauſe of life; nor again is the

ſpiritual body the life, nor the cauſe of it; but the one as well as the other are the inſtruments of the mind, and the neceſſary medium of every productive exerciſe of its faculties.

What the Chriſtian Scriptures then, and St. Paul, ſpecifically affirm, is not any abſtruſe metaphyſical doctrine, concerning mind and matter; but the ſimple phyſiological fact, of two ſpecies of corporeity, deſtined for man; the firſt, that of our preſent animal and diſſoluble organization, which we ſhare, in all its conditions, with the irrational ſentient tribes around us; and the ſecond—a future ſpiritual ſtructure, imperiſhable, and endowed with higher powers, and many deſirable prerogatives.

Now having the ſanction of this inſpired affirmation of theſe two kinds of corporeity, and intending to inquire concerning the probable prerogatives of the future human body; it is natural that we ſhould firſt ſtate what appear to be the eſſential conditions of corporeal exiſtence, whether animal or ſpiritual, ſo that before we come to aſk wherein the ſpiritual body ſhall excel the animal body, we may underſtand what it is in which the two muſt be ſuppoſed to agree.

We aſſume then the reality, and the independence of mind and matter; and yet ſuppoſe that, although intrinſically unlike, and capable of exiſting, the one without the other, nevertheleſs that, as they coexiſt, ſo are they intimately blen-

ded, and reciprocally affect each other within the circle of ſentient and active life. Body, whether animal or ſpiritual, is a third eſſence—a middle nature, and the medium of the reciprocity of the two unlike ſubſtances. Body is the tangential point of the two worlds of mind and matter; or it is the amalgam of two ſubſtances wherein the properties of both are ſo blended as to conſtitute a mean, eſſentially unlike what could have reſulted from any poſſible conſtruction of the one, by itſelf. The body is to the mind the means of a mode of exiſtence, and the organ of an exertion of powers which, in its incorporeal ſtate it could never have known and exerciſed. If, metaphorically ſpeaking, matter is refined and ennobled by its union to mind, it is the mind that is really the advantaged party in the connexion; for it is abſolutely indifferent to matter whether it be left in a groſſer ſtate, or be wrought into a more elaborate form. On the contrary, by compounding itſelf with matter, mind takes poſſeſſion of a world foreign to itſelf; and, in a ſenſe, doubles its powers of action, and extends its ſphere of exiſtence.

CHAPTER II.

The Conditions of Corporeity, whether Animal or Spiritual.

THE blending of mind and matter in the bodily ſtructure of the ſentient and rational orders, we may be aſſured, is a method of procedure which, if it be not abſolutely indiſpenſable to the final purpoſes of the creation, ſubſerves the moſt important ends, and carries with it conſequences ſuch as will make it the general, if not the univerſal law of all finite natures, in all worlds. A little attention to what is involved in the idea of corporeal exiſtence will incline us to believe that it is the baſis of intellectual activity—of moral agency, and of communion or ſociality among intelligent orders.

In ſtating theſe common prerogatives, or conſequences of corporeity, we of courſe leave out of view whatever ſeems proper to animal organization merely; and we then aſcend by abſtraction, as high as we can go, toward the few eſſen-

tial conditions of the combination of mind and matter.

And firſt, without queſtion, we muſt affirm that Body is the neceſſary means of bringing Mind into relationſhip with ſpace and extenſion, and ſo, of giving it—PLACE. Very plainly, a diſembodied ſpirit, or we ought rather to ſay, an unembodied ſpirit, or ſheer mind, is NOWHERE. Place is a relation of extenſion; and extenſion is a property of matter: but that which is wholly abſtracted from matter, and in ſpeaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith, can in itſelf be ſubject to none of its conditions; and we might as well ſay of a pure ſpirit that it is hard, heavy, or red, or that it is a cubic foot in dimenſions, as ſay that it is *here* or *there*, or that it has come, and is gone. It is only in a popular and improper ſenſe that any ſuch affirmation is made concerning the Infinite Spirit, or that we ſpeak of God as *everywhere* preſent. God is in every place in a ſenſe altogether incomprehenſible by finite minds, inaſmuch as his relation to ſpace and extenſion is peculiar to infinitude. Uſing the terms as we uſe them of ourſelves, God is not here or there, any more than he exiſts now and then. Although therefore the idea may not readily be ſeized by every one, we muſt nevertheleſs grant it to be true that, when we talk of abſolute immateri-

ality, and wiſh to withdraw mind altogether from matter, we muſt no longer allow ourſelves to imagine that it is, or that it can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of relationſhip to the viſible and extended univerſe. But in combining itſelf with matter, by the means of a corporeal lodgement, mind brings itſelf into alliance with the various properties of the external world, and takes a ſhare in the conditions of ſolidity, and extenſion. Thenceforward mind occupies one place, at one time, moves from place to place, and may follow other minds, and be followed by others;—it may find and be found; it may be detained, or be ſet at large; it may go to and fro within a narrow circle, or it may traverſe a wide circle; and while, by this ſame means, the material univerſe is opened to its acquaintance, it is alſo itſelf reſtricted in its opportunities of acquiring knowledge by its ſubjection to the laws of gravitation and motion: we may then with ſome degree of confidence, on theſe grounds, regard a corporeal ſtate as indiſpenſable to the exerciſe of active faculties and to a ſcheme of government, and to a ſocial economy.

That which is finite—a finite mind for example—muſt, as we are inclined to think, become ſubject to ſome actual limitations, and muſt undergo ſome ſpecific relations, before its faculties can come into play, or be productive of effects. There is reaſon to conjecture (perhaps ſtronger

terms might be uſed) that none but the Infinite Spirit can be more than a latent eſſence, or inert power, until compacted by ſome ſort of reſtraint. The union with matter, or the coming into a corporeal ſtate, may be, in fact, not a degradation to mind, but the very means of its quickening—its birth into the world of knowledge and action. The firſt conſequence of this birth is, as we have ſaid, the acquirement of locality in the extended univerſe.

But, in the ſecond place, a relationſhip not at all leſs important than the preceding, is undoubtedly dependant upon the union of the mind with matter, or upon its corporeity;—namely, its relationſhip to time.

Conſequences the moſt momentous, and which perhaps we do not often think of, connected as well with our intellectual and active, as with our moral life, attach to our connexion with that equable motion by which duration is at once meaſured, and made ſenſible to us. Nor is it eaſy ſo much as to conceive of a ſocial economy and ſyſtem of government, in a world where all were not held to one and the ſame rate of intellectual movement, through their contemporary periods. Familiar as we are, and have always been, with the equal periods that are marked for us by the celeſtial and telluric revolutions, we think it only natural, and a matter of courſe,

that our individual conſciouſneſs of duration ſhould flow on equably, and that this conſciouſneſs of time in one mind, ſhould pretty nearly keep pace with the ſame feeling in other minds. But a little attention to ſome familiar facts, as well as to the reaſon of the thing, will convince us that, for this equable conſciouſneſs, or perception of the ſteady flow of time, we are wholly indebted to external and artificial means, deprived of which our notion of duration, and our recollection of the ſucceſſive parts of it, would be the moſt variable and illuſory of all the conditions of our exiſtence;—nay, utterly irregular and unfixed, ſo that, according to the ever varying velocity of our mental ſtates, a minute might ſeem a century, or a century a minute. We muſt indeed ſtill, as finite beings, know ourſelves to be flowing along a line, or as exiſting inſtant by inſtant; but we ſhould have no means, either of determining the rate, or of rendering it equable.

Let the reader, by a little effort, imagine himſelf to be totally cut off from all connexion with the clock-work of the material univerſe;—uninformed of the alternations of day and night, and of ſummer and winter—remote from the ſwing of the pendulum, and unconſcious alſo of the beating of the pulſe, of the heaving of the cheſt, of the ſenſations of hunger and ſatiety, of ſleep and wakefulneſs:—in ſuch a ſtate of abſolute ſecluſion from all the mechanical and animal

indices of equable motion—that is to ſay, knowing nothing of time—he muſt very ſoon, or as ſoon as the previouſly acquired habit of the mind had become indiſtinct, ceaſe to be conſcious of any other difference between a long period and a ſhort one, than that which might be derived from the actual equableneſs of his thoughts and emotions; and if theſe at ſome ſeaſons, as in fact they do, followed one the other with incalculable rapidity, while at another ſeaſon a ſingle idea or emotion remained fixed in the mind, there would be no poſſible means of his aſcertaining whether, ſince a certain mental ſtate or epoch, he had exiſted an hour, a day, a year, a century, or a thouſand years. Thus inſulated from equable motion, we ſhould not be able to correct our individual conſciouſneſs of duration by comparing it with that of others under like circumſtances; for while one, by the peculiar conſtitution of his mind, would tell us an eternity had elapſed ſince we laſt conferred with him; another, either more inert, or more addicted to dwell upon abſtractions, would ſay—it was only yeſterday when we compared eras. To MERE MIND, a long period means nothing elſe but a period in which it has paſſed through many and various ſtates with a vivid conſciouſneſs and diſtinct recollection of each; and a ſhort period is one during which few ideas or emotions have ſluggiſhly followed each other, or have intently

engaged it; or, whether few or many, have clean paſſed from the memory. Yet the former may in fact have been only a tenth, or a hundredth part of the latter. Every one's experience in dreaming, or in ſickneſs, may furniſh him with facts illuſtrative of the unfixedneſs and illuſory quality of our conſciouſneſs of duration, when entirely deprived of the external means of collating our mental hiſtory with the regular motions of the material world.

It is motion that meaſures duration, and Time is duration, meaſured into equal parts by the equable motion of bodies through ſpace. But as motion belongs to matter, of which it is a condition, and is that wherein duration and extenſion combine to form a common product, ſo mind muſt become related to extenſion, in order to its having any knowledge of motion, or to its being able to avail itſelf of the meaſurement of duration; in other words, it is only in connexion with matter that it can know anything of time.

Minds embodied, not only learn to meaſure out their own exiſtence equally, and to correct the illuſions of which otherwiſe they would be the ſport, but alſo, by an inſenſible habit, they come to exiſt at a more even velocity, if we may ſo ſpeak, than could elſe be poſſible, and learn unconſciouſly to put a curb upon the exceſſive and dangerous rapidity of thought; while in other caſes a ſpur is ſupplied for the ſluggiſhneſs

of the mind, or a remedy found for its undue fixedneſs; and thus all minds are brought to move together, at nearly the ſame rate; or at leaſt as nearly ſo as is eſſential for ſecuring the order and harmony of the ſocial ſyſtem. We ſhould not indeed be warranted in affirming that mere minds, or unembodied ſpirits, could not, by any means, purely immaterial, become conſcious of the equable lapſe of duration; but we ſee in fact that it is excluſively through the corporeal alliance of mind with the external world, that this important rectification of its conſciouſneſs is effected; nor would it be difficult to ſpecify ſome very momentous conſequences attaching to the government of the moral ſyſtem, that may perhaps be found to reſult from the ſuſpenſion, or from the reſtoration of this means of knowing the lapſe of time. In truth, a ſpeculation of this kind, if purſued in all its bearings, might lead to our taking a new view, not merely of the economy of the human ſyſtem, but of that world of animal life and enjoyment by which we are ſurrounded. We are accuſtomed to take it for granted that all creatures are living at one and the ſame rate, or that they are *going by our clock;* whereas in fact, if we duly conſider the analogies of the ſyſtem of nature, we ſhall ſee reaſon to conjecture that, while perhaps ſome ſpecies of animals are living much ſlower than ourſelves, others may be living inconceivably

faſter. It is by no means unphiloſophical to imagine that the ephemera of a ſummer's noon, which we are apt to pity as ſhort-lived, may, in the compaſs of a few ſunny hours, be running through a century of joyous ſenſations; and if the microſcope, which expoſes to our view the vivacious tenants of a drop of water, had the power alſo of laying open the whirl of the ſentient faculty of theſe tribes, it might appear, to our amazement, that the buſy hiſtory of a thouſand years is condenſed into their life of a day, or an hour, ſo that the diminutiveneſs of their viſible organs would be even leſs aſtoniſhing than the compreſſion of their conſciouſneſs. Theſe ſpeculations are however foreign to our immediate purpoſe.

Nevertheleſs we muſt yet follow them ſo far further, as to point out a not improbable conſequence of the principle upon which the viſible univerſe is conſtructed:—we mean that of the ſubdiviſion of the maſs into ſpheres, revolving in preciſe times; and each world, as it ſeems, being furniſhed with a double or treble meaſurement of time, by its annual and diurnal rotations, by its cycle of ſeaſons, and by the revolution of its ſatellites. In looking abroad upon the thickly peopled fields of ſpace, wherein all worlds are ſeen to be made ſubject to the law of equable motion, who can reſiſt the belief that this ſtupendous machinery (whatever other purpoſes its re-

volutions may ſubſerve) is a vaſt horology—a regiſter of duration, to all rational tribes, and a means, indiſpenſable to the purpoſes of univerſal government, of holding all minds to the due ſymphony of time? As all minds, by the means of corporeity, are connected with extenſion, and are limited to place, ſo are all, by the ſame means, and by the revolution of the worlds they inhabit, bound down to time. There may be intelligent orders, ſo fiery in temperament, that, but for this phyſical check—this neceſſity of keeping pace with the ſlow march of the planetary bodies—they would outrun their term, and leave their ranks in the ſteady movement of the great ſocial ſyſtem. Or are there, on the other hand, any minds ſecluded from the ſight of the viſible heavens, and ſhut out from every means of reckoning years and centuries? Such may be paſſing through a ſtate and proceſs during the continuance of which the perception of time would be no boon.

In the third place, as the corporeal alliance of the mind with matter is ſeen to be in fact the means of expoſing it paſſively to be acted upon by the properties of the material world, and thus of making it liable to pleaſures and pains not proper to itſelf, and to ſome of the moſt intenſe kind; ſo may this connexion be univerſally neceſſary for the ſame end. In truth, the pleaſures

and the pains to which the mind is laid open by its amalgamation with matter in the body, are ſo intenſe as to take the lead, for the moſt part, in determining its active and moral deſtiny. If indeed the mind were not inherently ſuſceptible of impreſſions from the properties of matter, it is not any animal organization that could have rendered it ſo. Nevertheleſs it is probable that ſenſation is the reſult of corporeity, or an effect not taking place apart from that intimate blending of the two alien ſubſtances of which the body is the medium; or it may be only as embodied that the perceptions of the mind become definite and diſtinct. In illuſtration of this alleged conſequence of corporeity, as the neceſſary means of rendering the mind conſcious of the properties of matter, we might refer to the inſtances, ſo frequent in chemical ſcience, in which two ſubſtances remain in juxtapoſition, without in any manner affecting each other, or combining, until the preſence of a third ſubſtance brings their affinities into action. It is thus that the preſence of heat, or of electricity, or of oxygen, or of water, is the means of forming innumerable compounds, or of diſſolving them. And ſo, as there is room to conjecture, the unknown principle of life may be the *third power*, or element, the agency of which brings mind into conſcious connexion with matter, rendering it ſenſible of light, and colours, of heat, ſolidity, ſound, taſtes,

ſmells, motion, and all their variations of intenſity. Embodied, the mind, by a proceſs of natural and involuntary education, becomes familiar with a certain ſet or circle of the properties of the material world; and though ſtill unconſcious, probably, of many other of its properties, yet gains an acquaintance with it in all the points that are important to its preſent welfare; and thus, as in a foreign ſchool, brings its otherwiſe latent faculties into exerciſe. Moreover it is as embodied that the mind comes under the potent diſcipline of organic pleaſures and pains—and how large a portion of its hiſtory hinges upon this ſuſceptibility! There is no reaſon (at leaſt we have no reaſon) to believe that, apart from body, or in a purely incorporeal ſtate, the mind could either enjoy or ſuffer in any other manner than intellectually. Probably the whole of that peremptory and efficacious impulſe which is neceſſary for putting the intellectual and moral faculties in activity, and for maintaining their activity, ſprings from this expoſure of the mind to the ſtimulating properties of matter;—that is to ſay, from its corporeal conſtitution.

But then, and in the fourth place, this ſame intimate connexion between mind and matter, while it expoſes the mind, paſſively, to the influence of the inferior element, becomes, in return, the means of its exerting a power, and how

extenſive and myſterious a power is it, over the ſolid maſſes around it. Mind, embodied, by a ſimple act of volition, originates motion. That is to ſay, its will or deſire, through the inſtrumentality of muſcular contractions, as applied to the body itſelf, or to other bodies, puts it or them in movement. This power of the mind in overcoming the *vis inertiæ* of matter, and the force of gravitation, is the only active influence, in relation to the material world, which we have a certain knowledge of its poſſeſſing; for, as is obvious, the various combinations of ſubſtances that are brought about by the ſkill of man, are all indirectly effected through the inſtrumentality of the muſcular ſyſtem; nor can it be aſcertained whether the chemical changes and aſſimilations that are carried on in the ſecreting glands, and the viſcera, are effected by an unconſcious involuntary mental operation. This organic influence excepted, ſuppoſing it to exiſt, the mechanical power of the mind is the only one it enjoys; but this it enjoys, as we ſhall again have occaſion to obſerve, in no mean degree. It may, without much hazard, be aſſumed that motion, in all inſtances, originates in an immediate volition, either of the Supreme, or of ſome created mind, and that this power is exerted by the latter through the means of a corporeal ſtructure. In what way this ſame power may in future be extended or enhanced, we ſhall ſoon have to enquire.

Hitherto we have conſidered thoſe conſequences or prerogatives of corporeity which have an immediate relation to the material world, and in which conſiſts the mind's direct alliance with matter. But there are other conſequences of this ſame alliance that fall in upon the mind itſelf, and which, if they do not originate ſome of its operations, or modes of feeling, yet modify them to a great extent.

Thus, and in the fifth place, it is to its corporeal connexion with the external world that muſt be attributed the mind's liability to various mixed emotions, as well pleaſurable as painful, of the claſs called imaginative. Theſe emotions, often of the moſt powerful kind, and which are neither merely animal or organic, nor purely intellectual or moral, mingle with all other elements of our nature, and modify, abate, or ſtimulate, every function of the active and moral life. The ſenſe of fitneſs, of beauty, of ſublimity, of terror, of harmony and muſic, and their oppoſites, give riſe, in their various complex forms, to ſentiments and to modes of action ſuch as are ſcarcely more foreign to what belongs to brute life than they are to what might belong to mind in a ſtate of abſolute abſtraction from matter. Each of theſe ſenſibilities and taſtes, with its endleſs combinations, is, in a ſenſe, a product of the material univerſe, and is directly conſequent upon a corporeal mode of exiſtence.

The imaginative ſentiments might perhaps, at a firſt view, be regarded as adapted to a temporary purpoſe only, inaſmuch as they conſtitute a reconciling medium between the animal and the intellectual principles. But, in conſidering them further, it appears that they go beyond this lower office, and in fact mingle themſelves with the very higheſt and pureſt of our moral feelings. We ought then to reckon them among the noble and permanent elements of our nature, and ſo muſt aſſume that they will belong to the ſpiritual, as they have belonged to the animal body. If man were animal only, he would neither need, nor indeed could he poſſeſs, an imaginative faculty; or, on the other hand, if he were rational only, or moral only, the claſs of ſentiments that ariſe from this faculty he would ſpurn (could he even conceive of them) as degrading, or as illuſory;—inaſmuch as they preſent ſomething which is either more, or which is leſs than abſolute truth, reaſon, and rectitude. Or if man, being at once animal, moral, and rational, were yet wholly deſtitute of imagination and of its ſenſibilities, he would painfully want harmony and combination: and he would be compelled, every hour, to paſs, with a ſhocking abruptneſs, from one mode of exiſtence, and from one principle of life to another, without the aid of any tranſition-feelings. But as we are actually conſtituted, we find within the circle of

our mental economy nothing ſo purely rational (not even mathematical truth), and nothing ſo ſimply moral, as not, through the medium of imaginative taſtes, to be brought into alliance, remotely at leaſt, with our animal ſenſations; nor, on the other hand, is there anything ſo merely ſenſual as not to be, in ſome meaſure, relieved, ennobled, or graced, by an intermixture of ideas of beauty and order. Now the body, with its ſenſibilities, is manifeſtly the means of effecting this harmony of the various elements of our mental conſtitution, and ſo of generating complex ſentiments of a ſort which we ſhould moſt reluctantly lay aſide, even although the primary purpoſe they were intended to ſubſerve, in relation to the preſent life, were ſuperſeded.

Our ſpeculation muſt not haſtily be condemned as a mere ſubtilty, when we aſſume it to be probable that the correſpondence of finite minds with the Infinite Mind needs to be attempered by an admixture of thoſe imaginative ſentiments which take their riſe from the corporeal conſtitution. Thoſe organic and quelling impreſſions of beauty, ſublimity, majeſty, and thoſe feelings of awe, and of ecſtacy, and that adoration in which a latent dread or terror imparts intenſity to the happier feeling of affection—all theſe mixed emotions ſhall perhaps be found neceſſary, as well for keeping finite minds in the place that becomes them, as for enabling them to ſuſtain the immediate

preſence of the bright and abſolute perfection. The imaginative ſentiments may thus ſerve at once to facilitate a nearer approach to the ineffable glory than would otherwiſe have been poſſible, and to fence off the mount of viſion, if we may ſo ſpeak, againſt dangerous intruſions. If this conjecture be well founded, we may be inclined to ſuppoſe that all rational orders are made to commence their courſe under the condition of animal organization, wherein they may become thoroughly imbued with theſe imaginative ſentiments, which, in a refined form, they are to carry on with them throughout their immortality. Does this conjecture receive ſupport from the apoſtolic doctrine—"There are bodies celeſtial, and bodies terreſtrial—there is a natural body—and a ſpiritual body—Howbeit *that is not firſt* which is ſpiritual, but that which is *natural;* and *afterward* that which is ſpiritual." This order, or regular proceſs, this tranſition, is it the univerſal law of the intelligent creation?

Not to multiply diſtinctions, and leſt we ſhould ſeem to refine too much, we may claſs under this ſame head, thoſe various modifications of the moral ſentiments, both in the way of abatement and of enhancement, which ariſe from our corporeal ſympathies and animal deſires. Neither love nor anger, nor the ſenſe of juſtice, nor the emotion of pity, neither ſhame, remorſe, hatred,

amity, ambition, humility, hope, or fear, is what it would have been if there had been no concomitant organic ſenſations. Theſe emotions of the moral nature, and eſpecially when they come to form habits or diſpoſitions, and conſtitute individual character, are unqueſtionably modified, to a very great extent, by the peculiarities of the phyſical temperament; and hence ariſe various modes of feeling, of a complex kind, which muſt be traced to the body, as their ſource. Now even if theſe phyſical modifications of the moral nature might be dropped with the diſſolution of the animal frame, ſo that the moral ſentiments ſhould return to an elementary ſtate, it is not certain that we ſhould be gainers by the change: on the contrary, it is eaſy to imagine that a new power and intenſity, a vividneſs and a ſpring ſhall be imparted to the moral principles from their ſympathy with the organic energies of the ſpiritual body. At preſent we are conſcious of the fact that activity and force are infuſed into the moral ſentiments, even the moſt exalted of them, by their alliance with animal ſenſations; it is ſo with the domeſtic affections, and with general benevolence, and pity, courage, and ambition: the rule of analogy therefore leads us to ſuppoſe that ſimilar effects will follow from a ſimilar combination, in the future conſtruction of human nature.

Once more, and in the ſixth place, the corporeal alliance of mind and matter is, in the preſent ſtate, and, as we may ſtrongly conjecture, it will be, the means of ſo defining our individuality in relation to others, as is neceſſary for bringing minds under the conditions of a ſocial economy. The purpoſes of ſuch a ſyſtem demand, in the firſt place, what may be called the ſeclusion, or the inſulation of each ſpirit; or its impenetrability by other ſpirits. Communication and exchange of thought muſt, under any plan of free agency, be voluntary; there muſt reſt with each member of the community a power of reſerve; and then, the means of communication, being arbitrary, muſt be abſolutely under the command of the individual. Now the body is not the open bower or tent of the ſoul into which any one may walk at pleaſure; but it is its caſtle, from which all other minds may, at pleaſure, be excluded. Perhaps unembodied ſpirits (if ſuch there be) may lie open to inſpection, or may be liable to invaſion, like an unfenced field, or a plot of common land. But although ſuch a ſtate of expoſure might involve no harm to beings abſolutely good, or abſolutely evil, we cannot imagine it to conſiſt with the ſafety or dignity of beings like man; or indeed to be proper to a mixed economy.

But further; a ſocial ſyſtem demands the means of immediate recognition individually;

and this, in the preſent ſtate, is provided for by the endleſs, yet diſtinct peculiarities of bodily conformation, and by that law of the animal organization which gives to each peculiarity of the mind, and temper, and temperament, a characteriſtic exterior expreſſion. It muſt not be poſitively affirmed that theſe purpoſes could not, in the nature of things, be ſecured without the aid of a corporeal ſtructure; yet there is ſome reaſon to queſtion whether ſheer ſpirits could (except by immediate acts of the divine power) be individually dealt with, and governed, or could be known and employed, or could be followed and detained, or could form laſting aſſociations, and be moulded into hierarchies and polities, or could ſuſtain office, and yield obedience, in any certain manner, if at all. At leaſt it is true that all theſe functions and ſocial ends are now in fact dependent upon corporeity; and it is only fair to aſſume that they demand a bodily ſtructure in every caſe where minds are to live and act in concert with others.

The ſuppoſition has already been advanced that the definite or productive agency of finite natures demands that mind be compacted, or bound down to thoſe conditions of limitation which attach to matter, and which mind undergoes in becoming allied to matter. Now the ſame principle, if it be good, muſt imply, and even more clearly, this ſame limitation of minds,

as the condition of their being definitely related one to another, and of their acting one upon another, and one with another. We imagine then, that by the medium of corporeity, the mind is *defined*, and that its powers are rendered applicable to definite purpoſes.

In thus naming what appear to be the common conditions or prerogatives of corporeal exiſtence, whether natural or ſpiritual, we of courſe do not include any of thoſe adjuncts of the preſent life which make part of our animal organization merely, and which may readily be conceived of as dropped, along with the periſhable body. After ſetting off all ſuch temporary faculties of the body, and which are ſubſervient only to the well being of the animal ſtructure itſelf—to its preſervation, or to its reproduction, we reach thoſe properties or conſequences of the corporeal conſtitution which are directly ſubſervient to the mind, and which may therefore, on good grounds, be regarded as belonging to corporeity abſtractedly, and which are likely to attach to the future ſpiritual body. Such, manifeſtly, are—the occupation of place, or a relationſhip to ſpace and extenſion—the conſciouſneſs of equable motion, or a knowledge of time —the conſciouſneſs of the properties of matter, or ſenſation—an active power over matter, to originate motion—the ſuſceptibility to imagina-

tive emotions, and to mixed moral ſentiments—and a defined, recognizable individuality.

Beſides theſe properties or conſequences of the corporeal union of mind and matter, as above deſcribed, others of a more abſtruſe kind might be named which affect the proceſſes of reaſoning; but it may be better to confine ourſelves, at preſent, to what is the moſt ſimple and indiſputable, and eſpecially becauſe fit opportunities will ariſe, in purſuing our inquiry, for adverting to ſome of theſe more intricate ſubjects. In truth a ſtrict analyſis of our mental operations would hardly leave one free from a reaſonable ſuppoſition of being extenſively modified by the interaction of mind and body, or of being what it is in conſequence of the dependence of the mind upon the organization and functions of the brain. Plainly it is ſo with the memory, with the aſſociation of ideas, with the power of attention, with the proceſſes of compariſon, calculation and reaſoning, and with the inventive faculty, and the perception of analogies.

Having thus inquired what it is which ought to be attributed in common to the animal and to the ſpiritual body, and which muſt belong as well to the future as to the preſent lodgement of the human mind, we are next to aſk (on the ground of phyſical probability) what it is wherein the difference between the one and the other will conſiſt; or in other words, what are likely

to be the prerogatives of the latter, as compared with the former; or in what manner the actual powers of the preſent ſtructure of human nature may be conceived of as expanded or advantaged, conſiſtently with thoſe great principles of analogy which we find to attach to the divine operations in all their departments.

CHAPTER III.

The Probable Prerogatives of Spiritual Corporeity, as compared with Animal Organization:—the firſt of thoſe Prerogatives.

IN now approaching the hypothetical part of our ſubject, I muſt again remind the reader of the important diſtinction between the mere creations of the imagination, and the legitimate reſults of analyſis and abſtraction. Plainly it is not the imagination that can render us aid in conceiving of a new and different mode of exiſtence; ſince this faculty is but the mirror of the world around it, and muſt draw all its materials from things actually known. It may exalt, refine, ennoble, enrich what it finds; and it may ſhed over all the ſplendour of an effulgence ſuch as earth never actually ſees; yet it muſt end where it began, in compounding elements, and in recombining forms, furniſhed to its hand; and if ever it goes, or ſeems to go, beyond theſe limits, the product is groteſque or

abſurd, not beautiful: there is no grace or charm in that which trenches upon the actual forms of nature. But the faculty of analyſis may boldly, and ſafely, outſtep the imagination; and it may, by a careful examination of the conſtituents of human nature, conſidered in their abſtract value, be able, in accordance with ſound principles of analogy, to point out other modes of conſtruction, ſuch as, while they imply only ſmall actual changes of form, involve high prerogatives. In ſome of theſe inſtances it may not be difficult to aſſign a reaſon why ſuch prerogatives ſhould not have been granted to man, in his preſent condition; and yet it may be equally eaſy to ſhow that they are abſtractedly poſſible, and that they are compatible one with another, and that they comport with the probable purpoſes of a higher range of intellectual and moral life.

And be it always remembered that, although hypotheſis is not truth—or we ſhould rather ſay, is not truth aſcertained—yet, when legitimately uſed, it is the moſt ready and effective of all the means in our power for acquiring truth. It is by hypotheſis, framed with at once a bold and a cautious ſagacity, that the boundaries of ſcience are extended: and it is in the uſe of this method that facts and principles which once ſeemed to be placed far beyond the reach of human intelligence, have at length been brought to form a part of our well-eſtabliſhed modern philoſophy.

At the leaſt, or where nothing can be done beyond the mere ſtatement of a rational and conſiſtent theory, this, while carefully kept apart from matters of certainty and faith, may ſerve the important purpoſes, firſt, of ſuperſeding a multitude of difficulties, themſelves drawn from hypothetical ſources; and ſecondly, of affording a proviſional aid to meditative minds, in looſening from things ſenſual and temporary, and in bringing vividly home to their convictions the bright expectation of a future and undecaying felicity.

Nothing can be more abſurd than the ſuppoſition that any efforts of the mind, how ſtrenuous ſoever, can enable it to conceive, even in the fainteſt manner, of a mode of exiſtence eſſentially and totally unlike our actual mode of life; for this were to imagine ourſelves to be endowed with a real creative faculty. But the taſk we now undertake, although arduous, is altogether of another ſort; inaſmuch as it is propoſed to ſpecify the conditions of a mode of exiſtence, differing from the preſent *as little as may be*, and yet in a manner that ſhall ſecure the higheſt advantages. On a line of conjecture like this, ſobriety may be miſtreſs of our courſe, nor need we ſet a ſingle ſtep, without a ſufficient reaſon for the direction we take. That the principle of analogy will hold good, in connecting the preſent with the future conſtitution of human na-

ture, is a perſuaſion which, while the material univerſe is before us, it is ſcarcely poſſible to reſiſt: and that ſuch an analogy will actually run on from the preſent to the future, the language of Scripture plainly implies. But if ſo, then it cannot be thought a hopeleſs taſk to trace the rudiments at leaſt of the future, amid the elements of the preſent life. Our part then is to examine, in ſucceſſion, the ſeveral conſtituents of our corporeal exiſtence, and to conſider of what extenſions each faculty may be ſuſceptible, or how it might be ſet at large from the limitations that actually confine it.

We take perhaps the moſt acceſſible path on this field of hypotheſis by conſidering, in the firſt place, the leaſt intellectual of the faculties of the mind—namely, its power to originate motion—a power ſhared by all claſſes of beings that give evidence of conſciouſneſs, or ſenſation. Wherever there is feeling, there is alſo muſcular power, and will. Now this power, myſterious as it is, may be conceived of as applied in a very different manner, and ſo as to involve a great and deſirable extenſion of our range of corporeal activity and enjoyment. It was an ancient opinion, to which modern philoſophy alſo inclines—that motion, in every caſe, is the product of mind, and that though tranſmitted and continued through various means, it never commences except in a voli-

tion, either of the Supreme Mind, or of created minds. This doctrine may well have been ſuggeſted by our conſciouſneſs, with which it exactly comports. The mere volition is followed by muſcular action, and the proceſs is abſolutely ſimple and inſtantaneous; nor does any thought of the phyſical apparatus—the muſcular contractions, the tendinous attachments, or the bony fulcra—enter into the mental operation. In fact the power of the mind over matter involves no *proceſs* at all; there is no circuit of acts or preparations: motion follows will, juſt as perception follows the impact of vibrations—without an interval: will and motion are immediately conjoined, and the organic and mechanical ſtructure by which it is effected are modes only through which the power of the mind is defined, and is directed in a particular line of movement.

The *vis inertiæ* of matter, the tendency of gravitation, and the reſiſtance of the atmoſphere, or of more denſe fluids, are all inſtantaneouſly overcome by a direct mechanical force—a force which is not that of bones, tendons, and muſcular fibres; but, the force of mind. Bones, tendons, nerves, and muſcles, do in fact come between mind and the extraneous maſs; but it is as inſtruments only, and as a ſtaff or a chord intervenes between the hand and the body that is moved by it. The expanſive force of heat, as applied in the vaporization of water, is not a more direct mechanical

force than is the impulſive power of the mind in man and other locomotive animals. We are accuſtomed, indeed, to ſay that the mind acts mechanically, only by exciting muſcular irritability, and the tenſion of fibres. But is not this aſſumption gratuitous? Our conſciouſneſs does not ſuggeſt any ſuch belief:—in rapidly and forcibly moving the hand—in ſtriking a blow, we know nothing of contractile fibres, or of muſcles, or of a circuitous deſpatching of orders from the mind to the brain, and from the brain along the nervous chords, to ſuch and ſuch muſcles, as the caſe may demand. The mind is in the hand, or the arm, and there it originates the motion; it is not—or not if our conſciouſneſs ſpeak true—in the anatomical or phyſiological mechaniſm. This complex apparatus performs its part, at the moment when called upon, with as little of our control or interference as the heart, and the inteſtines, and the liver, perform their conſtant offices.

Nor is the mechanical power of the mind of a ſlender or evaneſcent ſort, like certain barely perceptible magnetic influences, which, although they may juſt be detected in a nicely conducted and elaborate experiment, elude common obſervation, and are incapable of being ſo far enhanced as to propel the ſmalleſt ſolid maſs. The mind impels matter with the celerity of lightning, and with a force that is bounded, as it

ſeems, only by the adheſive ſtrength of the engine it employs; that is to ſay, by the ſolidity of the bones, the tenacity of the ligatures and tendons, and by the degree in which the irritability of the fleſhy ſubſtance may be wrought upon. That the inherent power of the mind is in fact limited by the ſtrength of the materials it employs (juſt as the expanſive force of ſteam is limited only by the ſtrength of copper and iron) becomes evident in thoſe inſtances in which, from want of due caution, it actually breaks up or rends its own animal machinery. Acting through the medium of a lever of that ſort in which velocity is gained at the coſt of power, it yet puts in motion maſſes greater in bulk and heavier than the animal frame; and were the whole muſcular energy of a robuſt man to be applied in one direction and through the means of a lever of the firſt order, it would be ſufficient to cruſh or to burſt far ſtronger materials than thoſe which compoſe the animal body. An habitual and unconſcious diſcretion is, in truth, acquired early in life, which checks our muſcular efforts, and leads us to refrain from the full exertion of the power we might exert, leſt injury ſhould be done to the vaſcular ſyſtem, or to the tendons, or to the ligatures and faſcia.

A man in full health is capable of far greater efforts than he ordinarily permits himſelf to make; and when this habitual reſtraint is thrown

aſide, as in caſes of ſudden peril, or of delirium and madneſs, the inherent mechanical force of mind is diſplayed, and it is ſeen that one lunatic, or one deſperate man, exerts a power with which five or ſix in their ordinary ſenſes can hardly cope. This ſame force, otherwiſe applied, would be enough, and much more than enough, to overcome the *vis inertiæ* and the gravitation of the body, and to impart to it a velocity greater than that of the ſwifteſt of birds.

Furthermore, in the animal ſtructure the force of the mind is limited, not only in its *amount* by the ſtrength of the organic materials, but in its *direction* alſo by the ſyſtem of articulation, and by the ſpecific arrangement of the muſcles. A door, however impelled, can only revolve on its hinges: the piſton can play perpendicularly only; and the limbs have their appointed movement—prone or ſupine, lateral or rotatory, and always in conformity with a definite mechaniſm. One part of this mechaniſm conſiſts of the nervous communication between the limb and the brain. Sever or tie the nervous chord, and the muſcles no longer receive from the cerebral maſs or ſpinal proceſs that pabulum of irritability which they require: the mind, in that caſe, does not take effect upon the limb—the limb wanting its galvanic excitement. It may be ſaid indeed that the nervous chord is the channel, not

of muſcular excitement, but of *volition*, which, taking place in the brain, is ſuppoſed to run along the thread, conveying itſelf duly to this, that, and the other muſcles, to flectors, pronators, ſupinators, &c. as may be needed for the performance of the intended movement. But how is any ſuch gratuitous ſuppoſition proved, or even made to appear probable? All we are conſcious of is—the volition; and all we learn from phyſiology is, that muſcular contraction requires a certain galvanic influence, of which the brain appears to be the ſecreting viſcus, and the nerves, the channel. The hand cannot follow the mind unleſs it be conſtantly ſupplied with blood by the heart, and with galvanic excitement by the brain; nor can the ſtomach digeſt food unleſs, in the ſame manner, it be ſupplied with both, from the heart, and from the brain: but it is not the heart that digeſts the food, nor is it the brain that digeſts it; but the living aſſimilative power, with its ſolvents, in the coats of the ſtomach; and thus, as we ſuppoſe, it is not the brain that moves the hand, in any other ſenſe than that in which it may be ſaid that the heart does ſo; although the functions of both are indiſpenſable to motion; but it is the mind, preſent in the hand and arm, that is really the moving power.

But the inference we have in view, in connexion with our immediate ſubject, is not de-

pendent upon any hypotheſis we may adopt concerning the occult proceſs of muſcular movement; for whether we ſuppoſe, as I am inclined to do, that the mind impels the limb immediately, and that the influence derived from the brain, through the nervous chord, is ſubſidiary only; or whether we think that volition, affecting the brain immediately, is thence conveyed to the muſcles, it will ſtill be true that mind puts matter in movement; only under the laſt named ſuppoſition the influence muſt be conſidered as chemical; whereas, on the former ſuppoſition, it is ſimply mechanical. In the one caſe, as well as the other, inert matter is put into vehement action, and it is quite as eaſy to conceive of the one ſpecies of movement, as of the other, as originated by the mind.

We are then free to adopt the hypotheſis, which ſeems the ſimpler of the two, namely, that animal motion ſprings immediately from the inherent mechanical power of the mind over matter, which it impels at will, hither and thither, with a velocity like that of light, and with a force that, ſo far as we know, is limited only by the tenacity of the tendinous chords, and by the ſtrength of the coats of the veſſels.

But in like manner as ſenſation is confined, in the animal organization, to particular points, or to ſurfaces of nervous excitability; ſo is the mechanical force of the mind reſtricted to thoſe

flexions and rotations which the joints will admit of, and which the muſcles may perform. Nothing more therefore can be done by a machinery ſuch as this, but change the relative poſition of the limbs, and ſo, by throwing the centre of gravity forward or backward, on this ſide or on that, to effect locomotion. The flight of birds, the ſwimming of fiſhes, and the walking, running, and leaping of land animals are mere adaptations of an altered relative poſition of the limbs, taking effect ſuddenly and forcibly upon reſiſting bodies.

Let it, however, be ſuppoſed that muſcular action takes place in the mode of chemical excitement, which we have ſtated; and in this caſe it is eaſy to conceive of the very ſame power (nor need it be greater) acting upon, or through the medium of, a corporeal ſtructure abſolutely infrangible, and indeſtructible: and it would then ſuffice for effecting locomotion by impulſion upon a reſiſting medium in a manner analogous to the flight of birds, but greatly ſurpaſſing it in velocity. This ſuppoſition, though eaſily admitted, I ſhould not entertain; but ſhould prefer the hypotheſis that, in the future ſpiritual body, whether or not the mechanical apparatus is to be altogether ſuperſeded, the entire corporeal maſs ſhall be liable to a plenary mental influence, equably diffuſed, and although ſtill ſubject to the

vis inertiæ and gravitation that are proper to matter, that both ſhall be overcome, at will, by the embodied mind, ſo that the locomotion of the whole ſhall follow volition, as now the relative motion of the limbs follows it. This implies nothing more than the ſetting the inherent mechanical power of the mind at large, and the breaking up its reſtriction to the muſcular ſtructure, and the oſſeous articulations. A body thus informed throughout, by the energy of mind, might be either ſubtile and ethereal, like the magnetic fluid; or it might be as denſe and ponderous as gold, or as adamant; for the moſt elaſtic gas is not in itſelf at all more ſelf-motive than a block of granite; and it is a mere illuſion to imagine that the one might more readily be affected by the volitions of mind than the other. The ſeraph who ſteers his courſe at pleaſure from ſun to ſun, and who overtakes the ſwifteſt of the planets in its orbit, may corporeally poſſeſs an inviſible and imponderable ether, or (which is equally credible) he may command a gigantic body, ſolid as porphyry. The two ſuppoſitions ſtand on the ſame ground of abſtract probability; for matter, in relation to mind, is one and the ſame, and is always inert and paſſive.

The firſt article then of our hypotheſis concerning the future ſpiritual body, involves nothing more than an extenſion of a power now actually exerted by the mind, and which is eaſily

conceived of as ſet free from its muſcular reſtrictions, in ſuch a manner as ſhould allow of locomotion by ſimple volition, as well as of the power to put external maſſes in movement. Nevertheleſs, inaſmuch as a corporeal ſtructure muſt involve the limitations that attach neceſſarily to matter, it may well be ſuppoſed that this locomotive faculty, how wide ſoever its range, will yet be—a force related to other forces, and counterpoiſed by a definite reſiſtance;—it will have its calculable velocity, and its limit, which it will not paſs.

A fit occaſion will preſent itſelf in the following pages, for adverting to the probable uſes and conſequences of this enlarged power of locomotion; but that it actually awaits human nature might be plauſibly inferred on the ground that the muſcular force is now felt to be—a power reſtrained; that is to ſay, a faculty equal to much more than is as yet permitted to it: and perhaps, with not a few individuals, the conſcious muſcular energy is ſtrictly analogous to that of a ſtrong man fettered and handcuffed, who meditates what he will do when ſet at large. Is there not a latent, or a half latent inſtinct in the mind which ſpeaks of a future liberty of ranging at will through ſpace? There are ſome, perhaps, who will admit that they have indiſtinct anticipations of this ſort, quite as ſtrong as are thoſe moral

and intellectual aſpirations after immortality which have been conſidered good preſumptive proofs of the reality of a future life. The author would be very ſlow to ſeek ſupport to an argument, ſuch as the one now in hand, from ſcriptural expreſſions which, probably, ought to be interpreted in a ſpiritual ſenſe only; he will therefore merely name the often quoted paſſage (Iſaiah xl. 31,) as *poſſibly* having a ſecondary reference to the future corporeal powers of the ſons of God.—"They ſhall renew their ſtrength—they ſhall mount up with wings as eagles; they ſhall run, and not be weary, they ſhall walk, and not faint."

CHAPTER IV.

The Second and Third ſuppoſed Prerogatives of the Spiritual Economy.

THUS far our hypotheſis trenches very little upon the ground of mere conjecture, and it would be eaſy to go on in the ſame direction, imagining the mind, in its new corporeal lodgement, to gain a power over ſome other of the properties of matter, beſides the *vis inertiæ* and gravitation; and that it may be able to put in activity certain chemical affinities. Of this ſuppoſed influence we find what is very nearly an actual inſtance, or, at the leaſt, an indication, in the chemical aſſimilations, and the ſecreting functions, which belong to animal life, and which, if not immediately effected by an unconſcious mental agency, are unqueſtionably to a great extent under the influence of the mind, acting upon them in the way, ſometimes of acceleration, and ſometimes of abatement. Animal life, in its various functions, or that myſterious energy

which we name, but can never define, and never expoſe to view, may perhaps conſiſt in the power of mind over ſuch of the properties of matter as may be made available for the purpoſes of animal organization. Mind, allied to matter, unconſciouſly indeed, but as directed by the creative energy, combines or diſſolves, takes up or rejects, the elements with which it comes in contact, and thus lives, if we might ſo ſpeak, by its own diſcretive act. Now this ſame power over the chemical affinities of matter, may, like the power of the mind over maſſes of matter, be enlarged in another ſtate. But we leave this conjecture, and paſs on.

Nothing, however, can be more natural than the ſuppoſition that the paſſive power of the mind, or its conſciouſneſs of ſome of the properties of matter through the ſenſes, ſhall, in the future corporeal frame, be made to include other of thoſe properties. The mind, as we have already obſerved, is no doubt inherently percipient of light, heat, ſound, ſolidity, as well as of the ſeveral properties that affect the olfactory and guſtatory organs: for if it were not ſo, there is no reaſon to believe that any organic apparatus —any expanſion of nervous filaments, could endue it with this faculty. On the ſame ground we aſſume the mind to poſſeſs an inherent or eſſential mechanical force; yet a force that can

be exerted only through the inſtrumentality of a corporeal ſtructure. But as the ſeveral ſpecies of perception are rendered diſtinct, and are adapted to the various purpoſes of animal and rational life by being ſeparately attached, each to its organ, theſe contrivances, admirable as they are, muſt be regarded as ſo many limitations of the general percipient faculty of the mind, and as reſtricting it, as well in regard to the extent and the delicacy of its perceptions, as to the variety or kinds of them. The organs of ſenſe are particular adjuſtments of nervous ſenſibility, intended to concentrate the mind, at different times, upon ſingle properties of the external world, with a view to the better ſecuring of definite purpoſes. The ſenſes are *adits* of knowledge; and becauſe adits, therefore excluſive and reſtrictive means of information. It is upon the retina, and there only, that the mind converſes with light and colours: it is within the tympanum, and there only, that the mind converſes with the modulated vibrations of the air: it is upon the tongue that it diſcriminates certain chemical differences of the ſubſtances to be taken into the ſtomach. But we cannot ſuppoſe that, abſtractedly, theſe ſeveral properties might not affect the mind in any other mode, or at any other points; doubtleſs it might bring its percipient faculty into contact with theſe properties of matter more at large and under fewer limita-

tions; and it might alſo gain acquaintance with other properties than thoſe to which the five organs of ſenſation extend. We may eaſily ſuppoſe the medullary ſubſtance to be laid open to ſenſation otherwiſe than it actually is, and alſo to be endued with a more exquiſite or refined ſenſibility. The diſcrimination of colours, through the touch, by the blind, and the many inſtances that have occurred in which the want of one or more of the ſenſes has been compenſated by an enhanced ſenſibility of the remaining organs, afford proof enough, or as we ſhould perhaps ſay, give indication, of what may be called the verſatility of the percipient faculty, and they eſtabliſh the fact that this power is inherently much greater than, under ordinary circumſtances, it ſeems to be.

The animal organization, with its medullary maſs and its nervous expanſions, may be regarded, not merely as a means of ſenſation, but as a means of abatement, or if it were as a ſheath, defending the percipient faculty of the mind, except at certain points, from the too forcible impreſſions which would otherwiſe be made upon it by the external world. The body, as we ſuppoſe, is to the mind an envelop, or a rough coating, which ſerves to prevent its being either overborne, or unduly ſtimulated by the otherwiſe continuous influx of various and powerful excitements. The mind perhaps, in this its preſent initial ſtage of

exiſtence, might ſcarcely be able to aſſert its rational ſupremacy, or to exerciſe its proper, intellectual, and moral functions, if it were expoſed to as much ſenſation as it is inherently capable of receiving. But in its next ſtage of life, and when its active and higher principles have become mature, it may be well able to ſuſtain, and advantageouſly to uſe, a much more ample correſpondence with the material world than would now be good, or even poſſible.

The boldeſt ſuppoſition we can entertain, on this ſubject, ought not to be regarded as unphiloſophical or extravagant, while we have ſo many proofs before us of thoſe vaſt extenſions of our means of knowledge that have accrued from the improvement of the merely mechanical aids of the ſenſes. Let the well known facts be ſimply ſtated and duly conſidered. The neareſt of the fixed ſtars is at a greater diſtance from our ſyſtem than 19,200,000,000,000 miles, and the moſt remote of thoſe that are *diſtinctly viſible* by the teleſcope, are probably twice that diſtance, or much more. Nevertheleſs the tranſmiſſion of light through that incalculable ſpace is exact and preciſe; and when, by the means of the refracting power of ſome few lenſes, the remote object is made to ſubtend a larger angle than it does to the naked eye, then the eye with eaſe converſes with that object, and perceives that what ſeemed one, is actually two ſtars, and that theſe two re-

volve around a common centre of gravity; and moreover, that the curve they move in is not a circle, but an ellipſe. Thus this infinitely ſmall difference between one kind of orbit and another, has actually become perceptible to the human eye. It is manifeſt therefore that, as well the materials of knowledge, as the faculty of knowing, are immenſely more extenſive than, to the unaſſiſted ſenſes, they appear. Now it cannot be deemed extravagant to ſuppoſe that, inſtead of the aid furniſhed to the eye by the teleſcope, the percipient faculty itſelf might be ſo expoſed to the emanations or vibrations of light, as to be able to diſtinguiſh at once, what now it does diſtinguiſh by the aid of refraction. And if it might do this, who ſhall ſay it might not do ſtill more? Is it philoſophical to place any limit to the range of perception? we think not; and, on the contrary, regard it as altogether a probable ſuppoſition, that the ſame mind, which now diſcerns ſpheres, and diſtinguiſhes their motion at a diſtance incalculably remote, may hereafter be ſo advantaged, in its organic ſtructure, as to diſcern bodies, and their movements, on the ſurfaces of the planets of our ſyſtem, near as they are to us comparatively. If this be a wild hypotheſis, it is an hypotheſis like that which aſſumes that the infant who now croſſes the nurſery, may in time, and by the uſe of the very ſame locomotive powers, perambulate the globe.

The actual diſcoveries of modern ſcience are ſuch as to render everything credible which can be proved to come within the compaſs of analogy.

Whatever is true, or may be made to appear probable, in relation to viſion, may be aſſumed, *mutatis mutandis*, in relation to the other ſenſes; and it is not needful here to inſiſt upon the particulars. Our principle is—That perception is, at preſent, a circumſcribed faculty; and we rationally anticipate an era when it ſhall throw off its confinements, and converſe at large with the material univerſe, and find itſelf familiarly at home in the height and breadth of the heavens.

The five ſenſes, we have ſaid, may be regarded as limiting the percipient faculty, not merely as to the amount or extent of the impreſſions we receive, but in regard alſo to the kinds of ſenſation which the mind may be inherently capable of admitting. By the means of theſe ſenſes we become acquainted with ſome few of the properties of matter; but at the moſt it is only a few, and the intimate reſearches of our modern phyſical ſcience leave no room to doubt that there are many agencies in activity about us, which, although they make themſelves known in their ultimate conſequences, are not directly cognizable either by the eye, the ear, the touch, the taſte, or the ſmell. The external world, as at preſent perceptible to man, in five ſpecies, may, to other ſentient natures, be perceptible in

twenty, or in fifty kinds. If the mind may know the difference of hot and cold, hard and ſoft, loud or harſh and melodious, red and yellow, ſweet and bitter; it may diſcriminate other differences, or qualities that belong to matter, or every other ſuch quality. In truth it is more eaſy to conceive of the mind as converſant with all properties of the external world, than as converſant with ſome, while it is inſenſible of others. Mind, as we have ſaid, muſt be natively conſcious of the vibratory, emanative, and pungent powers of the external world; but if ſo, then we may aſſume that it only needs to be freed from the huſk of animal organization, to know, on all ſides and perfectly, that which now it knows at points only, and in an abated degree. The ancient philoſophy ſuppoſed there to be four elements, or perhaps a fifth; but we now reckon fifty; and in like manner as now we think of five ſpecies of perception, hereafter we may become familiar with a hundred, or a thouſand.

Yet this is not all that may fairly be aſſumed as probable, and as ſtrictly analogous to our preſent powers—mere conjecture not admitted. The ſenſes, ſuch as they are under the preſent animal organization, in no inſtance go further than to give us information concerning the laſt product of certain combined qualities or conditions of matter. Thus, for example, we perceive colours,

but we know nothing (by the ſenſe of ſight) of that ſtate of the ſurfaces of bodies, the effect of which is that they imbibe ſome of the elements of light, and throw off others: the petals of the poppy imbibe and aſſimilate the yellow and the blue, and with a moſt deciſive antipathy reject the fierce red of the ſun's rays; while again the gentle violet cheriſhes the more powerful element of light, and refuſes the pale and feeble. So do the chemical qualities of ſubſtances affect the tongue and palate, and the membranes of the noſe, with a certain product of their combination; but this combination itſelf, and its ingredients, and the reaſon of its affinity, remain occult. But it is conceivable that this INNER FORM of matter, as it has been termed, may, as well as the external ſpecies, be perceptible, ſo that the ſpecific cauſe of ſolidity, fluidity, cryſtallization, decompoſition, colour, taſte, ſmell, muſical relation, and other ſtates, movements, and tranſitions of matter, may be as immediately perceptible as are now the ulterior products of thoſe ſtates. Thus, beſides knowing effects, we ſhould alſo know cauſes; or, to ſpeak more correctly, we ſhould be able to trace forms and affinities, a ſtage or two higher than now we can. Inſtead of looking only at the dial-plate of nature, and of noting the hands and the figures, we ſhould be admitted to inſpect the wheel-work and the ſprings; and this inner perception of

real forms might well conſiſt with the ſimultaneous perception of external ſpecies; juſt as our diſſection of an animal does not prevent or ſuperſede our diſcernment of its form.

The material univerſe (and the ſame, with ſtill more meaning, may be ſaid of the intellectual univerſe) is a vaſt profound, upon the ſurface of which we float, and of which, by direct conſciouſneſs, we know nothing beyond the ſurface. Science, with its methods of inference, carries us a little way beneath the forms and ſemblances of things, and only a little. Meantime we cannot ſuppoſe the interior to be, from any abſtract neceſſity, incognizable by the human mind. Our knowledge of nature is like our acquaintance with the globe we inhabit, ſuperficial only; and the operations of the miner, like thoſe of the natural philoſopher, expoſe to our view a few fathoms of the depth, but yet leave the abyſs unexplored. Nevertheleſs it is aſſuredly poſſible, abſtractedly, that the very bowels of our planet ſhould be inſpected by the human eye. And ſo we may aſſume, concerning the inmoſt receſſes of the mechaniſm of the material world, that they might be known by man.

Nor need any jealouſy be entertained, as if this expoſure of the ſecrets of nature ſhould tend to abate our reverence toward the Creator, or breed in the human mind a preſumptuous fami-

liarity with the divine operations. It may indeed be well, and even neceſſary, while in the preſent world, where the Creator himſelf is veiled from our ſight, that an impenetrable veil of myſtery ſhould be thrown over the procedures of his power and wiſdom; and that ſo a check ſhould be given to the audacity of reaſon, and an awe and modeſty impoſed upon minds ready enough to build a tower of pride that ſhall reach to heaven. In the path of any ſuch intellectual arrogance, we meet an impaſſable obſtacle, reſulting from the ſecrecy that attaches to the proceſſes and the conſtruction of the material world —a ſecrecy ſuch as no means of analyſis, how exact and aſſiduous ſoever, can break through. Our ambition and ſelf-eſteem receive here an effectual rebuff. But it may, and probably will, be otherwiſe, when we reach a more advanced ſtage of our exiſtence, and come where the far more ſtupendous myſteries of the divine nature, and of the ſpiritual univerſe, ſhall begin to unfold themſelves to our view. Then it will be found that the lower, and comparatively unimportant wonders of the material world, may be looked at with a familiar intuition: and this firſt page of our ſchooling, which now concentrates all our faculties, being fully underſtood, ſhall leave us at leiſure to learn a higher leſſon.

We ought aſſuredly to believe that He who has endowed his rational family with powers

fitting them to comprehend the reaſon of his works, and with a diſpoſition to admire what they underſtand, will not, in the end, hide from them anything which they might know with ſafety and advantage; and that gradually, as one temporary motive of concealment after another is ſuperſeded, the veil will be drawn aſide, ſo that what once was inſcrutable ſhall be openly diſplayed. Theſe progreſſive revelations, inſtead of inflating intellectual vanity, muſt tend rather to inſpire an evergrowing awe of the inexhauſtible wealth of the INFINITE INTELLIGENCE, inaſmuch as every ſuch new diſcovery ſhall be attended with a new and glimmering perception of things heretofore not imagined to exiſt, or ſo much as whiſpered of among even the beſt informed of the elders of immortality.

CHAPTER V.

The Fourth of theſe Advantages.

THE above-named probable extenſions of the phyſical powers, in the future ſpiritual body, have relation to the correſpondence of the mind with the external world; and ſome other like advantages, leſs clearly ſupported by analogy, might be added; but paſſing any ſuch conjectures, we go on to conſider thoſe new adjuſtments of the corporeal ſtructure, the effect of which would be to confer advantage upon the mind itſelf, in relation to the exerciſe of its intellectual and moral faculties.

It can hardly be neceſſary, as a preliminary to this portion of our hypotheſis, to prove that all the faculties of the mind, even the loftieſt of them, as well as the very pureſt of the emotions, are, in their preſent corporeal lodgement, ſubject to much modification and much abatement, in conſequence of the dependence of the mind upon the animal organization. In every mental

proceſs, and in every movement of the affections, there is an attendant organic action—a ſubſidiary operation of the brain, and of the arterial ſyſtem, not to ſay of other vital organs; and inaſmuch as this accompaniment is neceſſarily clogged with the conditions that attach to inert matter, the mind is ſo far bound down to thoſe conditions, and is reſtrained from moving at any other rate than that at which the body can ſafely follow, and duly perform its part. Reaſon (in man) is not abſolute reaſon, but a reaſoning faculty dependent, to a great extent, upon, and characterized by, the particular cerebral conformation, and by the conſtitution or temperament of the individual. The ſame manifeſtly is true of the moral ſentiments.

Among theſe intellectual powers, intimately affected by the original ſtructure, and by the pathology of the body in each individual, the memory ſtands foremoſt. The memory is, in a peculiar ſenſe, a function of the brain; and as, in the admiſſion of images of the external world, everything depends upon the ſenſorium, ſo likewiſe in the retention and the reproduction of theſe ideas, the phyſical ſtructure, and the actual condition, or healthy action of the cerebral organ, determine its power and its activity. The memory grows with the growth of the body; ſtrengthens with adoleſcence, is the contempo-

rary of animal energy; and is the firſt of the mental powers to betray the incipient decay of the vital force: the grey head, the impaired ſight, the trembling limb, and the faithleſs memory, tell of the advance of years, even while reaſon, and perhaps imagination, ſcarcely ſeem to decline. Again, it is the memory that is the moſt directly affected by external injuries of the head, or by thoſe diſeaſes that ſpend their violence upon the brain. It is the memory, moreover, that aſks for, and admits thoſe artificial aids which beſpeak its intimate alliance with corporeal impreſſions. Thus it is that any very peculiar phyſical ſenſation, recurring after a long interval, brings to our recollection the incidental circumſtances and the mental ſtate, at the time of its firſt occurrence. Inſtances of this ſort are various, and have often been adduced, nor can it be neceſſary here to relate them.

It is therefore obvious that this organic mental faculty, as at preſent poſſeſſed even by the moſt highly favoured individuals, is ſuſceptible of much enhancement and extenſion, merely by an improvement of the corporeal conſtitution. In this there is nothing conjectural. But it may be well to conſider what is probably implied in ſuch an augmentation of the memory.

Let it then be kept in view that, as ſenſation, in its ſeveral kinds, or the conſciouſneſs we have of the external world, is a ſpecific adaptation of

the inherent power of the mind to perceive the properties of matter, ſo is the memory a particular adaptation of that original and eſſential faculty of the mind by which it retains a conſciouſneſs of its paſt ſtates, and knows them to be paſt, and to have been real, and clearly diſtinguiſhes them from ſimple cogitations. Senſation has reſpect to the particular uſes and purpoſes of the preſent animal and intellectual life; and ſo likewiſe the faculty of memory, as now enjoyed, has reſpect to the ſpecial purpoſes of our preſent condition: ſo much of it is granted to us as we actually need, but not more; or at leaſt by no means all that is abſtractedly poſſible. As ſenſation is a limited conſciouſneſs of the external world, ſo is memory a limited and incidental recollection of our paſt ſtates of feeling; it is a partial exerciſe of a larger power, which, in adapting itſelf to the occaſions of active life, forfeits, or holds in abeyance, its plenary prerogatives. Conſidered as a function of the brain, the memory retains what it retains, and reproduces what it reproduces, according to the law of an arbitrary, and often accidental connexion of ideas. The power which, in its original capacity, might have filled a broad field, does in fact only beat a narrow path, and gropes its way backward over the ground it has traverſed, in ſearch of what it has dropped. Or, to change our compariſon, the memory is a book, the blank

leaves of which are conſtantly filling, but of which the written portion never lies outſpread before us; and, moreover, the paper being of frail texture, and the ink evaneſcent, and the entries often made in haſte, or careleſſly, they ſoon become totally illegible. The memory furniſhes a partial and fortuitous ſample of facts; but it by no means (not even in the moſt eminent inſtances) exhibits a complete collection of whatever it has received.

Yet with all its incompleteneſs and its frailties the memory ſerves ſufficiently the ordinary purpoſes of life, active, intellectual, and moral; nor is it very difficult to imagine the reaſons which may make even theſe diſparagements a neceſſary part of our condition in the preſent ſtate. Perhaps, if our impreſſions of the paſt were not in ſome ſuch manner liable to be abated, and borne down, or obſcured and obliterated, there would, in moſt minds, be certain vivid recollections which would continue to uſurp the entire conſciouſneſs, and ſo might exclude the preſent, with its fainter ſenſations, its intereſts and its duties; and we might thus be liable to long ſeaſons of abſtraction, during which we ſhould ſtand like ſtatues amid the urgent affairs of the paſſing moment. Such, in fact, is the misfortune of a claſs of morbid minds. But this neceſſity for abating the vividneſs of the memory is temporary only; and it is eaſy to imagine ſuch an enhance-

ment of the active force of the mind, in relation to the paſſing moment, as ſhould fully counterpoiſe the influence of even the moſt diſtinct and vivid recollection of ſcenes gone by. Let but the voluntary principle be proportionately invigorated, and then the mind might enjoy a permanent and bright conſciouſneſs of all that it has ever known, felt, and performed :—it might thus repoſſeſs itſelf of its entire paſt exiſtence, and might continue to enjoy (or to endure) an evergrowing and entire recollection of its various ſucceſſive ſtates : it might every moment live its whole life over ſimultaneouſly, and with infallible accuracy might be conſcious of all the circumſtances and ſhades of every portion of its being. However much ſuch a full conſciouſneſs of the paſt might ſeem to exceed, in kind, as well as in amount, our preſent partial and fallacious recollections, it would nevertheleſs be only the ſame power of the mind, ſet free from phyſical obſtructions and infirmities.

The memory, even in its preſent ſtate, and affected as it is by the conditions of animal life, might be brought near to the perfection we have ſuppoſed (and in a few recorded inſtances it has been) if it were only exempted from accidental obſtructions ariſing from a turgid ſtate of the cerebral veſſels—a flaccid ſtate of the cerebral ſubſtance—a ſlight compreſſion—a confuſion

connected with ſome derangement of the digeſtive organs, and the like. The ſpiritual body then, in itſelf indeſtructible and exempt from the liability to animal decay, may allow the mental faculty to ſpread itſelf out to the full;—as if an inſcription, which heretofore had been committed to a leaf, or papyrian ſcroll, was now tranſferred to a fair and ample ſurface of Parian marble.

Memory, we ſay, is a corporeal-mental power, and it is ſo, not only as phyſiologically dependent upon the ſtate of the cerebral maſs, but alſo in a higher and more intellectual ſenſe, which ſhould not be loſt ſight of in relation to our preſent argument. Mind, abſolutely unembodied, and cut off from all connexion with the material univerſe, would not (as we have conjectured) retain the power of noting the epochs of its exiſtence, or be conſcious of the equal periods of duration. In ſuch an inſulated condition, it is probable, that the entire conſciouſneſs, compriſing as well the acts of the mind, as its paſſive ſtates, and its emotions, inſtead of conſtituting a continuous hiſtory, or a ſeries of changes, the one coming on as the other recedes, would aſſume the appearance of a various aggregate of ideas, as if ſimultaneouſly exiſting, and would be aſſociated with no notion of the paſt and the preſent; nor be attended with an anticipation of the future. Whether ſuch a condition of being could conſiſt

at all with the exerciſe of active faculties is not clear; but it is hard to think that it would comport with that progreſſive development of principles and of character which belongs to the moral life. The moral life is, in a particular ſenſe—A HISTORY: it is a proceſs, involving ſucceſſive ſtages, through the courſe of which the unalterable laws of the ſpiritual economy are in turn brought to bear upon the diſpoſitions and conduct of thoſe who are ſubject thereto. Take away memory, and we go near to annul government, and to deſtroy accountability.

Now it is as *embodied*, and as thereby converſant with material objects, that the mind learns to arrange its conſciouſneſs in a ſeries, or in other words, exerciſes memory. For this faculty, although not excluſively converſant with material objects, yet rarely, if ever, entertains any notions, as conſtituting part of our paſt hiſtory, unleſs connected with things ſeen, heard, and felt. Pure abſtract conceptions may indeed keep their place in the mind; but whenever the having entertained ſuch conceptions is *remembered*, it is only as they may have been accidentally conjoined with circumſtances of place, or company, or with phyſical ſenſations. The memory leans upon the material world.

On both theſe accounts then, that is to ſay, firſt, becauſe it is peculiarly dependent upon the

bodily organization, and ſecondly, becauſe it is mainly converſant with images of the external world, the faculty of memory is one which, with the higheſt probability, we may expect to be greatly extended and improved in a new and a more refined corporeal ſtructure. The important conſequences of ſuch an extenſion of memory it can hardly be neceſſary to ſpecify. A rational agent, whatever were his other powers, who ſhould be totally deſtitute of memory (if indeed we can at all form ſuch a conception) muſt occupy a very low place in the ſcale of being; nor could either the vividneſs of his momentary impreſſions, or the energy or graſp of his reaſoning faculties, in any degree compenſate for the want of an intelligent recollection of his paſt exiſtence. On the other hand, a being of inferior original endowments, but yet gifted with a perfect conſciouſneſs of the whole of his paſt courſe, could hardly fail rapidly to accumulate intellectual wealth, and to outſtrip thoſe of his competitors who were not gifted in the like manner. After a time, ſuch a being would poſſeſs an *amount of conſciouſneſs*, if we may ſo ſpeak, which in itſelf would be opulence and power. Man, in the preſent life, occupies a middle poſition, between theſe two ſuppoſed caſes; for his memory, with all its imperfections, and although it retains, at command, a ſmall portion only of what is committed to its keeping, yet retains

enough to ſecure to itſelf the fruits of experience and ſtudy; and in what it actually embraces and performs, it gives a promiſe of far greater things, when it ſhall be lodged in a corporeal ſtructure, liable to no decay or diſturbance.

A little ſteady reflection will open to any one who purſues the idea, many momentous conſequences involved in the ſuppoſition of an entire continuous recollection of our paſt exiſtence; or of what might be termed, a PLENARY MEMORY. In relation to the maturing of the moral life, it is this vivid conſciouſneſs of the whole ſeries of our actions and emotions that is needed for penetrating the mind with a ſenſe of its own condition, and for rendering it its own equitable cenſor. It is manifeſt that thoſe egregiouſly falſe eſtimates, which we ſo often entertain of our own merits, gain entrance by favour of an oblivion of the moſt conſiderable and characteriſtic portions of our moral life. It is from a full and inceſſant recollection of the paſt, that are to ariſe, if at all, and in a due and neceſſary intenſity, thoſe ſtrivings of the ſpirit with itſelf, and thoſe compunctious agonies of the heart, whence improvement may reſult. The trite motto on a ſun-dial, *non ſine lumine*, might aptly be transferred to the human conſcience, in relation to memory; and we may believe that when its full

light, unabated and perpetual, ſhall be brought to bear upon the ſoul's ſenſe of good and evil, then ſhall be developed, in its dread power, the force of the moral principle, as implanted by God in our boſoms.

The abſtract poſſibility of an entire reſtoration of memory, or of the recovery of the whole that it has ever contained, need not be queſtioned; or if it were, an appeal might be made to every one's perſonal experience; for we ſuppoſe there are none to whom it has not happened to have a ſudden recollection—a flaſhing of ſome minute and unimportant incident of early life or childhood; and perhaps after an interval of forty or ſixty years. With ſome perſons theſe unconnected and uncalled for reminiſcences are frequent, and very vivid; and they ſeem to imply that, although the mind may have loſt its command over the ſtores of memory, and may no longer be able to recall at will the remote paſſages of its hiſtory, yet that the memory itſelf has not really parted with any of its depoſits, but holds them faithfully (if not obediently) in reſerve, againſt a ſeaſon when the whole will be demanded of it. Might not the human memory be compared to a field of ſepulture, thickly ſtocked with the remains of many generations; but of all theſe thouſands whoſe duſt heaves the ſurface, a few only are ſaved from immediate

oblivion upon tablets and urns; while the many are, at preſent, utterly loſt to knowledge? Nevertheleſs each of the dead has left in that ſoil an imperiſhable germ; and all, without diſtinction, ſhall another day ſtart up, and claim their dues.

CHAPTER VI.

The Fifth and Sixth hypothetical Prerogatives of the Spiritual Body.

WHAT is true of the memory, is true alſo of the law of mental ſuggeſtion, or, as it is called, the aſſociation of ideas; namely, that it depends, in a very intimate manner, upon the functions and condition of the brain, and of other vital organs. That unintermitted current of thought, which conſtitutes the ſtaple of our conſciouſneſs, and upon which the mind exerts its voluntary power at intervals, and which it partially controls, receives its determining guidance, in each mind, from the peculiarities of the temperament, and the habits, and the original diſpoſitions. The reaſon why ſuch an idea follows ſuch another, in each mind, is to be ſought for in the conformation and actual condition of each, including very much that is merely phyſical, and proper to the animal organization. And yet

this involuntary and conſtitutional ſuggeſtion of ideas, as is well known, has a moſt extenſive influence in regulating the operations of the higher and the more active faculties. The deciſions we come to in common life, the ſtyle and ſubjects of our ordinary converſation, the creations of the imagination, and even the ſevereſt proceſſes of the reaſoning faculty, are all modified, and are often originated, by the arbitrary law of aſſociation, ſuch as it is, in the mind of the individual; and this, again, reſults in part from the peculiarities of the animal organization. No one, accuſtomed to retrace and to analyſe, with philoſophic curioſity, the ſtream of his involuntary ideas, can have failed to notice the paramount influence of merely animal ſenſations over them. Eſpecially during ſleep, when the accidental aſſociation of ideas is entirely freed from the control of reaſon, each function of life, and each organ, takes its turn in the production of images and emotions. It ſeems as if in this movement and ſucceſſion of ideas inceſſantly going on, ſleeping and waking, nature was at work, mingling the heterogeneous elements of the intellectual and the material worlds, in preparation for the higher proceſſes of the rational and moral life: for, in fact, there is always going on a mental aſſimilation, or amalgamation, wherein the ſpecies of the external univerſe are being blended with the materials of reaſon, and with the

emotions. This involuntary proceſs is a concocting of that upon which the mind is afterwards to nouriſh itſelf.

Throughout the period of infancy and childhood, the involuntary ſuggeſtion of ideas takes its courſe almoſt uncontrolled; and it again flows on at random in ſeaſons of debility, delirium, or inſanity, and alſo through the cloſing years of ſenile decay. But the mental and moral advancement that diſtinguiſhes youth and manhood, conſiſts in the gradual (or partial) ſubſtitution of a rational for a fortuitous law of ſuggeſtion; or, in other words, of a voluntary, inſtead of an involuntary ſeries of thoughts. A vigorous mature mind is one in which the real relations of things, and not their accidental connexions, bring them forward, and determine either their continuance, as objects of thought, or their ſpeedy diſmiſſal. It is eaſy then to imagine a ſtate wherein the organic and accidental ſuggeſtion of ideas ſhould wholly diſappear, and be ſucceeded by a law of aſſociation purely rational; ſo that each ſucceſſive ſtate of the mind ſhould be the true and juſt conſequence of its preceding ſtate, and of its actual impreſſions, and always according to the rule of abſtract fitneſs. Thus analogy would come in the place of contingency, and truth be ſubſtituted for accident.

Conſtituted as we are at preſent, the body, with its ever-varying conditions, with the fumes

of its laboratories, with its appetites and its ills, ſways the mental being; and it is only at intervals that the mind aſſerts its proper ſupremacy. But the future ſpiritual body, as we may ſafely aſſume, will be the inſtrument—and the mere inſtrument of the mind, and in every reſpect will be ſubordinate to it. That more excellent corporeal ſtructure, whether it be denſe or ethereal, whether tangible or not, is not deſtined to lead, or to give law, in any ſenſe, to the intellect: it will not either ſuggeſt ideas, or infuſe emotions: it will not whiſper its own intereſts to the ſoul: for it will have none apart from thoſe of the mind; nor will it ſteal an advantage upon reaſon, to inſinuate its deſires. Reaſon and moral ſentiment, in full vigour, will purſue their courſe, and be liable to no interior diſturbance—to no privy conſpiracy—to no ſilent and inſidious attraction. Our preſent ſtate is one of alternation between the active and paſſive faculties, the latter chiefly prevailing; but the future being will, as we ſuppoſe, be active only, and always ſo. The human mind, now, may be compared to a lake among the mountains, expoſed to guſts and eddies from every ravine that opens upon its margin; and troubled, too, by gurgling ſprings from beneath. But the ſame mind, in its future ſtate, may more reſemble a river, profound and copious, which, with a ſteady movement, purſues its way in one direction, and with a force

that clears all obſtacles, and bears along whatever floats on its ſurface.

The ſuppoſition we are now entertaining deſerves a little further conſideration. That the mind is itſelf inert, or is diſpoſed to ſubſide into a ſtate of torpor, is what we ſhould be ſlow to believe; and it is better to attribute its apparent ſluggiſhneſs to its connexion with animal organization than to think it inherently inactive. It is certain that no intellectual proceſs can be carried on apart from a concurrent evolution of the cerebral organ, which of courſe, becauſe it belongs to the animal ſtructure, can be ſuſtained only for a time, and ſoon generates fatigue, and a ſenſe of pain. Thinking, therefore, like every other voluntary animal function, has its brief period of excitement, and its conſequent ſeaſon of exhauſtion. Thus the mind is ſubject to laſſitude, becauſe it cannot act except with the conſent, and by the aid of the body, which is eſſentially inert, and which demands ſtimulants to move it at all. Perpetual mental activity, therefore, is not poſſible in the preſent ſtate. But now let it be ſuppoſed, and the ſuppoſition implies very little that is purely conjectural, either that the future ſpiritual body, as more refined, and leſs, if at all, dependent upon ſtimulants, ſhall perform its office in the mental proceſſes, without any ſenſe of exhauſtion; or (and this is equally eaſy to imagine, and it is conſiſtent, too,

with ſome actual facts) that the corporeal part of mental operations ſhall be effected in a manner analogous to the mechaniſm of the involuntary animal functions, ſuch as the pulſation of the heart and arteries, the periſtaltic motion of the inteſtines, digeſtion, and the ſeveral ſecretions, all which go on with continuous regularity, and are not attended by any conſcious effort, nor produce any fatigue. A ſmall change, perhaps, in the arrangement of parts, and in the functions of the brain, might ſuffice for effecting this important enhancement of our mental economy. Thus it is but the opening, or the keeping open, of a foramen between the right and left auricle of the heart, that enables an animal or man to live without inceſſant reſpiration; and thus, too, as we may fairly conjecture, the branching off of nerves, higher or lower, from the brain, or the altered location of ſome cerebral gland, might, even in the preſent animal body, allow of perpetual intellectual activity, without exhauſtion, and without any conſcious effort: but how vaſt would be the power ſo obtained! The mind, in ſome ſuch manner, ſet free from the chain that forbids it to move faſter, or further at a time than the pulpy ſubſtance, which fills the cranium, can bear, would inſtantly aſſume its eſſential vitality, and would work, day and night, regardleſs of reſt. Under the preſent conſtitution of human nature, the mind might be compared to

an Arabian eſcort, attending a caravan, which, with its cumbrous bales, and its ſick and infirm, drags its weary length a ſtage or ſo daily; but only releaſe this eſcort from its charge, and it ſtarts off, nor can hardly the winds overtake it.

A change, ſuch as this, in our mental economy, would not merely augment incalculably the mind's power and its means of advancement, and accelerate its operations; but would exclude, perhaps entirely, the many illuſions and falſe judgments that ſteal upon it, like a thief in the night, during its ſeaſons of inertneſs. Such a new conformation of the corporeal-mental ſyſtem, by allowing to the mind its eſſential and conſtant activity, would leave no room for that fortuitous ſuggeſtion of ideas which now comes into play amid the alternations of mental activity. The involuntary ſeries of ideas would cede to voluntary and rational conceptions; and how much of the fatuity and caprice that attach to human conduct would be ſhut out by this ſubſtitution merely! Not indeed that the ſuppoſed change would of itſelf render men wiſe and virtuous; but it would at leaſt enable the wiſe and the virtuous to hold on their courſe with a more ſteady conſiſtency. Under ſuch an economy, it is probable that the good would be much better than now they are, and the bad perhaps much worſe; we may therefore readily ſurmiſe the reaſon of the actual conſtitution of human na-

ture, in this behalf, as fitting mankind for a ſtate wherein neither good nor evil is to reach an abſolute and unmixed perfection. Were ſuch a *luſus naturæ* poſſible, as that a human being ſhould be born in whoſe brain the mental proceſs, inſtead of being connected with that portion of the organ which acts by occaſional incitements, ſhould attach to that portion which keeps the involuntary functions of life in movement—ſuch a man (ought we to call him monſter or ſeraph?) would, if otherwiſe eminently endowed, reach, in early life, the *acmé* which other men do not attain till life begins to wane, and, in the firſt years of manhood, he would be maſter of all ſciences, teacher of all wiſdom, and director of all affairs.

Thoſe who ſteadily addict themſelves to the purſuit of truth, in any line of thought, are well aware of the diſturbance and the diſappointment that ariſe, notwithſtanding their utmoſt efforts to the contrary, firſt, from the inceſſant intermixture of ideas foreign to the ſubject of which the mind is labouring to make itſelf maſter, and which take their riſe from the principle of aſſociation; and then, ſecondly, from the mere ſpending of the force of the mind, that is to ſay, of its *organic force*, juſt at the moment when abſtract notions are coming into an intelligible poſition, and when their correſpondence is about

to be perceived. The ſame proceſs, taken up at another time, is not found to preſent preciſely the ſame elements, or not in preciſely the ſame proportions; the reſults therefore differ in the iſſue, by a little; and ſo we fail of the ſatisfaction of aſcertaining truth. In ſuch inſtances it is as if the furnace of the chemiſt, upon the continued intenſity of which the ſucceſs of a difficult experiment wholly depends, were ſupplied only with a niggard allowance of fuel, which is almoſt always burnt out before the ingredients in the crucible are completely aſſimilated.

And it is thus, too, that ſo few arguments, orally conducted, reach any uſeful reſult, even where there are no motives of prejudice, intereſt, or perſonal feeling to pervert the judgments of the diſputants. One of the parties in the controverſy (and perhaps both) is thrown out of his track, at almoſt every ſtep, by the fortuitous ſuggeſtions that ſpring from ſounds, terms, and alluſions; and his opponent, either weary of bringing him back to the line, or taking advantage of his erratic courſe, abandons the queſtion, and thinks only of triumphing in the perſonal combat. Or, as frequently happens, even if the antagoniſts are equally ſincere in their purſuit of truth, and pretty evenly matched, too, in intellectual power, yet the *organic power* of the one fails much ſooner than that of the other; and the more infirm party, to conceal his conſcious

exhauſtion, and to cover his retreat, betakes himſelf to ſophiſtry and evaſion.

In fact, it is only on the ground of mathematical ſcience, where the ſteps of every proceſs of reaſoning may be infallibly recorded, ſo that the whole can be taken up and laid down, without damage, at different times, that the diſadvantages we have ſpecified may be warded off.

Again, and to come to our ſixth ſuppoſed prerogative of the ſpiritual body; the mental power, both in its extent and in its kind, depends very much upon the ability (poſſeſſed by one mind in a far greater degree than by another) of carrying on ſeveral operations ſimultaneouſly. In truth there are certain difficult complex ſpeculations which can be purſued only by the few who poſſeſs this peculiar ability in an eminent degree; and here, as in the laſt-named inſtance, a new conſtruction of the corporeal-mental ſyſtem may be hypothetically aſſumed, ſuch as would at once enhance immenſely the intellectual power. We need not here ſtay to decide the preliminary queſtion, whether the power of the mind to carry on ſeveral operations ſimultaneouſly, is apparent only, or is actual and real;—that is to ſay, whether, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, the mind be capable of complex acts, or only applies itſelf, with inconceivable rapidity, in turns to different objects, ſo as to *ſeem* to attend to ſeveral at once.

This obſcure queſtion we may leave in the rear, and take up, as ſufficient for our preſent purpoſe, the plain fact, looſely ſtated, that the human mind does, without conſcious difficulty, carry on two, three, or more operations within one and the ſame mental period. Thus, for example, there are few who cannot with eaſe read aloud, with due care and emphaſis, while a train of thought, wholly unconnected with the ſubject of the book, is entertained. Or a converſation may be carried on with our neighbour, on the right hand, in company, while we attentively liſten to that which is paſſing between thoſe on our left. Or a piece of muſic, of difficult execution, is performed, and at the ſame time ſchemes are meditated, or powerful emotions indulged. By the means of this ſame faculty, extemporary ſpeakers not only deliver themſelves with propriety and energy, while the ſubſequent portions of their argument are being digeſted and arranged; but note, and turn to their advantage, the varying emotions of their auditors, nor loſe a ſmile, a frown, or a ſneer, that ſhows itſelf on the ſea of faces before them.

Now this power, actually poſſeſſed and exerciſed by men in the preſent ſtate, whether it be preciſely what it ſeems or not, may eaſily be conceived of as enlarged in its compaſs, when the ſame mind comes to be lodged in a body that has more appliancy, and a higher finiſh. And

yet this obvious and probable enhancement of our power of attention is not all that may reaſonably be looked for, as likely to reſult from a more refined corporeal conſtitution. Let it be conſidered, then, that the cerebral part of the mental proceſs is, as we have already ſaid, like every other voluntary operation, attended with a ſenſe of fatigue, and that it is followed by laſſitude. Thinking, therefore, even in the moſt vigorous minds, has its limits and its ſeaſons; nor are theſe limits to be overpaſſed without injury or peril to the brain. A ſingle proceſs, or a proceſs that is homogeneous and ſimple, may, however, be carried on more eaſily, and longer, than a complex proceſs, or than one that exerciſes different faculties, and involves heterogeneous ſubjects. Indeed any high degree of complexity ſoon brings on a confuſion of ideas, and a collapſe of the mental energy. In fact, very few minds voluntarily undergo any ſuch difficult labour; and moſt make their choice of ſome ſingle object, and addict themſelves thereto in compliance with the natural bent of the mind, or with accidental intereſts, and wiſely turn to the beſt account the ſpecial gifts which nature may have conferred upon them, whether of reaſon, imagination, or moral ſentiment. The habit of ſimple and ſingle intellectual action ſoon fixes itſelf in a definite form, and men become mathematicians, logicians, experimenters, poets,

artiſts, moraliſts, and thus learn to entertain every object of thought in a technical manner. Hence reſult thoſe partial apprehenſions of general truth which limit the advancement of each mind within narrow bounds: and hence, too, comes that diviſion of labour in the world of mind, which, although productive of advantage on the whole, and in relation to ordinary purſuits, and to the ſecular ſciences, yet bars the advancement of philoſophy in its wider range, and is peculiarly diſadvantageous in its bearing upon the elevated themes of theology, which, becauſe they are in the moſt abſolute ſenſe univerſal, are not to be apprehended by any ſingle faculty of the mind, but ſtand in ſuch a manner related to our entire intellectual and moral conſtitution, as that it is only, when every faculty, in harmonious and ſimultaneous exerciſe, is actively engaged upon them, that they can be really embraced. The metaphyſician, let his analyſis of abſtract notions be as exact as it may, ſtill miſapprehends the Divine Nature, inaſmuch as the only analytic habit of his mind, and his peculiar mental conformation, tend to abate the moral and the conceptive faculties; it is therefore only one ſet of relations which he diſcerns; and ſo the poet, and even the man of acute moral perception, alike miſapprehend the ſupreme excellence. On this high and arduous ground we fail, not merely becauſe the infinite tranſcends the finite, but alſo

becauſe, by inveterate habit, we go on to divide, and to diſtribute, and claſſify that, the very eſſence of which is, that it is indiviſible and ONE.

But inaſmuch as the human mind, even now, goes ſome way, when employed upon lower and more common objects, in carrying on diverſe operations ſimultaneouſly, it is very credible that, in the future ſpiritual body, this power, depending, as it appears to do, upon the corporeal ſtructure, ſhould be greatly extended. And this extenſion may take place either merely by a higher degree of refinement in the corporeal-mental mechaniſm, ſuch as ſhould allow more activity with leſs effort; or elſe, which is the preferable ſuppoſition, that the mental proceſs, ſo far as dependent upon the body, ſhould be placed in analogy with the involuntary animal functions, and ſo be free to move on without expending the organic force. In either caſe the mind, feeling itſelf releaſed from a confinement that had heretofore impeded its progreſs, would at once bring the complement of its faculties to bear upon whatever engaged it:—it would henceforward fill out its circle of thought and emotion inſtead of paſſing from part to part, and of relinquiſhing one, while it graſps another. The mind, thus advantaged, would combine itſelf with every element of knowledge and feeling; and while having more to do with ſyntheſis than with

analyſis (which at preſent, from the limitation of its faculty, it chiefly affects) it would, not the leſs, diſcern in their diſtinctions whatever really differs in nature. The mind, thus ſet at large, would probably lay aſide entirely its habit of attending to things by turns, or in ſucceſſion, or as if it were traverſing *a line*, and would, if we might uſe the figure, bring a broad percipient ſurface into contact with broad ſurfaces, and would act and feel at all points at once. It muſt be in ſome ſuch manner, if ever, that the human mind will attain a comprehenſive knowledge of the higheſt and moſt momentous truths:—it is thus, if at all, that it will become qualified to reaſon ſatisfactorily concerning the principles of the divine government; and thus, if ever, that, inſtead of building up and pulling down, with fruitleſs labour, its ſyſtems of theology, becauſe ſomething eſſential is always found to have been omitted, that it ſhall build, and bind what it builds, and ſo make ſome real progreſs in knowing the Infinite Perfection.

CHAPTER VII.

The Seventh probable Advantage of the Future Life.

THERE is yet a mental advantage, highly deſirable in itſelf, although but moderately enjoyed at preſent by the human mind; and it is one which may reaſonably be anticipated as likely to accrue from a more entire ſubſerviency of the corporeal economy to the intellect. What we mean is, an intuitive perception of abſtract truths, even of a complicated kind; and whether they be mathematical or metaphyſical.

There is, we grant, an intenſe gratification, as well as a credit, reſulting from the ſucceſsful though laborious proſecution of abſtruſe principles, through circuitous and intricate paths; and if we were to adduce, as a ſignal example, that proceſs of reaſoning which has brought our modern aſtronomy to its preſent ſtate, and if we think of the ſteady reſolution, as well as graſp of mind, and the intrepidity which have been

brought to bear upon the ſubject, a juſt exultation on account of the powers of the human underſtanding may be felt; and we might be almoſt ready to decline any imagined advantage, ſuch as ſhould ſuperſede theſe arduous and ennobling labours. Nevertheleſs, it muſt be confeſſed that, inaſmuch as it is truth, and nothing elſe, which is the ultimate object of philoſophic reaſoning, and, as it is the *reſult* rather than the *proceſs* for the ſake of which ſo much labour is undergone, a direct mode of attaining any truth cannot be otherwiſe than preferable to a circuitous one. The illuſtrious men who have earned immortal fame on the fields of modern ſcience would, unqueſtionably, any of them, have gladly foregone their individual reputation in exchange for a natural faculty of diſcerning, inſtantaneouſly, the entire chain of relations which, in fact, it coſt them the labour of their lives to demonſtrate. The traveller prides himſelf upon his achievement who, at the jeopardy of his life, and with incredible efforts, has climbed a peak of the Andes: but would not that ſame adventurer relinquiſh the credit he has ſo won, if, inſtead of it, he might take the wings of the eagle, and hover at liberty and leiſure above the ſnowy ſummits?

In a mathematical or a metaphyſical propoſition it is affirmed, that two or more quantities,

[illegible] being, though diſſi-[illegible] form, or expreſſion, are equal, or are [illegible] or that they bear ſuch and ſuch a re-[illegible] the one to the other. The ſubſequent [illegible] of reaſoning, which is to exhibit this [illegible] equality, or this identity, conſiſts in [illegible] but in tracing and naming, one by one, all [illegible] intermediate relations, each of which [illegible] is so ſimple or obvious that it may inſtantly be [illegible] and will certainly be aſſented to. But [illegible] always room for ſome conſiderable diver-[illegible] of method in preſenting ſuch demonſtrations; [illegible] this diverſity has reſpect to the acquire-[illegible] the intellectual habits, and the native [illegible] of the minds to which they are to be [illegible]: for while, in dealing with one mind, [illegible] may be neceſſary to inſiſt, ſlowly and patiently, [illegible] every intermediate ſtep, and to expreſs in [illegible] the very ſimpleſt relations, with other minds [illegible] ſuch minuteneſs would be both ſuperfluous [illegible] repulſive. Inaſmuch, as theſe are well able [illegible] at once at a glance a wide range of related [illegible] and are accuſtomed, with ſafety and aſ-[illegible] to advance by great ſtrides, where the [illegible] muſt grope their way. It actually [illegible] within the human mind to diſcern in-[illegible] and remote relations; and yet this can be [illegible] ever by the ſtrongeſt minds, only within [illegible] limits.

There are, moreover, very many abſtract re-

lations, ſuch that, with our preſent faculties, we fail to trace them at all, in a direct manner; and they become known to us only by an inference, drawn from the abſurdity of admitting any contrary ſuppoſition. In fact, a conſiderable portion of abſtract ſcience ſtands under this condition, and is aſſented to, rather becauſe the denial of it involves ſome impoſſibility, than becauſe the truth itſelf can be brought to ſtand out clearly in our view. The *reductio ad abſurdum*, how uſeful ſoever it may be, and indeed neceſſary, with our preſent limited faculties, is a method of reaſoning that would never be reſorted to by minds enjoying a wider range of thought; and the uſe of it may be taken as a ſure indication of the confinement and imperfection of our intellectual faculties.

Thoſe who, either from an original perſpicacity, or as the fruit of acquired facility, are able to graſp complicated abſtract relations, may be ſuppoſed to do ſo by the means of an unconſcious rapidity in running through all the intermediate relations; or perhaps, and this ſeems the more probable ſuppoſition, it is by a peculiar power of diſcerning, at once, what may be called the *entire nature* of the ſubject, with all its relations, ſo that the particular truth, affirmed in any one propoſition concerning that nature, ſtands out as a neceſſary part of the whole, or as plainly involved in ſome more comprehenſive propoſition.

Now this ability, whether it conſiſt in the power to paſs in an inſtant along a chain of truths, or in the faculty of graſping truth in its univerſal and moſt abſtract forms, does in fact belong to ſome human minds; and when we come to aſk what it is which prevents inferior intellects from exerciſing this power in any ſenſible degree, and what it is which puts a limit to the power, even in the moſt highly gifted minds, we ſhall be led to believe that the limitation ariſes from the condition of the cerebral ſtructure, or from its pathological ſtate, and that it conſiſts in ſome organic confinement, or from a ſluggiſhneſs of the brain. That the cauſe of this difference between one mind and another is corporeal, may reaſonably be inferred from the fact, that thoſe variations of power of which every one is conſcious in himſelf, ſpring from the ſtate of the brain; as when, from circumſtances unqueſtionably of a phyſical kind, ſuch as the condition of the general health, or the ſtate of the atmoſphere, or the influence of ſtimulants, or the condition of the ſtomach, the ability to graſp abſtract truths is very greatly enlarged, or is as much contracted. No one mind, it is true, can be made conſcious of the individual facilities, or of the difficulties that attach to another; nevertheleſs each may ſcrutinize the variations that affect itſelf, and may, with ſome degree of diſtinctneſs, trace the operation of whatever affects the body, in depreſ-

ſing or elevating the intellectual vigour. Thus analyſing our perſonal conſciouſneſs, and taking our happieſt moments as a gauge of the original power of the mind (for no man ever out-ſtretches his actual powers) we may feel a ſtrong perſuaſion that what we need, is only to be a little more diſengaged from *organic* imperfections and impediments, in order to our being able to ſeize, as by intuition, the moſt remote and intricate abſtract truths. The conjecture then is hazarded, and its reaſonableneſs is referred to thoſe who are addicted to the purſuit of abſtract ſcience, that a corporeal-mental conſtitution, either more refined than the preſent animal organization, or entirely diſengaged from the organic mechaniſm of veſſels, circulating fluids, and ſecretions, would admit of the intuition of principles, which are now aſcertained by laborious calculations, or by difficult and indirect proceſſes of reaſoning.

It ſeems ſafe to affirm, in relation to what may be abſtractedly poſſible to the human mind, that, whatever it has at any time actually achieved, under favourable circumſtances, or whatever effort it may, for a few moments only, have ſuſtained, the ſame, to ſay no more, it might at all times perform, and might continue to perform, if it were but exempted from thoſe cauſes of embarraſſment and exhauſtion which are felt to ariſe from the imperfections of the animal organiza-

tion. If indeed we are calculating, in any inſtance, what it may fairly be expected that men, ſuch as they are, will achieve, we muſt reckon only upon the average amount of their powers —bodily or mental. But if the queſtion be— What might the human mind achieve, ſet free from the infirmities and diſadvantages that attach to individuals, then it is not the actual *average* that is to be regarded; but the actual *maximum;* and the rareſt and moſt admirable performances of a favoured few, who have far outdone their competitors, are to be aſſumed as the real meaſure of the abſtract powers of the human intellect. And even this meaſure ought to be regarded as probably too low, inaſmuch as there is reaſon to ſuppoſe that the moſt vigorous human mind ſtill labours under ſome conſiderable diſadvantages of the corporeal kind, and would be capable of far more, were it wholly exempted from all the obſtructions and obſcurities that attach to the animal brain.

Now there are well authenticated inſtances (and that of Newton is enough for our argument) of the poſſeſſion, to a great extent, of the very power we are ſpeaking of, namely, the ability to diſcern, at once, and without a proceſs of proof, the remote relations of number and figure. Something of this ſort comes within the reach of moſt minds, addicted, by original taſte, to mathematical ſcience. Such, on frequent occaſions, ſtep on beyond the formal methods inſtituted to exclude

any affirmation contrary to the one ſet forth in the theorem; and in a moment perceive that this theorem is only a ſpecial ſtatement of ſome more univerſal truth, which truth is already intuitively known.

What then would be the conſequences, and what the practical value of ſuch an emancipation of the intellect from the trammels of calculation, and the ſubtilties of logic? With a view to finding a reply to this queſtion, it muſt be kept in mind that the reaſoning faculty is in itſelf nothing more than an inſtrument—a means to an end—a power, ſubordinate to higher purpoſes: it is for the truth's ſake, and nothing elſe, if the mind be ingenuous, that we reaſon or calculate. The neceſſity we find ourſelves under, at any time, of putting this engine in operation, and of keeping it in play through the courſe of a long and difficult proceſs, cannot, *in itſelf*, be deemed a perfection. It is indeed well that we poſſeſs ſuch a power, and that we are able, at any coſt, to aſcertain remote and abſtruſe truths; but ſurely, no one would refuſe to accept the ſame reſults, obtained in a readier manner. We do not conſtruct ſteam-engines for the ſake of working them; but for producing the accommodations of life; nor would a furnace be kindled were we permitted to wield the magician's wand, and could at will ſurround ourſelves with every luxury.

As it is, we have time, in the preſent life, to do little more, in relation to abſtract truths, than

juſt to find them out; or at moſt, to apply them to ſome few practical purpoſes. But let it be aſſumed that, in another ſtage of our exiſtence, we ſhall be freed from the operoſe methods of calculation and reaſoning, and be endowed with the power of intuitively perceiving all the properties and conditions, as well of mathematical as of metaphyſical entities:—the mind, not made indolent by this advantage, would ſtart forward, as from an advanced poſition, and move on with rapidity toward new and higher ground. Maſter of all actual and poſſible relations, affecting ſpace, time, matter, number, and abſtract being;—relations it could not conſent to leave unknown in the rear, the mind would proceed to inquire concerning the perfections of the Infinite Nature, toward which all virtuous intelligences muſt be tending, with an irreſiſtible impulſe, when once it is directly opened to their meditations. In the preſent world we purſue the inferior order of abſtract truths, becauſe theſe compriſe the only ſpecies of abſolute perfection that comes within our range; but when a ſtill higher, and a vaſtly more excellent ſpecies of truth—truth combining all intrinſic attractions, and all practical inferences—ſhall invite our inquiry, then muſt it take the ſupremacy that belongs to it; and we ſhall feel the advantage of being able to diſmiſs, as familiarly underſtood or diſcerned, all inferior principles.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Eighth Prerogative, according to our Hypotheſis, of Spiritual Corporeity.

A SOCIAL economy, with all its happy and momentous conſequences, and apart from which ſcarcely half of human nature could be brought into action—a ſocial economy demands at once a power of individual ſecluſion, and a faculty of communication. The corporeal lodgement of the mind, fencing it from intruſion, provides, as we have aſſumed, for the firſt of theſe purpoſes; and in doing ſo, that is to ſay, in preventing what might be called the immediate contact of minds, or their free intermixture, it reduces them to the neceſſity (at leaſt in the preſent ſtate) of employing ſome ſyſtem of external notices of thought; or, as they are termed, ſigns, whether repreſentative and real, or arbitrary, as language.

Nor is language important to us merely in our ſocial relations; for although it can hardly be ſuppoſed that a mind abſolutely inſulated

would, in its ſolitude, have originated language, or could have felt the want of a means of expreſſion, nevertheleſs, as language has actually become a part of our intellectual conſtitution, the employment of it exerts an influence over the whole of our mental operations; and while it facilitates them, in one ſenſe, does alſo, in another, impede and limit the play of our faculties; and eſpecially of the higheſt of thoſe faculties. The conſtant preſence of words in the mind ſlackens its curioſity, by leading it to believe that it knows what in fact it does not know; and it renders alſo its perception of all abſtract truths obtuſe and confuſed, in ſo far as the rude ſymbol of each idea is taken in the ſtead of the idea itſelf, and carries with it its concretions, its exceſs, and its defect, and its accidental aſſociations. The ſubſtitution therefore of ſome new and more direct or *real* means of communication between mind and mind, would not merely place the ſocial economy on a more ſure, elevated, and happy ground; but would, by its indirect conſequences, involve very important advantages to the mind in its own operations. Everything would come before us as freſh, and real, and ſubſtantial, if our imperfect and artificial ſymbols were diſplaced by a means of expreſſion eſſentially true and perfect.

Language belongs, in the firſt inſtance, to the ear, and is afterwards, by a transfer of aſſociations,

conveyed to the eye. Nevertheleſs, when once the written and viſible ſyſtem of ſymbols has become as familiar to the mind as the audible ſymbols are, the one connects itſelf with its aſſociated ideas quite as rapidly as do the others; nor do we, in reading, attain the meaning of the words circuitouſly, by firſt thinking of the ſound for which they ſtand, and then of the meaning of that ſound. The two ſpecies of ſymbols, therefore, the viſible and the audible, are to be regarded as on a level when preſented to the mind, though not entirely ſo when language is mentally employed, as a vehicle or medium of cogitation, for when ſo uſed, it is the ſound, rather than the written ſign, that is thought of. On account of this difference we muſt at preſent be underſtood to ſpeak of language oral and audible.

Language, conſiſting as it does of arbitrary ſigns, is manifeſtly a rudiment of the material ſyſtem; it is a fruit and conſequence of our corporeity, and might, with ſome propriety, be deſignated as the point of contact, where mind and matter, artificially, yet moſt intimately blend, and reciprocate their reſpective properties; the firſt, namely mind, imparting to the modulations of ſound ſeveral hundred thouſand diſtinctions, which nothing elſe than the boundleſs refinements of its own conceptions could, to ſuch an extent, multiply and fix: while, on the other hand, the

ſecond, namely matter, impoſes upon the firſt its own limitations, and generates innumerable errors, conſequent upon its eſſential rudeneſs, and its inferiority or imparity, as related to the mind.

Every machine and inſtrument is an adaptation of ſome exiſting power or principle, conferring upon the intelligence that has deviſed and that employs it, a ſpecial advantage, in carrying on ſome operation which otherwiſe would be barely practicable or not at all ſo. But whether or not the particular work ſo performed could be achieved without the inſtrument, ſtill the mind which invents and employs it is always immeaſurably ſuperior to its own inſtrument; and whatever refinement of workmanſhip, or intricacy of conſtruction may belong to the latter, both are leſs than the ſkill and intelligence whence they proceed; and leſs, too, than the bodily powers to which they render aid. What is the ſtaff or the hammer to the hand and arm that wield them? what the lens or teleſcope to the eye? or again, to the mind that reaſons on the facts they diſcloſe; or what the ſculptor's chiſel to the taſte and ſkill that direct it?—or what the lyre and its chords to the ſoul of melody that trembles on the fingers of the performer? Now of all the inſtruments or artificial combinations which man employs, there is not one at all to be compared with language;—there is not one nearly ſo elaborate in its conſtruction, or ſo copious in its materials, or ſo nice and appliant in its evolutions.

The vocabulary of a highly civilized people, as that of the Greeks, Romans, Italians, Germans, Engliſh, including the inflections employed in its combinations, and including alſo technical terms and proper names, muſt, at an average, be eſtimated as compriſing two hundred thouſand diſtinguiſhable arbitrary ſigns; and a large proportion of theſe are ſuſceptible, in conſtruction, of very many variations of meaning, ſo as in fact nearly to double the number of ſounds to which diſtinct ideas are attached. And yet this vaſt apparatus, taken in its moſt refined form, is found, in relation to the occaſions of the mind, to be ſcanty, inexact, and poor! It is nothing better than a material machinery; and matter muſt fall vaſtly ſhort of being commenſurable with mind. Whether regarded as the inſtrument of ſilent thought, or as the medium of communication between mind and mind, language proves itſelf ſo inadequate to ſome of the purpoſes to which it is applied, as to forbid the hope that thoſe ſciences will ever reach a permanent and indiſputable ſtate which depend upon it as their only means of expreſſion. Mathematical truth, happily, has formed for itſelf a language adequate to its purpoſes; a language real, and which is liable to no ambiguity or variation: but then this is becauſe mathematical ſcience is converſant with the properties of matter, and its relations; and therefore the inſtrument of its conveyance,

being homogeneous, is ſufficient. But how far otherwiſe is it when we have to do, either with metaphyſical abſtractions, or with the heights and depths and refinements of the human paſſions and affections! On this ground how does it want compaſs, nicety, power! Language well and truly conveys all thoſe notions that are its own creatures, or that are more modified by it, than they modify the medium of their expreſſion. After having vulgarized and enfeebled our conceptions and our ſentiments, language then ſufficiently repreſents and re-combines what it has firſt reduced to its own level. Meanwhile, every profoundly impaſſioned and ſenſitive mind, and every mind accuſtomed to hold language in abeyance, during its proceſſes of analyſis and abſtraction, is painfully conſcious of the inferiority of any actual medium of expreſſion that is at its command. In the receſſes of the human ſoul there is a world of thought which, for the want of determinate and fit ſymbols, never aſſumes any fixed form, ſuch as might beneficially conſtitute a part of the intellectual and moral wealth of the ſpecies, or even much augment the wiſdom and virtue of the man.

Or if we needed another ſort of illuſtration of the vaſt ſuperiority of the mind, as meaſured againſt its inſtrument of expreſſion, we might refer to the facility with which three, five, or even ten or twelve different ſets of ſymbols are

held in readineſs, and uſed, almoſt indifferently, for the conveyance of thought. What a proof is this of the graſp, and of the elaſticity of mind, that it can, with a ſovereign eaſe, and juſt as a man lays down one tool and takes up another, ſo lay down and take up at pleaſure this or that voluminous machinery of ſigns! Let it be ſuppoſed that each language of five, familiarly commanded by any one, compriſes not more than twenty-five thouſand words; then does the mind hold each of theſe ſets of ſigns, with all the ſpecial rules that affect the conſtruction of each, unconfounded and diſtinct, ſo as in a moment to be able to detach its paſſing train of ideas from one of theſe ſyſtems of ſigns, and to affix it to another! Now this wonderful facility in ſo playing with theſe operoſe and cumbrous engines, and in ſo ſhifting inſtantaneouſly the entire ſyſtem of intimate mental aſſociations, is by no means to be conſidered barely as a proof of great ability in the individual, or of the reach of the memory; but rather as a tacit, yet ſure indication of the immeaſurable, not indeed infinite, inherent power of the human mind, to which ſuch operations may become ſo familiar as to be performed almoſt without any conſciouſneſs of effort. Of what then might this ſame mind be capable, if it were furniſhed with an engine of expreſſion homogeneous with itſelf, plaſtic in quality, and commenſurate with its faculties!

Now there are two ſuppoſitions, either of which may, with ſome reaſon, be entertained relative to the means of communication in a higher economy; the firſt of which is, that, in the ſtead of a ſyſtem of ſigns adapted, as all our ſigns are primarily, to ſenſible objects, and derived from the material world, and transferred by figure to things abſtract and intellectual, there ſhould be conſtructed a ſyſtem primarily adapted to things abſtract and intellectual, and drawn from the world of mind, and therefore ſtrictly proper to notions of this claſs, and neither more, nor fewer, nor other, than thoſe notions are; nor in any ſuch way convertible as to give riſe to ambiguities of expreſſion, and confuſions of thought. Such a medium of communion, it is manifeſt, being the mind's own creature, and its commenſurate power, would, in all its applications, both as an engine of cogitation and as a means of communication, tranſcend the moſt perfect of our mundane languages, as far as any one of our languages tranſcends the mute ſigns and awkward grimaces reſorted to by men not underſtanding each other's tongue. With a real language of this kind at command—and which would be a true reflection of itſelf, a juſt and clear image of thought and emotion—the mind would feel as if the broad light of day pervaded its inmoſt receſſes, or as if its very ſelf were repeated in every expreſſion; the likeneſs of the mind and ſoul would be ſuch

as is returned of the perſon by the moſt highly poliſhed mirror; or to adduce the moſt complete illuſtration of the advantages of an intellectual language, ſuch as we have imagined, we muſt again refer to the inſtance of the language of mathematical ſcience, which, becauſe homogeneous with the truths it conveys, is faultleſs, infallible, and liable to no loſs or change in the lapſe of ages: it is exempt from the caprices of faſhion, and ſuperior to the individual errors and infirmities of thoſe through whoſe hands it is tranſmitted. Now a language formed by the mind for itſelf, and after it has become fully furniſhed with abſtract ideas, and after the purely intellectual part of its circle of notions has gained a due prevalence over ſenſible images, ſuch a language, conſiſting of ſymbols of abſtractions, not of the ſymbols of the ſymbols of thoſe abſtractions, would be to the mind, and to its operations, what the language of geometry, and algebra, and of the modern calculus, is to the truths thereby conveyed; and the conſequence of employing this homogeneous and perfect medium would be the ſuperſeding of all fluctuating ſyſtems of metaphyſics, and theology, and morals, and the excluſion of endleſs and fruitleſs altercations on ſuch ſubjects, and the gradual accumulation and conſolidation of an ABSOLUTE PHILOSOPHY.

Our modern philoſophy, in all its branches, has now been about twenty-five centuries in grow-

ing ; and during the laſt five of theſe centuries, a ſolid and permanent advancement has been made in all thoſe ſciences which command a medium of expreſſion adapted to their nature, and exempt from ambiguities and fluctuations. Meanwhile abſtract intellectual philoſophy (putting out of the queſtion the general rectification of ſentiments and notions accruing from the influence of Chriſtianity) remains what and where it was, in the bright times of Grecian intelligence. The preliminary work of fixing the ſenſe of terms, and of advancing axioms, has ſtill to be done anew by every profeſſor of theſe ſtudies ; and his labour is ſcarcely completed before it is broken up and caſt aſide by his ſucceſſors. This incertitude appears to admit of no remedy.

The ſecond ſuppoſition that offers itſelf, in relation to the future communion of minds, is this, namely, that the method of expreſſion by arbitrary ſigns ſhould be altogether ſuperſeded, and that, in the place of it, the mind ſhould be endowed with a power of communication by a direct conveyance of its own ſtate, at any moment, to other minds ; as if the veil of perſonal conſciouſneſs might, at pleaſure, be drawn aſide, and the entire intellectual being could ſpread itſelf out to view. " If there are tongues," ſays the apoſtle, " they ſhall fail ;" and it may be intended, not that the various languages of earth

ſhall be exchanged for the one language of heaven, but rather that language itſelf, or the uſe of arbitrary ſymbols, ſhall give place to the conveyance of thought, in its native ſtate, from mind to mind. The conveyance of emotions, by the varying expreſſion of the countenance, and which is underſtood as if inſtinctively by infants and by animals, gives us a faint indication at leaſt of a mode of communication much more intuitive and immediate, than that of language: nor is it very difficult, by the aid of this inſtance, to carry forward our conceptions ſo far as to graſp what we are now ſuppoſing, namely, an inſtantaneous and real unfolding of the thought and feeling of one mind, by an act of its own, to other minds. We ſay by an act of its own; for the purpoſes of a moral economy, and the preſervation of individuality of character, ſeem neceſſarily to demand the ſecluſion of each mind, except ſo far as it may chooſe to diſcover itſelf. This ſecluſion and individuality appears alſo to be involved, as we have already remarked, in corporeity.

Of the ſame kind with the expreſſion of feeling by the countenance, is the conveyance of the fine diſtinctions of thought and emotion by the means of the modulations of the voice, which in fact amount to a *ſecond power*, ſuperadded to the conventional value of language. What is conveyed by emphaſis, and ſtill more by tones, often

far ſurpaſſes what is contained, or could be contained, in the words as written. This language of tones is a *real* language, ſuffuſed, if we may ſo ſpeak, over the maſs of arbitrary ſigns, and ſerving to give them a double force; it is a vital energy, informing an inert body. Thoſe who have had much to do with children muſt have obſerved that they acquire their knowledge of arbitrary terms, and eſpecially of abſtract phraſes, in a great degree, by the aid of their *inſtinctive* apprehenſion of the meaning of tones, and of the expreſſions of the countenance. It ſeems as if this real language were implanted in all minds, and being underſtood without teaching and without induction, is made the means of acquiring that which can be known only by inſtruction and habit. In this fact have we not an indication of a future means of communion, more real and immediate than that of arbitrary ſymbols? The intellectual power of muſic furniſhes another, and an analogous inſtance of the conveyance of emotions, with diſtinctneſs and force, by means more natural than that of conventional ſigns. Melody and harmony have a fixed affinity with the ſeveral emotions of our moral conſtitution; and they awaken, with unvarying certainty and preciſion, this or that ſentiment or paſſion. In this inſtance we have an example of the corporeal conveyance of the ſtates of one mind to other minds, founded upon the original conformation of mind,

as combined with matter. And this mode of communion may eaſily be conceived of as much extended and improved.

Whether we prefer the firſt or the ſecond of the above-named ſuppoſitions, the conſequences muſt be nearly the ſame; for an arbitrary language, if abſolutely perfect, and framed from intellectual, not from material types, would perhaps fall very little ſhort, in accuracy or power, of an immediate revelation of the inmoſt mind, as a mode of intercourſe; and in either caſe, the interchange of knowledge and feeling would be incalculably promoted, and at the ſame time the mind, in its ſolitary operations would be freed from the thouſand illuſions that take their riſe from the ambiguous and impliable languages of the preſent ſtate.

There is, however, a point of difference between the two ſuppoſitions, which deſerves to be noticed, and it is this; that whereas the uſe of language, let it be as perfect as it may, makes it neceſſary for the mind to tread always upon a ſingle line of thought, at a time, and to divert from that line as often as it would give utterance to feelings or ideas of another claſs—on the contrary, if the mind were able to unveil itſelf independently of any medium of expreſſion, and if, as we have before ſuppoſed, a more refined corporeal ſtructure ſhould enable it to purſue, ſimul-

taneouſly, ſeveral diſtinct trains of ideas, then would the intercourſe of minds fill a vaſtly wider circle than otherwiſe it could; and in fact thoſe complex truths, and thoſe mixed impreſſions, might be conveyed which, on the very account of their complexity, are not at all to be communicated in their real nature or their full force, ſo long as it is neceſſary to ſunder them, and to dole them out piecemeal. It is eaſy to underſtand how happily this advantage muſt bear upon the advancement of the junior members of a vaſt ſocial economy, in their intercourſe with thoſe who have long ago ſcaled the heights of divine philoſophy; for although the infant capacity of the learners, as well as other reaſons, might put limits to the communication of knowledge, yet whatever it was judged expedient to convey, might be conveyed in its genuine form: it would be truth entire, although truth in part; whereas, at preſent, we learn little, if anything, and eſpecially in relation to things ſpiritual, that is not ſo conveyed as to give birth to many errors of apprehenſion, and ſo as to confirm ſuch errors, by intermixture with unqueſtioned truths. Language, or the ſymbolic conveyance of thought, is but a melody, ſweet yet ſimple; but a full utterance of the ſoul, ſuch as we have here imagined, would, in compariſon, be a ſwelling harmony, as of many voices and inſtruments.

CHAPTER IX.

The Ninth point of Advantage belonging to the contraſt between Animal Organization and Spiritual Life.

THE preſent animal body, although juſtly conſidered as the auxiliary of the mind, is very far from being merely ſuch; for, on the contrary, it has its proper intereſts, and its peculiar impulſes and inſtincts; and theſe are of ſo peremptory a ſort as often to prevail entirely over thoſe of the mind. But now we aſſume it as probable that the future corporeal ſtructure, whether it be ethereal or palpable, ſhall be the INSTRUMENT OF THE MIND, and nothing elſe, and that it ſhall have no purely organic welfare to provide for; and in a word, that it ſhall, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, be the ſervant of the intellectual and moral nature; juſt as the hand, the foot, or the eye, is the ſervant of the body.

The ſerious, and too often fatal diſadvantage,

which we undergo in commencing life as animals merely, and in having the intereſts of the animal nature ſecured by habits, and by powerful impulſes, before the higher welfare of the ſoul, or of the intellect, comes to be thought of, is a trite ſubject of fruitleſs complaint, and one not neceſſary here to be inſiſted upon. This order of things is no doubt unavoidable, and properly belongs to the initial ſtate of our exiſtence; but it is eaſy to conceive of a very different economy, and one that, while it ſhould afford all the benefits derivable from a corporeal union of mind and matter, would be exempt from the dangers and degradation thence accruing in the preſent ſtate.

The animal body is not only mechanically diviſible, and deſtructible, and eaſily injured; but it is alſo inceſſantly preying upon itſelf; and it ſpeedily diſſolves, unleſs ſuſtained by aſſimilative materials. This liability to diſſolution, and to external violence, neceſſarily involves keen ſenſibilities, and powerful appetites; and it alſo demands an inſtinctive dread of death. Now theſe various pleaſurable ſenſations and deſires, and theſe ſenſibilities to pain, and theſe inſtinctive fears, are generally paramount, and unremitted, and therefore take the lead of every other impulſe, and give law to, or virtually overrule, the courſe of life, and to a great extent countervail what, abſtractedly, we ſhould ſay, was

the intention of nature, rendering the rational faculties, and the emotions, ſubordinate to the preſervation and pleaſures of the body. The rational faculty has indeed its taſtes, and the moral faculty has its impulſes; but theſe principles are neither inceſſant, nor of abſolute and imperative neceſſity; they therefore learn to give way to that which will not give way. To a great extent it muſt be granted that the body ſerves the ſoul, only in order that the ſoul may the more effectively ſerve the body; as if a brute held a man in bondage, whom it compelled to lend it his ſuperior intelligence, and whom, for its own purpoſes, it would cheerfully carry and help at bidding.

Inſtead of all this, let us imagine a corporeal frame, indeſtructible, and indiviſible; vital without waſte, and therefore needing no pabulum, or none but ſuch as might be ſupplied in a manner analogous to that in which the animal body derives ſupport from the atmoſphere, and from light and heat. Such a body would need no dread of diſſolution; nor would it have its cravings, its appetites, or its ſenſual propenſity; or to ſay all in a word, it would have no welfare of its own to care for, or to aſſert. Inſtead of an importunate controverſy, never well adjuſted, and never brought to a concluſion, between body and ſpirit, there would be, on the one ſide, the

their paſſivity of a tool, or engine; and on the other ſide, the unchecked ſupremacy of a ſuperior nature. There would be one claſs of intereſts only to be thought of, and only one claſs of occupations to be followed. The body, with its complement of powers, applicable to its congenial element—matter—would be to the ſpirit, precisely what now the ſenſes and the muſcular ſyſtem are, while in a healthy condition, to the animal will. Not only do not the eye, and the ear, and the hand, ever repugnate, or plead for their particular intereſts; but they are almoſt, or entirely, forgotten, while the animal will is eagerly employing them to effect its purpoſes. And thus, as we may imagine, the ſpiritual body ſhall be ſo purely the inſtrument of the maſter power, that it will barely, if at all, enter into the conſciouſneſs, as a ſeparate exiſtence. Perhaps beings who have never been ſubjected to the conditions of animal life may, although actually corporeal, need to be informed of their corporeity; or they may know it, rather by reflection and inference, than by immediate conſciouſneſs; and we may conceive of an inſulated race of ſpiritually embodied beings who, although really converſant with an external and material world, would have recourſe to circuitous deductions, when required to ſhow that anything except mind exiſted.

This ſort of abſolute ſubordination, or ſheer inſtrumentality of the body, is, we ſay, readily conceived of; and it is clearly a condition of being which is abſtractedly poſſible, and ſuch as may in fact be now the prerogative of the moſt exalted natures. There are, however, reaſons for doubting whether, in the full ſenſe, as above ſtated, it is intended for man, or at leaſt in the *next* ſtage of his exiſtence; and it is ſeparable from thoſe other advantages which, in the preceding chapters, we have ventured to aſſign to the future ſpiritual body. This body may indeed be immortal, indiviſible, and exempt from the neceſſities of aliment and clothing; but in ſo far as it is ſtill aſſimilated with the material world, percipient of the properties of matter, and therefore ſo far paſſive, the mind, by this alliance, may yet be ſuſceptible of pleaſures, not proper to pure ſpirit, and ſuch as may give occaſion to the continued exerciſe of ſelf-command; and it may ſtill be bound to uſe abſtinence, and to cheriſh nobler counteractive taſtes. Then again, as is quite obvious, whoever, by alliance with matter, is open to ſenſitive pleaſures, is likely to be liable, nay, we ſhould ſay, is neceſſarily liable, to the ſuffering of pain, from expoſure to other properties of matter, as, for example, to the intenſity of fire. This point well deſerves attention; nor is the chain of inferences on which our reaſoning depends, circuitous. Corporeity

is, by its definition, an amalgamation of mind and matter, in conſequence of which the former exerts certain powers over the latter, and in turn becomes paſſively conſcious of its properties. Of theſe properties it is conſcious, firſt, in the way of mere diſtinction; and ſecondly, in the way of gratification, and of ſuffering—of pleaſure and pain. Now it is hardly to be admitted as poſſible, that a corporeal ſtructure—the vehicle of mind—ſhould be open to the one claſs of ſenſations, and not to the other: in fact, the one is often nothing more than an exceſs of the other; and it is as eaſy to think of the mind's being conſcious of light and colours, but unconſcious of their abſence and their oppoſites, darkneſs and blackneſs, as of its percipience of ſenſitive pleaſure, while incapable of ſenſitive pain. It is true that the mind may be removed from the actual occaſions of pain; or it may be ſhielded from it; but yet it muſt, as we ſuppoſe, be eſſentially liable thereto, if it be at all paſſive in relation to the properties of matter.

Moreover, as there appears to be a *phyſical* connexion, or neceſſary correſpondence, between the one claſs of ſenſations and the other, ſo likewiſe are we compelled to ſuppoſe that there is a moral relation between the two; or a neceſſary connexion, ariſing from the conſtitution of free and accountable agents. For all the analogies

at preſent within our reach, tend to confirm the opinion that thoſe higher and purer motives in which virtue eſſentially conſiſts, demand, as their ſupport, the concurrent influence of certain lower and more cogent motives;—thoſe namely which ſpring from an abſtract liability to corporeal miſery. And if the mind is to hold converſe with matter pleaſurably, this acceſſion of the means of enjoyment is probably to be balanced by ſuch a liability to pain as may effectively check the too eager purſuit of a lower and dangerous ſpecies of felicity. Is there not reaſon in the ſuppoſition that the two kinds of paſſivity are neceſſary as antitheſes, the one of the other, as well in a moral, as in a phyſical ſenſe? If man, in a future and higher ſtage of his exiſtence, is to exult in the brightneſs and beauty of a fair and new creation, and is to delight himſelf in contraſts and agreements of colour, glowing amid a univerſal effulgence, if he is to perceive all ſweets and perfumes, and to be raviſhed with forms, melodies, and harmonies, can this corporeal bliſs be taſted on any other condition than that of its being *poſſible* for him to endure the anguiſh of fire, the vehemence of froſt, the diſtraction of diſcord, the horror of deformity, and the pungent corroſion of acrid poiſons? And again, if the moſt elevated and the pureſt ſort of happineſs—that moſt proper to the ſpirit—is to be ſoftened down, attenuated, blended, by taking its turn with plea-

ſures of an inferior kind, and if in this manner complex ſentiments are to be generated (which in fact appear neceſſary to the harmony of the intellectual life), if this is to take place, then muſt not thoſe who are thus open to what we muſt call the ſeductions of corporeal enjoyment—muſt they not have in recollection, as a ſilent dread, the abſtract poſſibility, at leaſt, not merely of moral and intellectual degradation, and a loſs of the nobleſt taſtes; but of expoſure to the terrible wretchedneſs of continued corporeal pain?

As a leading hint for meditations of this ſort, let it be remembered that no expectations we are able to form, on the ground of phyſical analogies, ſuch, for example, as thoſe that have occupied the preceding pages, or any others which to the reader may ſeem more probable, throw any light upon the momentous queſtion, whether, in the next ſtage of our exiſtence, we ſhall find ourſelves MORE HAPPY, or leſs ſo, than we are at preſent. There are, indeed, the ſtrongeſt reaſons for ſuppoſing, revelation apart, that human nature is deſtined to expand its actual powers, and to occupy a wider ſphere of action and of knowledge, than it does in the preſent ſtate; but then this future advancement, like ſome advancements of the preſent life, may rather expoſe us to heavier cares and pains, than augment our enjoyment, or ſecure our peace. The actual condition of mankind, taken at large, will by no means warrant

our confidently aſſuming that a phyſical and intellectual progreſſion muſt imply an increaſe of happineſs and virtue; nor, when the moral ſtate of a large proportion, or of the maſs of mankind is duly conſidered, can we, on the ſtrength of abſtract arguments, drawn from the divine attributes of benevolence and wiſdom, deduce with ſafety the inference that the millions of our fellow-men are moving forward on the road to goodneſs and felicity. On the contrary, appalling facts that force themſelves on our reluctant notice, in relation to the habits, uſages, and propenſities of ſeveral races of the human family, wear the moſt grim and gloomy aſpect, and are ſuch as to ſuggeſt forebodings as painful as any the mind can admit. Individually, indeed, we may entertain a cheerful and rational hope concerning the future life; but then the grounds of it muſt be drawn altogether from another quarter —namely, from the ſpecific inferences of our belief as Chriſtians. But to this ſubject a little more attention is due, before we advance to the ſecond portion of our theory of another life.

CHAPTER X.

The balanced probability of Happineſs or Miſery involved in the Phyſical Theory of Another Life.

IN reviewing the ſeveral particulars of this firſt portion of our phyſical theory of another life, it may be well to advert, for a moment, to each ſingly, with the view of ſhowing more in detail, that each of theſe points of ſuppoſed advantage—each conjectural prerogative of the ſpiritual body—ſtands evenly balanced between happineſs and ſuffering, as a means of augmenting, indifferently, the one or the other, as thus:—

By the ſenſes of ſight and hearing, by the excurſive power of the imagination, and by the far-ſtretching deductions of ſcience, we now take mental poſſeſſion of a vaſt extent of the viſible world; and the power of actually traverſing the fields of the material univerſe, we may, with ſome ſhow of reaſon, anticipate, as intended for a being to whom already ſo much has been

granted. Does it not ſeem that, at preſent, while ſome of the faculties, corporeal and mental, greatly exceed others in the range or ſphere that is allowed them, there is an incompleteneſs, or a want of balance, in our conſtitution? We are tenants of a ſpacious houſe; but although we have the run of certain apartments, we are only permitted to look into the halls and the ſaloons. But ſhall not theſe reſtrictions be at length removed, and man find all doors of the palace thrown open to him? Man who now poſſeſſes the faculty to comprehend, and the taſte to admire, the divine works, ſhall at length, as we may infer, enjoy the liberty of following the Creator wherever order and beauty are diſplayed. The mind ſhall find itſelf competent, corporeally, to every labour, and to every adventure which its high rational deſires may impel it to attempt; nor, in the mere deſtitution of the mechanical means, ſhall it be left to ſigh, and to confeſs that its nobleſt ambition is fruſtrate; and that, although endowed with a ſeraph's intelligence, and incited by an inſatiate thirſt of knowledge and deſire of action, it is gifted only with a locomotive power fit for the brute that grazes in a meadow! The complement of the human faculties ſhall, may we not confidently ſay it? be at length filled up, and the body be put in ſymmetry with the range of the mind.

But then every faculty has its impulſe, which,

when repreſſed, becomes a wreſtling uneaſineſs; and this ſpecies of agony bears proportion to the inherent energy of that faculty. And if now, when the locomotive power has but a very narrow range, and when the exerciſe of it, although pleaſurable at firſt, very ſoon produces fatigue and pain—if now, we ſay, corporeal reſtraint and impriſonment be one of the moſt intolerable of bodily ills, what ſhall impriſonment be when the locomotive energy is a thouſand times more vehement than at preſent, and when the exerciſe of it is attended with no conſcious effort, and is followed by no laſſitude, and when the wideſt and the faireſt fields ſhall lie in proſpect before it? The chain of the captive is galling, in proportion, or nearly ſo, to the captive's animal vigour and elaſtic ſpirit. Let it then be imagined that the future man, new born to his inheritance of abſolute mechanical force—the inherent force of mind—and finding himſelf able at will to traverſe all ſpaces, ſhould in the very hour wherein he has made proof of his recent faculty, be ſtopped, either by malignant ſuperior powers, or by the dread miniſters of juſtice, and, on account of forgotten miſdeeds, be ſeized, enchained, incarcerated! Might we not, with a rational conſiſtency, and in conformity with ſome of the actual procedures of the preſent ſocial ſyſtem, imagine, for example, the mercileſs tyrant who in cold revenge has held the innocent

in his dungeon through long years, or the ruffian ſlave dealer, juſt burſting from the thralls of mortality, and proudly careering through mid-heaven, but only to encounter there ſome ſtronger than himſelf, and more fierce, who, with mockery ſhowing their warrant, ſhall grapple with his young vigour, hale him to the abyſs, find there a chain ſtrong enough to bind him, and rivet him to the rock, where he is to chafe, and taſte the retributive miſeries of captivity, and the fruitleſs ſtrivings and writhings of a power ſufficient, if it were not bound, to bear him from ſtar to ſtar! All this is ſo credible abſtractedly, and may be ſo readily conceived of, on the ground of common facts, that one can hardly think of it otherwiſe than as actually true.

Many ſimilar conceptions, which often break upon the mind uncalled, and which, even when ſtrictly examined, refuſe to be diſmiſſed as mere dreams—many ſuch conceptions which, whether or not they have their archetypes in any region of the univerſe, are at leaſt reaſonable enough to anſwer the purpoſe of convincing us that thoſe enhancements of our powers which are to be expected in a future life, may be either the means of enjoyment, or the means of miſery, according as our moral condition, and the great rules of the divine government ſhall determine.

Or let us take up another ſort of alternative;

and in order to conceive the more diſtinctly of the happy part of it, imagine the inſtance of a ſpirit, which, in the initial period of its exiſtence, has been ſecluded from the material univerſe, and acquainted only with intellectual abſtractions, and with pure moral emotions: ſuch a ſpirit, already capable of reflecting upon, and of comprehending the change it is paſſing through, we ſuppoſe gradually to awake to a conſciouſneſs of the properties of matter, one by one: hitherto totally deſtitute of ideas and ſenſations, it is now ſlowly born into corporeal exiſtence; it is becoming conſcious of ſolidity, and it gropes its way along extended ſurfaces, and in learning the power of reſiſtance in theſe ſurfaces, it learns its own new power of originating motion, and of traverſing ſpace. It begins then to graſp the external world, and ſeems to itſelf to have taken poſſeſſion of a foreign nature, and by the aid of the contraſt, thence ariſing, it comes to think, for the firſt time, of its own ſpiritual nature, as a diſtinct being; by the knowledge of *another ſpecies*, it comprehends and reflects upon its *own ſpecies*, which we may ſuppoſe to have been abſtractedly impoſſible ſo long as one kind of being only was known. Thus the ſpirit's birth into the world of matter, is almoſt equivalent, perhaps quite ſo, to a new birth into the world of mind.

But other ſenſations follow in their turn. This ſolid extenſion, with which it has juſt become

converſant, is perceived to be not of uniform quality; for beſides its mechanical properties, its hardneſs, ſoftneſs, roughneſs, and weight, it affects the ſenſitive faculty by its chemical properties, in all their variety;—its pungencies, its flavours, its perfumes; and each new property, as it comes to be perceived, enlarges, ſo far, the mind's circle of conſcious exiſtence. Then next the vibrations of ſound call it to enter a new world; and melody and harmony, breaking ſuddenly upon the ſoul, cauſe it to feel as if another ſpirit had been added to itſelf; or as if another being, happy, empaſſioned, and ecſtatic, had come to be blended with it, and to double its power of enjoyment. Recollecting its primitive ſtate of mere intellectuality, it now feels itſelf to be three or five times more than it then was. But the range of perception ſtill goes on enlarging, and this mind, in the courſe of its gradual birth into the material world, becomes alive to warmth —genial and pleaſurable ſenſe, and yet an ominous ſenſe alſo. Has it not now reached the boundary of ſenſitive exiſtence? no, for in the next inſtant light breaks in upon it with a ſudden amazement, and the univerſe, with all its beauties and glories, and its immenſity, ſtands revealed! We ſaid, that the firſt perception of ſound and harmony was as if another ſpirit, rich in ſenſations, had been added to the individual conſciouſneſs; but this new perception of light

is nothing leſs than the having the individual conſciouſneſs, heretofore gathered about a centre, expanded without a bound, and made capable of a ſort of ubiquity. To ſee, and in ſeeing, to converſe with all forms of grace and grandeur, is to have the life multiplied a million times; and it is to ſtretch exiſtence and enjoyment to the height and width of the univerſe. Thus far we have followed the new-born mind to the limit of thoſe ſenſations that are actually enjoyed by ourſelves; but there yet remains all that further conſciouſneſs of the properties, and of the internal conſtitution of the material world, which lies beyond the reach of human organs of ſenſation;—all that which is too ſubtile, or too intenſe, or too remote, to be admitted or ſuſtained by the animal brain and nerves; and this yet unknown portion of the properties of matter, not improbably, vaſtly exceeds the portion which our animal life allows of our perceiving: and we are free to ſuppoſe that, when a more refined and imperiſhable corporeity ſhall be inherited by man, the means of knowledge, and the faculties of ſenſitive enjoyment ſhall be augmented tenfold; ſo that its future new birth into the material univerſe ſhall quicken and amaze the human ſpirit, as much as we have imagined the pure ſpirit to be awakened and delighted, in paſſing from mere abſtract intellectual life, to ſenſitive life, ſuch as we now actually poſſeſs it.

Yet all this, manifeſtly, is only the favourable ſide of an alternative; for our daily experience teaches us, that ſenſations which are pleaſurable within a certain limit, become firſt uneaſy, and then painful, beyond it; ſo that agreeable ſenſation may be called the delicious *initial* ſtage of a proceſs, the *laſt* ſtage of which, if it comes on, is an intolerable anguiſh. Every ſpecies of ſenſitive enjoyment needs a ſtay; and it is *enjoyment* ſo long only as it is moderated: in other words, the mind, in becoming conſcious of the properties of matter, is laid open to the extremes of pleaſure and pain; and it may endure the one as ſoon as enjoy the other; the moſt thrilling delights are but the a, b, c, of inſupportable torments. What, for example, is an extreme caſe of neuralgia, but a point at the lower limit of the very ſcale upon which are marked the nice degrees of animal felicity? Only let the inherent ſenſitive faculty of the mind be entirely excoriated, if we might ſo ſpeak, and itſelf be turned out upon the material world, to feel and to taſte, without abatement, the whole ſtreſs of all its properties, and it muſt ſuffer anguiſh in a thouſand modes. In the preſent animal body the mind's ſenſitiveneſs to light, for inſtance, is ſheathed and reſtricted: how ſmall is the optic expanſion, and how is this ſmall ſurface curtained, and provided with triple means of ſecluſion! The mind converſes with light in a very jealous

way, and much as the beſieged hold a parley with the beſiegers, when the latter are ten thouſand to one, of the former; that is to ſay, a few of the enemy only are admitted within the gates at a time. Fully expoſed to the vibrations of light, the mind, even, at the dimmeſt twilight, would ſuffer an agony of excitement; and under the beams of noon muſt be maddened with torment. Need we go on to ſpeak of heat, of which the feebleſt degrees only are pleaſurable, while a ſlight augmentation of its intenſity totally vanquiſhes the fortitude of ordinary minds; and none perhaps could retain ſelf-command longer than a few minutes if left to feel its extremity. And let it be remembered that, although the animal texture, the muſcular fibre, the nerve, and the veſſels, are preſently diſſolved, or conſumed, by the action of fire, and ſo the animal anguiſh quickly reaches its end, yet that we aſſume far too much if we conclude that the ſenſitive faculty of the mind is itſelf liable to any ſuch diſſolution. Fire reduces to vapour or to aſhes, that which, by its nature, may exiſt indifferently in a ſolid and organized, or in a gaſeous, or a pulverized form. But is the mind ſuſceptible of vaporization, or can it be reduced to powder? We ſuppoſe not, and therefore believe it might ſuſtain, undeſtroyed and undamaged, the utmoſt intenſity of heat; nor is it certain that every ſpecies of corporeity muſt give way, and be diſſipated by this element.

There is room for the ſame ſtatement in relation to every property of matter, which we find intenſely to affect the ſenſitive principle; ſuch as the corroſive poiſons; and perhaps we owe it, at preſent, to the inſenſibility of our animal organization, or to its neutralizing inertneſs, that the material world does not, in a thouſand modes, affect us as do arſenic and oxalic acid when taken into the ſtomach. Enough we know to be ſure, that, apart from conſiderations of a religious kind, the probabilities of enhanced pleaſure or pain, in coming more fully into contact with matter and its properties, are evenly balanced.

Again:—a diſcernment or intuitive knowledge of the interior conſtitution, and of the occult forms of the material ſyſtem, we have named as likely to be enjoyed when the mind enters upon its ſtate of ſpiritual corporeity, and we have conjectured that this immediate perception of the mechaniſm of nature, beſide the pleaſure it may directly afford, will involve a higher advantage, inaſmuch as, by diſengaging the attention from thoſe phyſical truths, which now principally excite curioſity, and employ the reaſoning faculty, it ſhall ſend the mind forward, with its inſatiable thirſt of knowledge, toward the more excellent and ſublime myſteries of the ſpiritual economy, and of the divine nature. But then this advan-

tage demands certain moral conditions in the mind itſelf, or it muſt become the occaſion of an enhanced miſery; and that in two ways; as thus:—

—The pleaſures, organic and mental, ariſing from objects of ſenſe, are, to a great extent, as we well know, dependent upon our being able to keep entire many illuſions, and certain natural exaggerations, which at once conceal what might awaken diſguſt, and impart to theſe enjoyments a fictitious importance. All gratifications of the ſenſes, and all the pleaſures of taſte, and all the excitements of worldly pleaſure—all the pride, and all the pomp of life—demand largely the aid of artificial lights, and glare, or in plain words, of *deception*, to eke out their eſſential poverty, and to render them what the mind can, and will, care for. Every day we ſtoop to be cheated and delighted with what we ſhould ſcorn or loathe, if it were offered to us in its naked value. But, by the law of habit, a long courſe of excluſive regard to factitious gratifications of this ſort, brings the mind into a ſtate in which, at length, it ceaſes to recollect that an illuſion is an illuſion —ceaſes to reclaim its native ſuperiority, and becomes the paſſive victim of the ſleights and tricks of worldly pleaſure. The ſoul is at laſt ſmothered in the trumpery of its vulgar and ſenſual delights. Now to a mind thus wedded, by inveterate habit, to all that is falſe and unreal,

the new faculty of ſeeing through forms and ſemblances, and of keenly and clearly diſcerning the unadorned mechaniſm of things material, muſt at once ſtrip it of its all, and reduce it to a pitiable deſtitution. The gold will no longer ſhine, the diamond no longer ſparkle; the plumed pomp of rank will be a nothing—ſet about with quills; and this plump world, ſleek with delicacies, is at once ſhrivelled to an atrophy; and the material univerſe, lately ſo gay and blooming to the idolatrous eyes of its devotee, ſtarts to view, as a gaunt ſkeleton, barely knit together with its ſear ſinews.

Or we may look at the natural conſequence of this ſuppoſed intuition of the occult conſtruction of the material ſyſtem on another ſide. If the entire nature of things material were once ſeen, and ſeen without a ſhadow of uncertainty, and all were known at a glance which it is the glory of our phyſical ſciences to diſcover; then the mind, by the neceſſity of its conſtitution, would be thrown forward toward higher objects, and its inherent curioſity would be fixed upon the next range of unknown principles. But what muſt theſe principles relate to? Unqueſtionably they muſt involve, if they do not excluſively embrace, the awful verities of the Divine Nature. It is theſe truths that muſt ſtand forward *next*, after the material ſyſtem has been underſtood. And yet, while this phyſical ne-

ceſſity of moving forwards impels the mind irreſiſtibly to approach the Ineffable Perfection, perhaps its own moral condition, and its confirmed impure taſtes, are of a kind that would lead it to eſcape, and to hide itſelf from the brightneſs of eternal truth. We may imagine an inſufferable conflict, rending the ſoul perpetually, and urging it at once vehemently to penetrate a myſtery, and to learn that which, when actually known, muſt inflict upon it the tortures of ſelf-contempt, remorſe, and deſpair.

Or again :—A very obvious train of thought, and one by which we need not be here detained, will lead us to admit that the boon of a plenary memory, or a perpetual and perfect conſciouſneſs of all that has, in any period, belonged to our corporeal and mental exiſtence, could prove a bleſſing only to thoſe whoſe whole conſtitution, moral and intellectual, were in harmony; but a curſe to any within whoſe boſoms vehement and malign paſſions were at variance, and all at war with the unalterable principles of virtue. Memory, what is it but the fuel of remorſe to the guilty? and how intenſely muſt that fire burn which ſhall be ſupplied with its material in a hundred-fold proportion to what it is in the preſent life! But on this topic the reader's meditations can need no prompting.

Then a ſimilar train of inferences may be purſued in relation to the ſuppoſed ſubſtitution of a real and rational aſſociation of ideas, in the place of an accidental and organic ſucceſſion of thoughts and feelings. The bliſs of folly, and the laughing infatuation of vice, are ſuſtained, in great meaſure, by the aid of that whimſical and irrational ſeries of images which ordinarily diverts the mind from the conſideration of its real condition, and its welfare. And theſe fantaſtic images become continually more and more blended with the actual moral taſtes, and therefore more and more enchain the attention, and exclude truth and reaſon. The diſſipation of theſe dreams would be, to a mind enthralled by them, a ſad and terrible awakening. On the contrary, if the mind has really ſet forward on the road of virtue and wiſdom, and intenſely deſires truth—the higheſt truth, and nothing elſe: then nothing ſo propitious, or ſo happily exciting, could happen to it, as to be exempted, and for ever, from the tyranny of merely organic ſuggeſtions, and from the brute deſpotiſm of fortuity, within the ſacred precincts of its meditations and emotions.

The very ſame alternative preſents itſelf, if we think of the probable conſequences, either of an enlarged power of attending ſimultaneouſly to various objects, and of carrying on various operations, or to the faculty of perceiving abſtract re-

lations, at a glance. For each of theſe advancements, while it liberates the wiſe and ſincere from mental embarraſſments, and frees them from occaſions of error, will ſtrip the unwiſe and the falſehearted of thoſe means of illuſion which, with a half conſcious perverſity, they have been wont to employ for the purpoſe of maintaining their ſelf-eſteem. To rational natures, illuſions muſt be temporary; but it is not certain that a cordial and happy admiſſion of truth, and a ſubmiſſion to its practical conſequences, will immediately and in all caſes, follow the diſſipation of error; for between the mere intellectual perception of any principle, and a yielding to the inference thence reſulting, there intervene, not only contrary deſires and inveterate habits, but the ſheer ſtubbornneſs of the will; or that energy of pride which is ſeen to be the firmeſt element of human nature, and the one which, leaſt of all, and laſt of all, is open to the influence of conſiderations of perſonal welfare; nor are inſtances rare, wherein, with a clear and diſtinct choice, perſonal welfare—ſelf-intereſt entire, has been held in contempt, and has been for ever thrown away, for the ſaving of pride, and for the preſervation of a ſtubborn purpoſe. Now that which happens (we may ſay ordinarily, or often) in the preſent ſtate, may be reckoned upon as likely to happen alſo in a future ſtate; and it may then be ſeen that intelligent beings, under

the full glare of the eternal principles of truth and virtue, will nevertheleſs ſpurn to confeſs the application of theſe truths to their own individual caſe, and will chooſe rather to endure the worſt conſequences of perſiſting in a falſe poſition. There are few, perhaps, who, if they would look cloſely into their hearts, might not find the indications at leaſt, of feelings which, under certain circumſtances, would impel them to act in the obdurate manner we have here ſuppoſed.

There is, however, this difference to be noted, namely, that, in the preſent ſtate, let truth be brought home to our convictions ever ſo clearly, at certain times, there is yet always left behind a reſerve of ſophiſms, or of ſpecious exceptions, or evaſions; there is always a miſtineſs and a dimneſs, to which, after a little while, the mind may revert, and ſo may fondly perſuade itſelf that things are not really as they have been repreſented. But this refuge of lies, muſt, as we ſuppoſe, be entirely broken up with the breaking up of that animal organization of the mind whence chiefly illuſions ariſe; nor could theſe fallacies ever again be reſorted to, after the faculty of diſcerning intuitively the abſtract relations of things had come into play. The mind would then inceſſantly have in view the unalterable verities of moral order and goodneſs, juſt as we now apprehend the ſimpleſt mathematical

propoſitions, and yet would (or might) wreſtle againſt the plain conſequence, as applied to itſelf, with an unabated determination never to confeſs it—never to bend, or to ſay, "I have ſinned, and am in the wrong." Such a ſtruggle between the intellect and the will, going on while the perſonal welfare was diſmally ſacrificed, cannot be conceived of otherwiſe than as involving utter wretchedneſs.

Nor ſhould it be forgotten that, although at preſent, owing in part to the extreme indiſtinctneſs and variableneſs of language, in part to the organic imperfections of individual minds, and in great part too ariſing from our want of immediate communication with the ſpiritual world —owing we ſay to theſe cauſes, even the ſimpleſt elements of moral truth never force themſelves irreſiſtibly upon our aſſent; whereas, when theſe obſcurities and ambiguities ſhall have paſſed away, moral truth, probably, will be the ſimpleſt and moſt certain, and the moſt irreſiſtibly convincing of all kinds of truth, not excepting mathematical axioms; ſo that the mind, if it be not happily in harmony with theſe principles, ſhall be cruſhed under their weight, and be totally unable ſo much as to raiſe itſelf into an attitude of reſiſtance, although ſtill repugnant in will. As the moſt diſtreſſing uneaſineſs to which upright minds are now liable is that occaſioned by miſgivings and perplexities concerning the great

moral ſyſtem, ſo, in the future ſtate, as we may believe, ſhall an intenſity of diſquiet affect the perverſe, the unjuſt, and the impure, from the glaring brightneſs and certainty of the principles of that ſame ſyſtem.

We have alluded to the benefits and pleaſures that are likely to reſult from the ſubſtitution of a perfect medium of communication among minds, in the place of the rude and inadequate ſymbols which compoſe our mundane languages. And yet here again this high advantage can be no bleſſing apart from goodneſs, integrity, purity, in thoſe to whom it ſhall attach. All powers and qualities, whether mechanical, chemical, intellectual, or moral, are ſeverally enhanced by the accumulation of numbers:—that is to ſay, each part or parcel of the maſs is raiſed to a higher value or intenſity when it forms one of a heap, than when left to itſelf; it is ſo that combuſtion rages the more as fuel is heaped upon the pyre, and ſo that minds develop their fulleſt powers, and ſo that very ſedate ſentiments are often exalted to the pitch of a mad enthuſiaſm. The more complete and immediate is the correſpondence of the parts, or of the individuals one with another, the more will this enhancement of the individual, and of the combined force be accelerated, and the further will it go. The preſent imperfections of language therefore,

if on the one hand they operate to bar our advancement in knowledge and virtue, on the other, ſerve to put a check upon the peſtilent circulation of vice. The actual peace and purity of the world are perhaps nearly as much attributable to the ſhutting in of the horrid ſecrets of the worſt hearts, as to the diffuſion of the benign ſentiments and happy affections of the beſt. What would human ſociety preſently become, if thoſe myſteries of malice and impurity that are locked within ſome few boſoms, were divulged to all, ſo that all might and muſt catch the infection of blaſphemy, hatred, and corruption!

Now, although we ſuppoſe that, in the future as well as in the preſent ſtate, communication ſhall be voluntary, and that therefore the ſecrets of the heart may there, as here, be kept ſecret; yet we know there is actually a motive in our nature, and a motive that expands itſelf eſpecially in the moſt depraved minds, impelling ſuch, with a wantonneſs of horrid vanity, to expoſe the ulcers of their ſouls to the eyes of others. That ſuch an ambition attaches to deſperate wickedneſs, none can doubt whoſe lot has led them to be much converſant with the loſt and reprobate of human kind. This motive cannot fail to be powerfully excited by the conſciouſneſs of an increaſed facility for indulging it. This ſort of augmentation attends all the paſſions and deſires. Let then the very worſt

minds, herding with multitudes ready for infection, find themſelves endowed with a faculty—not of dimly, laborioufly, and inadequately expreſſing intellectual and moral notions, but of vividly and copiouſly ſetting forth, as it were upon the ſtall, the rich abominations of their ſouls, and of attracting and of faſcinating all eyes, by the endleſs novelties of their verſatile wickedneſs:—let ſuch feel themſelves able to convulſe vaſt congregations with woe-ſhaken burſts of laughter, by freſh and freſh expoſures of infernal ſin; let there be room for this, and what were ſuch a world! and yet in following out this frightful ſuppoſition, we invent nothing, we aſſume nothing out of nature, or which may not be ſuſtained as ſimply probable by the analogy of actual facts, frequently occurring in the preſent ſtate.

Once more; let it be conſidered that, although the abſolute ſubordination of the corporeal faculties to the will and purpoſes of the mind, and the conſequent abſence of ſeparate bodily intereſts, muſt be felt as a high advantage, by thoſe who are conſcious that they are ſteadily purſuing the real welfare of the ſpirit, and are purſuing it on the true path; the feeling muſt be the very reverſe in any caſe in which it is known that theſe real and permanent intereſts have been deſperately compromiſed, and that the courſe

upon which the ſpirit is ruſhing forward is one of madneſs, folly, damage, and deſpair. In the preſent ſtate, we often owe much of the alleviation of mental diſtreſs to the conſtantly recurring neceſſity of caring for the body; and ſometimes even the very ſufferings of the body gratefully relieve the heart of the otherwiſe inceſſant burden of its griefs: there is a diverſion, an alternation, and a relief, ariſing merely from the ſhifting of our cares and pains.

But if the body has no longer any wants, and no ſeparate welfare to be thought of; if it have come to be nothing but the mind's paſſive inſtrument, and its medium of action and ſenſation; and if, at the ſame time, the mind knows that it has fallen far back from the courſe of hope and happineſs, if its well-being has been ſported with, and thrown away, then muſt a brooding melancholy and remorſe fix themſelves without intermiſſion upon the ſoul, and its miſery muſt become unmixed. Here again we are not dreaming of things altogether unreal and fantaſtic; but are only imagining this our actual human nature, and our actual modes of feeling, at work in their accuſtomed manner, under a change of circumſtances; and this change, too, ſuch as has a rational connexion with the known principles of the intellectual ſyſtem.

Our concluſion then is (as ſtated at the commencement of this digreſſive chapter), that al-

though we may reaſonably anticipate certain enhancements of the powers of human nature to take place in a future ſtage of its progreſs, yet, that none of theſe additions or improvements neceſſarily involves an increaſe of happineſs; but on the contrary, is in itſelf as likely to bring with it an intenſity of ſuffering. The queſtion, therefore, whether we are to be MORE HAPPY in another world, than at preſent, or leſs ſo, muſt be determined by reaſons that are to be ſought for altogether from a different quarter. Any PHYSICAL THEORY of another life muſt leave this anxiety juſt where it found it.

CHAPTER XI.

Probable Point of Contraſt between the Animal and Spiritual Body, in the Principle of their Conſtruction reſpectively.

HITHERTO we have adventured nothing concerning the exterior conformation, or viſible ſtructure of the future human body; nor indeed are we much diſpoſed to do ſo, inaſmuch as it is not merely a ſubject of ſecondary importance in itſelf, but it is one that comes leſs within the reach of rational conjecture; and, moreover, it is of a kind likely to call up the fantaſies of the imagination. Nevertheleſs, before we paſs on, let a word be ſaid on this point: yet we ſhall not ſtay, either to defend or explain the hint or two we may ſuggeſt.

We aſſume then, in the firſt place, that the apparent import of ſome paſſages and phraſes of Scripture tends to ſuggeſt the belief that the die of human nature, as to its form and figure, is to be uſed again in a new world. Partly on the

ground of inferences from general principles, and partly on the ſtrength of particular aſſertions, we ſuppoſe that the fair and faultleſs paradiſaical model of human beauty and majeſty, which ſtood forward as the moſt illuſtrious inſtance of creative wiſdom—the bright gem of the viſible world —this form, too, which has been borne and conſecrated by incarnate Deity—that it ſhall at length regain its forfeited honours, and once more be pronounced, "very good;" ſo good as to forbid its being ſuperſeded; on the contrary, that it ſhall be reinſtated and allowed, after its long degradation, to enjoy its birthright of immortality.

It is true, indeed, that the inſpired writers put a diſparagement upon thoſe adventitious recommendations of the perſon to which, in our fondneſs and folly, we are prone to attach an inordinate importance. Nevertheleſs, while they do ſo, they are far from uſing the ſtyle of cynics or of ſtoics; much leſs do they, like the atheiſt, throw contempt upon human nature, or ſpurn the conditions of the animal and ſocial economy, or pride themſelves, like the myſtic, upon a ſovereign diſdain of all ordinary motives and affections. Nothing of this ſort do we meet with in the Scriptures: on the contrary, not merely the prophets and poets of the Old Teſtament, but our Lord and his apoſtles, uniformly treat with a grave reſpect whatever is part and

parcel of human nature;—a reſpect well becoming devout minds, which are apt to diſcern, and are prepared to reverence, the Creator, in all his works. From the general tone of the inſpired writers we might gather the opinion that, in ſpeaking of the human body, they, with a prophetic eye, beheld it as deſtined to a new and permanent glory, and as intended to ſtand as the image of God, freed from diſtortions and blemiſhes, and exempt from decay.

So plaſtic are all materials under the hand of Infinite Intelligence, and ſo ſuſceptible are natural forms of accommodation to two or more purpoſes, and ſo much does the unexhauſted ſkill of the Creator delight to ſhow its reſources, that we may readily believe the human body to have been ſo planned, from the firſt, as that its form might adapt itſelf to another, and a different internal economy. That is to ſay—while the uſes of internal parts, and their functions may be changed, yet it will be ſo as that the new functions and uſes of parts ſhall, without damage, work in with the original contour and ſymmetry of the form. In this manner, not only ſhall the firſt deſign of the Creator be honoured, but the momentous early hiſtory of man upon earth ſhall be viſibly kept in mind, by the perpetuity of the form under which its events were tranſacted; and ſo, too, ſhall there be ſecured a vivid

recollection of perſonal identity, and individual character. On this ſuppoſition, the human form, whatever ſplendours may inveſt it, or whatever energies it may exerciſe, will carry forward, through ages, a memento of that firſt ſtage of life, whence fortunes ſo high have ſprung; in like manner (to compare great things with ſmall) as ancient houſes preſerve, in their armorial bearings, the ſymbols of the feats by which the founder of the family won his honours and lands.

But let all this be as it may, meantime there is little hazard in ſtating the probability that, whatever is to be the type of the future corporeity, it ſhall not exhibit leſs of divine ſkill and benignity than does our preſent animal organization; rather, as it may well be ſuppoſed, this advance in the ſcale of being ſhall be marked by a correſponding higher excellence of the mechaniſm that ſuſtains it; and we may believe that the frame which is to exult over death, ſhall be even more wonderfully conſtructed than the one over which death had triumphed. Shall not the very elements of that immortal body be more plaſtic, more refined, and more readily aſſimilated to mind; ſo that no contrarieties will have to be reconciled, no repugnancies to be overcome, and no compromiſes to be made?

There is, however, a probable point of contraſt

in the conſtruction of the preſent and the future body, which deſerves to be noticed; and it may be thus explained. The admirable contrivances involved in animal and vegetable organization may properly be conſidered under two aſpects; that is to ſay, firſt, as conſiſting in the adaptation of the general properties and affinities of the material world to the purpoſes of life; and ſecondly, in the adaptation, one to another, of the ſeveral members, organs, and viſcera of the plant or animal, ſo as to educe from thoſe elementary principles the intended reſult. For example, in the economy of a plant, there is firſt to be noticed, the CHEMICAL and inviſible proceſs, through the courſe of which light, heat, moiſture, electricity, oxygen, azote, carbon, and the various metallic and ſaline ſubſtances furniſhed by the ſoil, are compounded, in modes inimitable by human art, for the production of the ſeveral ſpecific vegetable ſubſtances—the wood, the reſins, the ſap, the ſugar, and the reſt. But then, in the next place, there is the MECHANICAL adjuſtment of parts, as ſeen in the root, and ſtem, and leaves; in the veſſels, the abſorbents, the expirents, the flower, the fruit, the ſeed. And the ſame diſtinction is obſervable in the animal ſyſtem; that is to ſay, there is the ſecret proceſs with its elementary principles; and there is the viſible mechanical apparatus.

Now in ſome beings the *principles* may be few and the *proceſs* ſimple, while the *mechaniſm is* complex and the *parts* intricate and many. Or in other beings, on the contrary, the principles may be various, and their interaction highly refined, while the mechaniſm is of the ſimpleſt kind; and then it is eaſy to conceive of great diverſities in the *relative complexity* of theſe two claſſes of contrivances;—as for example, in one inſtance there may be an elaborate ſtructure, and few elementary principles; in another, a harmony of a thouſand elements, effected upon an organization that might be underſtood at a glance. If an illuſtration of this diſtinction were needed, we might refer to certain products of human ingenuity, and perhaps ſhould not find a better than that furniſhed by the chronometer, or by a muſical automaton, in both which a very few of the principles or properties of matter are wrought upon; namely, gravitation, elaſticity, momentum, friction, vibration; and theſe few are all of one claſs, and might perhaps be reduced to two; while the parts of the mechaniſm, and the adjuſtments which are to produce the required regularity of movement, are ſo numerous, ſo refined, and ſo complicated, as to render either of thoſe pieces of workmanſhip a wonder of ſkill, ſcience, and practical ingenuity, as well as of manipulative execution. On the other hand, an achromatic lens preſents an inſtance of almoſt

the ſimpleſt poſſible ſtructure, and of the abſence of anything that can be called mechaniſm, or complication of parts; and yet this mere adaptation of two cryſtal diſcs, the one to the other, which may be underſtood at a glance (while the chronometer, or the automaton, might long perplex even an intelligent eye) involves, and brings into combined operation, not merely certain abſtruſe mathematical principles, but ſeveral of the mechanical properties of matter, together with the laws of light, and the ſpecific qualities of particular ſubſtances: in fact, almoſt the round of our modern ſciences is implicated, directly or remotely, in the conſtruction and uſe of an achromatic lens.

Now to apply the diſtinction, as above explained, to our immediate purpoſe, we aſſume the probability that the contraſt between the preſent animal body, and the future ſpiritual body, or between terreſtrial and celeſtial orders, will be found to bear an analogy to the difference, thus exemplified; ſo that while the animal organization of the preſent human body, although in fact it combines many principles, and brings into concert many powers, yet excites our admiration mainly on account of the complexity of its parts, the delicacy of its conſtruction, and the elaborate adaptation of function to function; on the contrary, the ſpiritual body ſhall, perhaps, be abſolutely homogeneous in its elements, per-

fectly ſimple in its conſtruction, and uniform in its ſtructure;—a pure corporeity. Nevertheleſs, by a wonderful adaptation of its principles, it ſhall ſtand actively related to all, or almoſt all the powers and properties, as well of the material as of the immaterial univerſe; and ſhall offer an epitome of all being—paſſively ſenſible of all qualities, potent toward all—the mirror of whatever exiſts, and an apt agent in every ſort of movement.

In a ſtructure, ſuch as we here imagine, it would be the *harmony of principles*, inſtead of the *complexity of parts*, that would diſplay the infinite reſources of the Creative Intelligence; and moreover, a ſtructure of this ſort would leave human ingenuity in the rear, even at a greater diſtance than do the terreſtrial organizations at preſent known to us; for while the ſkill of man goes far in effecting delicate and complicated pieces of mechaniſm, it ſoon reaches its ultimate point in attempting to harmonize various principles, within the limits of a ſimple ſtructure; nor in fact is it eaſy to name more than two or three ſignal examples of this kind in the whole range of the arts.

The above-mentioned hypotheſis of a ſimple conſtruction of multifarious principles, plainly implies, if not a higher exertion, yet a fuller diſplay of intelligence than is afforded by an elaborate conſtruction of few principles. Or per-

haps the difference in this reſpect ſhould be thus ſtated, that, in the former caſe, the Contriving Mind ſtarts from a higher point, inaſmuch as there is preſumed a preparatory adaptation of the firſt elements of the material and ſpiritual ſyſtems; and this ſpecies of ſkill ſuppoſes an abſolute knowledge of, and command over, not only all things actual, but all things poſſible. Man fails in his attempts of this ſort, becauſe he has no command whatever over things that might be, but are not; and only a very limited and glimmering knowledge of unreal, abſtract, or poſſible exiſtence. What he finds ready to his hand, he can re-combine; and there he ſtops; but the Creator has deviſed all elements, material and immaterial, ſo as at once to admit of certain combinations of them, and to provide for every poſſible combination which the ultimate, and far remote purpoſes of his univerſal government may at any time require. Our hypotheſis is then, that the ſpiritual body, and the future mode of human exiſtence, ſhall give evidence (not ſo clearly given in the preſent world) of an abſolute ſupremacy in relation to the primary laws of the creation, ſuch as affords room for highly complex adaptations of elements and principles, within the ſimpleſt ſtructures.

CHAPTER XII.

The Tranſition of Human Nature from Animal to Spiritual Corporeity, a part of the eſtabliſhed Order of Things.

THERE may be, as in fact we aſſume that there are, the ſtrongeſt phyſical reaſons for expecting a new and higher kind of life, as intended for the human family. Innumerable analogies gathered from the proceſſes of the vegetable and animal world illuſtrate and corroborate this expectation; while the irreſiſtible impulſes, or inſtincts of the human mind—moral as well as intellectual—ſupport it. Nevertheleſs, for religious purpoſes, and for bearing the ſtreſs of our moral principles, we muſt always chooſe to rely upon the direct teſtimony of the inſpired writers. Our faith and hope reſt upon the affirmation of heaven itſelf; not upon the ſoundneſs of philoſophical ſpeculations, or even demonſtrations, if ſuch could be obtained. It is not as theoriſts, but as believers, that we look for another life.

And yet there is a particular conſequence, reſulting from our receiving the knowledge of another life through the medium of a miraculouſly-atteſted revelation, which demands to be noticed; and it is this, that the corporeal renovation of human nature, which may properly be regarded as an eſtabliſhed part of the great order of the material and ſentient univerſe, or as a NATURAL TRANSITION, comes to be aſſociated in our minds with religious ideas *only*, and ſo to ſhare the fate of a claſs of impreſſions which, alas! with moſt men are not the moſt conſtant or ſubſtantial.

The inſpired writers have a definite commiſſion to execute, a ſpecial purpoſe in view, and an extraordinary diſpenſation to carry forward; nor do they ever loſe ſight of their peculiar office: —their buſineſs is, in whatever they may announce, or relate, and whether it be in itſelf natural or ſupernatural, ordinary or otherwiſe, to fix the attention of men upon the divine agency, to which they always give a prominence that nearly puts out of view ſecond cauſes. Mankind looks with eagerneſs to that which is viſible and proximate; but the miniſters of heaven demand devout regard to be paid to that which is inviſible, and which, although remote, is yet principal. God is the ſource of all things, and the diſpoſer of all: and he is ſo alike of what follows a known and common courſe, as of what

breaks in upon that courſe. The inſpired writers have but one language, the language of piety, for events of whatever order; hence it is that the terms and ſtyle of a ſupernatural narrative run through the account they give of even the moſt ordinary and natural events: not that they ever affirm miracles where there were none (a moſt unworthy ſuppoſition) but that they convey an impreſſion, always juſt indeed, of the conſtant preſence of the divine power and providence: in a word, they write and ſpeak as "ſeeing Him who is inviſible."

But there ariſes incidentally, from this mode of writing, a degree of ambiguity, or we ſhould rather ſay, a degree of difficulty, in diſcriminating between what was ſtrictly miraculous, and what ſimply natural, in ſome of the tranſactions recorded in Scripture; for when facts of the latter kind are deſcribed as ſeen from the height of heaven, they may appear to have been, what they were not—ſpecial interpoſitions of omnipotence. In truth the ordinary and extraordinary acts of the divine government differ, rather relatively, and as they effect our modes of thinking, than eſſentially. Rigidly conſidered, the entrance of a human being upon the world, in the common courſe of nature, is not leſs really a manifeſtation of the power and providence of God, in that ſingle inſtance, than is the exit of a human being from the world, in a chariot of fire; there can

be no impropriety, therefore, in referring the one event, as well as the other, to its proper cauſe —the power and will of God. But yet when, in obedience to the dictates of piety, we have thus acknowledged the ſupreme agent in relation to the ordinary occurrences of life, or to the events that belong to the hiſtory of nations, it may be neceſſary, and it is uſeful, to diſtribute them into claſſes, as natural, or ſupernatural; and it is the buſineſs of the Biblical expoſitor to make this diſtinction, wherever it may be done, in expounding the inſpired hiſtories. Now unqueſtionably, what may be done in relation to the accounts of paſt tranſactions, may alſo be done in relation to thoſe predicted events that are yet to mark the deſtiny of the human family; and it will perhaps be found, in ſome inſtances, that our conviction of the reality of things future, or unſeen, has ſuddenly become more impreſſive, merely in conſequence of our having ſeen reaſon to think of them as *natural*, or as proper parts of the eſtabliſhed ſcheme of the univerſe, inſtead of miraculous interruptions of that ſcheme.

In ſuch inſtances, if ſuch there be, it is not that events of the latter claſs are abſtractedly leſs credible than thoſe of the former; for in relation to omnipotence the two kinds ſtand on preciſely the ſame level of credibility; but it is merely that, from the conſtitution of our minds, and from our habits of thinking, we are able to

bring the one home to our conceptions in a more vivid and a calmer manner than we can the other. Whatever be the mode in which any great change in the phyſical condition of man is brought about, that is to ſay, whether it be in ſteady and regular accordance with the ſyſtem of the univerſe, or as a ſingle and unprecedented act, two things are ſtill true concerning it, namely, firſt, that ſuch a change muſt ſpring from the divine power; and ſecondly, that if it be future, and if remote alſo from our ordinary means of information, our poſitive belief of it muſt reſt upon the divine teſtimony. Theſe facts eſtabliſhed, and remembered, we are then free to conſider any future ſignal event in the hiſtory of man in the light either of natural, or of ſupernatural cauſation, as the reaſons adduced in each inſtance may ſeem to demand.

With the daily and hourly miracles (ſo to call them) of the vegetable and animal world before our eyes; with creations, renovations, tranſitions, and tranſmigrations innumerable, going on, while yet individuality and identity are preſerved, nothing ought to be thought incredible, or even unlikely, concerning the deſtiny of man, which comports with theſe common wonders, and which in itſelf is only an analogous transformation. No prejudice of the vulgar can be more unphiloſophical than is that which would

obſtruct, for a moment, our acquieſcence in the belief of a future transfuſion of human nature, with its individuality, into a new and more refined corporeal ſtructure. The profound reſources of the divine intelligence are conſtantly being developed in our view, not in a thouſand modes merely, but in a hundred thouſand; and it is perfectly manifeſt that this Sovereign Intelligence—maſter of whatever is abſtractedly poſſible—delights in taking the utmoſt range of diverſity, not merely as to faſhion, but as to rule and condition, and as to hiſtory and circumſtance; and if ſo low a mode of ſpeaking were tolerable, one might ſay, the probabilities that man, the chief terreſtrial animal, and an animal of ſo complex a conſtitution, is deſtined to undergo ſeveral tranſitions, are as a thouſand to one to the contrary. Everything belonging to human nature is myſterious: or rather, beſpeaks the exiſtence of powers and inſtincts *undeveloped*, and which, though they juſt indicate their preſence, do not reach their apparent end in the preſent ſtate.

It is true, indeed, that many ſpecies of animals fulfil (ſo far as we know) the law of their exiſtence, and reach their higheſt excellence, under one form of life; and then die, as they were born, with no other difference than what belongs to the changes involved in growth and decay. But then none of theſe ſpecies offer, in their organization,

any indications of incompleteneſs, or ſhow the latent types of an expected metamorphoſis; whereas, in every caſe where a tranſition from one mode of life to another is to take place, the germs of the future being are wrapped up in the organization of the preſent being; and in every ſuch inſtance a well-practiſed naturaliſt, in examining it (ſuppoſing it to have been hitherto unknown to him) during its initial ſtage, would, without heſitation, announce it to have in proſpect another, and a higher mode of life; for he would diſcern within, or upon it, the ſymbols of its deſtined progreſſion, and he would find in its habits certain inſtincts that have reference to a more perfect manner of exiſtence. Now is it ſo with man? We have already taken this for granted, and the theme is one that has often been touched, and is not a neceſſary part of our argument, inaſmuch as the taſk we have choſen is not that of proving the truth of the doctrine of a future life, but that of following ſome probable conjectures concerning it, taken as true, on the authority of the Chriſtian writings. Nevertheleſs a word or two may be allowed on the ſubject before we paſs on.

The propoſition, then, which we aſſume is this, that the rational and moral conſciouſneſs, with the various faculties therein compriſed, is to ſurvive the decompoſition of the animal ſtructure, and is to attach itſelf to a new and more

refined ſtructure. Of courſe, therefore, it is not to the *animal organization* that we are to look, as if to find *there* the ſymbols of a metamorphoſis, or the germs of another type of life; for the mere animal is to accompliſh its purpoſes in the preſent initial era of human exiſtence; and, like other intranſitive ſpecies, it develops all its parts, and falls into decay without leaving any renaſcent element. But it is among the moral ſentiments and the intellectual faculties, that is to ſay, within the circle of the proper conſciouſneſs of the man, that we ought to find, if at all, the indications of a ſecond birth, and of a new economy of life. Now all that has been ſaid, and that may be ſaid, and it is not a little, in illuſtration of the theorem of the immortality of man, as foreſhown by his moral ſenſe, by his expectation of retribution, by his aſpirations after a better exiſtence, by the vaſt compaſs of his faculties, and by his inſtinctive horror of annihilation—all theſe prognoſtics of futurity, and if there are any other, are capable of being condenſed into a ſingle propoſition, ſetting forth the fact—a fact the mere ſtatement of which contains virtually a demonſtrative proof of the principle it involves, namely—That the idea, or the expectation of another life is a conſtant element of human nature, or an original article in the phyſiology of man. Shall any one deny that the human family has harboured the thought of living again after death? or if any

one would labour to ſhow that this common expectation is groundleſs, his very argument, and the ſtreſs and ingenuity of his reaſoning, afford the beſt ſort of evidence that the inſtinctive belief of immortality is too general, and is too deeply ſeated to be eaſily looſened.

Now let this mere fact, ſtripped of whatever, by the moſt ſevere analyſis, we may reject as adventitious, be coldly regarded, in a purely phyſiological light; and let it be put on the ground of analogy with any facts that may ſeem naturally to comport with it;—as, for example, with the preparations that are made by any of the tranſitive ſpecies of animals (whether blindly or wittingly) for their approaching metamorphoſis. If an animal—an inſect—the hiſtory of which, at preſent, we know nothing of, is obſerved, at a certain ſeaſon of the year, to abandon its uſual haunts, and to turn away from its wonted enjoyments, and to ſeek for itſelf a crevice, or ſecure aſylum, fit for affording it what it muſt immediately need in its new and untried condition; if it is ſeen to be employed in a manner which has no utility whatever in relation to its preſent mode of life;—in ſuch a caſe, we infer, without a ſhadow of doubt, that the creature is following a ſure leading of nature; nor ſhould we deem anything much more unaccountable or monſtrous, than to find that all this forecaſting of futurity, and all theſe prudential operations came

to nothing, and that the deluded inſect, inſtead of awaking in gaiety from its tranſition-torpor, had utterly periſhed, and that its duſt had been irrecoverably ſcattered by the winds.

What ſound principle of philoſophy, then, forbids our looking at the human ſpecies as the chief of the terreſtrial tribes, and then inferring that the ſum of human inſtincts, impreſſions, expectations, and opinions (taken at large), conſtituting as they do the elements of our conſtitution, the parts of our nature, are to be held infallible indications of what awaits the ſpecies, and as phyſically prophetic of its deſtiny? Our preſent argument is reducible to a very few words, or to a ſyllogiſm that contains its own demonſtration. Man, we affirm, is to undergo a metamorphoſis, and is to paſs on to another ſtage of exiſtence—becauſe, by the conſtitution of his mind, he expects to do ſo.

But we are told that it is among the characteriſtics of human nature to admit, and to adhere to, many groundleſs opinions; and if we ſhould deny this, an opponent would ſay—'You affirm *my opinion* of the futility of the doctrine of a future life to be falſe; yet it is mine, and the opinion, too, of many.' In reply, we freely admit this fact, and allow that an adherence to baſeleſs prejudices is a characteriſtic of human nature; but we muſt inſiſt upon an important diſtinction, which is this, that, although any particular per-

ſuaſion may be unfounded, and any ſingle dogma may be falſe, and any one chain of reaſoning ſophiſtical, yet it muſt by no means be granted, either, that the reaſoning faculty in man is, in its firſt principles, illuſive, or that the abſtract import, or condenſed value of human belief, taken together, can be at variance with truth and nature; or that the common inſtincts of the human family are nugatory, and have no end, or final cauſe. Suppoſitions ſuch as theſe are contradicted by the entire analogy of the animated world; as well as that they are abſtractedly improbable and repulſive. Thus, for example, *any one* of the religions profeſſed by particular tribes of men may be falſe, in whatever diſtinguiſhes it from *other* religions; that is to ſay, in whatever is partial and peculiar; but the religious inſtinct, and the abſtract belief of inviſible creative power, is not falſe; and ſo any ſpecific expectation of what awaits us after death, may prove a dream; but not ſo the human expectation at large of ſurviving the diſſolution of the body. Thoſe ſheer errors of which men individually, or nationally, have been the victims, are always of a kind that may be traced to artificial and accidental cauſes, ſuch as the influence of intereſted impoſtors, or enthuſiaſts; or they have ſprung from the vanity and perverſity of philoſophers, or founders of ſects. But, on the contrary, the common or generic impreſſions,

expectations, and opinions of man, ſpring unqueſtionably from the elements of his nature; and how much ſoever they may be warped, or exaggerated, deformed, repreſſed, or denied, they reappear, everywhere, and in every age, with unabated force, and with very nearly the ſame eſſential properties. Theſe opinions and impreſſions muſt be ſubſtantially true, if there be truth or harmony at all in the ſcheme of the univerſe. Among ſuch phyſical elements of human nature, the prime is the belief of an Intelligent Firſt Cauſe; and the ſecond, is the belief of a future life, and a retributive economy. To impugn, then, the doctrine of immortality, or of another ſtage of exiſtence, ſucceeding the preſent, is to find a ſpecies, marked in the moſt diſtinct manner with the indications of a future transformation, and yet to affirm that no transformation actually awaits it.

But if a future life does await the human family, and if it be a change involved in the original conſtitution of our nature, then it muſt be allowable to ſpeak of it, and of the means and mode of the change, as we might of any other part of the ſcheme of the univerſe :—yet always with a becoming modeſty and ſerioufneſs; and this, notwithſtanding the particular circumſtance attending our belief of the fact, namely, that our perſuaſion of it reſts upon evidence which has been miraculouſly conveyed to us; and not-

withſtanding the fact alſo, that the renovation of human nature, when brought about, ſhall be effected in a manner bearing peculiarly upon the religious condition of men, as individually accountable.

Every ſignal event, affecting the welfare either of individuals or of nations, may, with the ſtricteſt propriety, be viewed, either firſt, as a natural product of common cauſes, or as an act of the divine government toward the individual, or the community, and as carrying with it a ſpecial meaning, in relation to the principles of the great moral economy under which mankind perſonally, and in the aggregate, are moving forward. Thus, for an inſtance, the firſt deſolation of Jeruſalem was in truth—what it is repreſented to have been by the inſpired hiſtorians and prophets—an immediate judgment of God upon the nation's impiety and infatuation; a judgment long threatened, and, in the deſtined moment, accompliſhed. Nevertheleſs, it was the natural conſequence, not merely of the perſonal ambition of the Babyloniſh monarch, but of the altered relative poſition of nations within the range of the Chaldean power. In like manner, that viſible diſplay of the divine diſpleaſure which marked the ſecond deſolation of the Jewiſh ſtate, by the ſword of the Romans, may, without any diminution of our religious ſentiments concern-

ing it, be traced as eaſily and naturally to its proximate political cauſes, as we ſo trace the fall of any modern republic. And what is true in reference to things on a ſmaller ſcale, is not untrue, or irrational, in relation to things on a larger ſcale. No principle of piety—piety well underſtood—forbids our conſidering, under this ſame twofold aſpect, the deſolation of the world by the general deluge, which, while it was, in the fulleſt ſenſe, an outburſting of divine wrath, provoked by the boundleſs wickedneſs of the human race, was, at the ſame time, an event attributable, like an earthquake, or the eruption of a volcano, or the inundation of a province, to the working of telluric forces, whether chemical, mechanical, meteorological, or ſidereal. If, from an ill-judged fear of giving way to a ſceptical temper, we refuſe to entertain the phyſical, along with the religious view of theſe, and of ſimilar events, we expoſe ourſelves to the danger of being driven altogether from our religious convictions, by proofs, not to be reſiſted, of natural agency in bringing thoſe events about. On the contrary, a well digeſted perſuaſion of the perfect conſiſtency of the natural, and the ſpiritual economies under which we are placed, at once exempts our religious faith from all jeopardy, and brings our confidence in the certainty of the divine promiſes and threatenings home to the mind, with the moſt impreſſive

force and vividneſs. It is not the leſſening, but the enhancing of religious ſentiments toward which we are now tending.

In like manner, and in adherence to the ſame rule, we might find our ſalutary apprehenſion of that ſecond, and yet more tremendous deſolation of this our planet by fire, which awaits it, to be ſuddenly and greatly ſtrengthened by our ſeeing reaſon to conſider it as a phyſical event, to which, from their very conſtitution, all the planetary bodies are expoſed, and which, under certain conjunctures, muſt inevitably happen; and which our own planet is always in imminent danger of. If it be the ill chance of a family to occupy the upper ſtories of a vaſt laboratory, wherein proceſſes are carrying on, ſuch as would want only the ſlighteſt accident to produce an inſtantaneous and fatal exploſion, ſuch a family, knowing the conditions of its tenancy, aſſuredly ſhould live mindful of what may, any hour, be their fate.

The phyſical fortunes of our globe (let the phraſe be for a moment allowed) have already, as we cannot doubt, included more than one chaotic convulſion; and it has undergone, if not more than one univerſal ſubmerſion in water, at leaſt one fuſion by fire. It may then have to paſs through another, at ſome period when, either by colliſion with ſome erratic celeſtial body, or by the gradually advancing vehemence

of the central furnace, the pent-up energy of telluric combuſtion ſhall get vent, and becoming ungovernable, ſhall, in the rage of a day, or of a month, leave nothing mundane undiſſolved that, in its nature, may yield to the intenſity of heat.

Such, then, being the probable fate (if we may ſtill ſpeak phyſically) of this planet, and perhaps of others of the ſyſtem, it is what we may be looking for; and as if our poſition were like that of the occupiers of the vine valleys, on the trembling flanks of Etna or Veſuvius, whom we may imagine to have been informed, or to know on ſome rational grounds, that, by the ſlow but inceſſant enlargement of the fiery abyſs beneath them, the entire cruſt and framework of the mountain muſt, within ſome calculable period, fall in, and the vaſt circuit of its baſe be converted into a ſea of flame and ſulphur. On juſt ſuch conditions, may we ſay, does the human family tread, from age to age, the ſoil of their native planet. Now all this, which would happen, and at the very moment when it ſhall happen, if there were no rational and accountable family upon the earth, ſhall, when it does take place, come in at the deſtined hour to accompliſh the ſpecial intentions of the divine government toward the deſcendants of Adam. To us men it will be, in a peculiar ſenſe, as to all mundane creatures it will be, in a common

ſenſe, the terrible day of wrath — a day not by any propitiation to be averted.

It is true that when the preſent progreſs and proſpects of nations are conſidered, and when the yet undeveloped powers of nature, in ſeveral regions of the earth, are calculated, a ſtrong, or almoſt an irreſiſtible perſuaſion is engendered, as if long cycles of centuries were ſtill in reſerve for the human family, during which civilization and happineſs ſhall be ſpreading, until the combined faculties of the phyſical and moral world ſhall have produced their utmoſt ſum of good. But then there are other conſiderations which may well lead us to regard ſuch expectations as extremely fallacious, and as very likely to be diſappointed. What we ſee taking place on a ſmall ſcale, may poſſibly take place on a larger ſcale: as for example;—a diſtrict of country, or a few acres only, has been redeemed from the wilderneſs, and is juſt beginning to reward the enterpriſe and ability of a meritorious band of ſettlers; and we confidently realize, in idea, the wealth, and the thriving population, which within a century muſt cover it. But an inundation, or an earthquake, lays waſte the fair territory;—its occupiers periſh in the cataſtrophe, or are ſcattered, never to be reaſſembled; and the whole falls back into its primeval ſavageneſs. What now is our little planet, but a narrow province of a vaſt empire; and the fate of a diſ-

trict, or of a farm within it, may be the fate of the whole. If a dyke bulges, and lets in the ocean, if a fire conſumes a factory or a city—the cruſt of the globe may bulge, and the central forces of water, or of fire, or of both in conflict, may deſolate all continents. None can affirm, while theſe leſſer calamities are matters of frequent occurrence, that the greater ſhall never happen.

Whether it is to take place in that ſame day of telluric ruin, or not (which is not our preſent queſtion) there is to be, and it is to come in as a proper part of the great economy of the univerſe, a ſecond birth of the human family, when all born of Eve, ſhall, by the creative energy, live again; and, whether for the better or the worſe, individually, ſhall take their ſtand upon a higher level of phyſical exiſtence than at firſt. This tranſition, which now we find it ſo difficult to think of, otherwiſe than with a ſort of incredulous apprehenſion, as a myſterious article of our Chriſtian faith, ſhall, when it occurs, be felt, however momentous in its conſequences, as a ſimple fact, and as forming a natural epoch in the hiſtory of man, whom we ſhall then underſtand to be a creature deſtined, from the firſt, to metamorphoſes, and to far extended progreſſion.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Survivance of Individual Character, and of the Moral Conſciouſneſs.

A CERTAIN degree of illuſion attaches to whatever is future and untried; and this falſe colour, ſpread over our proſpects, at one time exaggerates our hopes, and at another, by reaction, damps them as much. If a future change in our condition be of a very extenſive and important kind, we are very apt to ſuppoſe that, even if our conſciouſneſs of identity be not impaired by the event, our ordinary modes of feeling, and our characteriſtic ſentiments and taſtes, will none of them remain the ſame. From previouſly entertaining theſe deluſive expectations it happens, when we come actually to paſs through ſome ſuch important revolution of our perſonal condition, that our firſt emotions are not ſo much thoſe of ſurpriſe at the greatneſs of the change, as of diſappointment at the

ſmall extent to which it has affected our uſual ſenſations, and at finding how little our cuſtomary perſonal conſciouſneſs has been diſturbed. We feel ourſelves poſſeſſed of the ſame familiar ſelf —of the ſame peculiarities of taſte; and that the very ſame moral and mental habits have paſſed on with us, through the hour of tranſition, from one condition of life to another; nor can we ſay that this tranſition, in itſelf, has made us more wiſe or virtuous, or that it has enhanced, by ſo much as a particle, our perſonal merits; although it may have enlarged our range of action, and perhaps have added to our means of enjoyment.

Now we may reaſonably imagine that it will be preciſely thus in the moment of our paſſage from the preſent, to another mode of exiſtence. The ſeveral powers of life ſhall have become more intenſe in their activity, our conſciouſneſs will have been expanded; the faculties will no longer labour and faint at their taſks, or relapſe exhauſted: life will burn clear and ſteady, and will need no repleniſhing; but yet the inner man—the individual—the moral perſonality, will be untouched:—the remembrance of yeſterday, and of its little hiſtory, will be diſtinct and familiar; and we ſhall come to an inſtantaneous conviction of the momentous practical truth, that the phyſical and the moral nature are ſo thoroughly independent one of the other, as

that the greateſt imaginable revolution paſſing upon the former, ſhall leave the latter ſimply what it was.

A ſhort ſeaſon, probably, will be enough to impart to us an eaſy familiarity with our new home, and a ready uſe of our corporeal inſtruments, and a facility in joining in with the economy around us. Moreover, it is reaſonable to believe that, whereas, in the preſent ſtate, the heterogeneous elements of mind and matter, as conſorted within the animal organization, are held together as by force, and ſo as to occaſion a vague feeling, coming over us at times, as if we were dreaming, or as if our very life were an enigma, and as if we were held back from actual contact with what is real and ſubſtantial;—on the contrary, when the corporeal nature has become nothing elſe than the inſtrument and vehicle of the mind, and when the two elements of our exiſtence have come to be perfectly blended, and when, as a conſequence, our feelings are all of one ſort, and when our ſeveral energies and impulſes, inſtead of counteracting one the other, ſhall flow on always in the ſame direction, that then there ſhall attend us an incomparably more vivid ſenſe of reality—that then we ſhall perceive all things with a ſharp intenſity, and ſhall have a bright, vivid, conſciouſneſs of life, ſuch as ſhall make us think of the gone by period of animal life, as if, indeed, it had been a dream.

It is ſo that a man may have groped his way, hour after hour, acroſs a marſhy level, veiled in fogs, till he comes to the foot of a ſteep, where, after ſome arduous ſteps, he gains a height, and not only overlooks the miſts of the ſwamp, but beholds a wide illumed landſcape, and the clear ſky, and the ſun.

At the moment of recogniſing our perſonal conſciouſneſs, after paſſing through the future phyſical transformation, what we muſt fix upon will unqueſtionably be our habitual emotions, taſtes, and moral diſpoſitions; for it is theſe that conſtitute the very core of our being, and it is theſe that muſt ſtand out, with ſo much the more characteriſtic diſtinctneſs, when whatever that was accidental and adjunctive has fallen off from us. All merely animal ſenſations will have been ſuperſeded; all mechanical and technical habits will have loſt their means and occaſions; the intellectual furniture will, for the moſt part, or perhaps entirely, have given place to knowledge of a more direct and ſubſtantial kind; but the ſentiments we have cheriſhed, and the affections that have ſettled down upon the mind, and which conſtitute its character—theſe, now, with a bold ſupremacy, will make up our conſciouſneſs, and compel us to confeſs ourſelves to be the ſame. Much, indeed, that belonged to our firſt ſtage of exiſtence, will, in the retroſpect, appear ſhadowy and unimportant; but not ſo any of thoſe events

or courſes of conduct that ſhall be found to have created or controlled our moral being.

It is plain that, when any order of beings is to paſs under a renovating proceſs, the proceſs muſt be of a kind analogous to the properties which are to be ſo transformed; thus, for inſtance, it can be nothing but a phyſical power, and a ſeries of phyſical tranſitions, that muſt tranſlate an animal from one condition of organization to another; and thus, too, it can be nothing elſe but a moral power, and a moral proceſs, or a working upon the *affections* by *motives*, that can effect a tranſition from one moral condition to another. It is, indeed, eaſy to admit the illuſion that, if we were but tranſported to a purer ſphere, and were but exempted from certain evil influences, we ſhould at once become virtuous; but a ſuppoſition ſuch as this will not bear to be examined; for although external cauſes may have had a powerful influence, at firſt, in producing our preſent moral diſpoſitions, and ſo in determining our character, theſe diſpoſitions, when once formed, poſſeſs a fixed continuity of their own, which is by no means deſtroyed merely by removing the exterior influences whence they aroſe: and, moreover, ſuch diſpoſitions, or ſettled paſſions, when actually conſolidated, include a reproductive energy;—they are living powers; they vegetate, and cover the entire ſurface of the ſoul. The moral nature then, or the per-

ſonal character, far from being open to renovation merely by the means of a phyſical tranſition from one mode of life to another, or by a paſſage from one ſet of circumſtances to another, is not to be rectified, if at all, otherwiſe than by its coming under the operation of congruous influences; that is to ſay, it muſt be wrought upon by moral conſiderations, and muſt be ſwayed by reaſons.

An inſtantaneous change, either from good to evil, or from evil to good, if effected in a ſovereign manner by a foreign power, and effected irreſpectively of an economy of motives, would rather be the annihilation of one being, and the creation of another, than the changing of the character of the ſame being; for it is of the very nature of a change of character that there be an internal proceſs, a concurrence of the will, and a yielding of the rational faculties to rational inducements; and alſo the giving way of one ſpecies of deſires, and of one claſs of habits, to another. While, therefore, it conſiſts perfectly with the abſtract reaſon of things, and with what we ſee around us in nature, to expect that the future tranſition from the preſent mode of exiſtence to another will be effected immediately by the divine power, it directly contradicts, not merely the reaſon of things abſtractedly, but our actual knowledge and experience of the principles of the moral and intellectual ſyſtem, to hope

for any ſuch ſovereign renovation of our diſpoſitions, as conſequent upon an enlargement of our faculties, or upon a change of ſcene, circumſtance, and ſociety. That the Sovereign Benevolence may indeed, if it pleaſes, ſo touch the ſprings of our motives as to bring about effectively a change of character, is by no means to be denied; and indeed ſuch an act of grace lies at the foundation of that economy of mercy under which we are now placed; but then this exertion of ſpiritual influence always flows in the channel of moral means and inducements; nor are we entitled to look for it under any other conditions than thoſe that are explicitly laid down, and ſolemnly inſiſted upon by the inſpired writers, who ſtrictly confine our expectations of efficacious grace to the preſent economy, and who, in the tones of awful warning, announce *this* to be the day of ſalvation, and *this* the accepted ſeaſon of mercy.

A little conſideration may convince us that to indulge an expectation of a ſudden and phyſical reſtoration of moral ſoundneſs, by a ſovereign act, in the ſame way that we may look for a renovation of our corporeal faculties, muſt directly tend to bring the mind into a ſtate in which nothing leſs than the moſt prodigious of all miracles could avail for its reſtoration. The firſt principles of a moral economy are immediately nullified when we perſuade ourſelves that

our moral nature does not differ from our animal organization, in relation to the divine power, and that the one, like the other, might be reinſtated by a word. The hope, well ſuſtained as it is, of a happy and not a very remote renovation of our bodily and intellectual exiſtence, and of an entrance upon a higher and a wider field of action and enjoyment, does indeed impart a kindling impulſe, and a much needed energy, to the languiſhing principles of virtue; but theſe very principles, upon the force and vivacity of which our future welfare abſolutely depends, could only be relaxed, or totally deſtroyed, by our ſuppoſing that, when we wake up in another world, we ſhall find a miracle to have been wrought unconſciouſly upon our tempers, deſires, and affections—and ſuch a miracle as ſuperſedes the mortifying taſk of now repreſſing malign and ſenſual diſpoſitions, and of cheriſhing thoſe that are pure and benevolent.

We conclude, then, that any expectation of an improvement of the moral nature, merely in conſequence of a tranſition from a lower to a higher ſtage of phyſical exiſtence, will be found deluſive. And yet, though we muſt not ſuppoſe the moral faculties to be renovated by ſuch a tranſition, we may well believe that it will give ſcope to a much increaſed intenſity of all emotions and affections of this claſs, whether they be benign or malignant, pure or ſordid. This pro-

bable enhancement of feeling in another life deſerves ſome attention; for it is conceivable that the moſt profound or agitating ſenſations of which we are conſcious in the preſent ſtate, may ſeem trivial, when they come to be compared with the correſponding paſſions and affections of the future life.

Every one accuſtomed to reflect upon the operations of his own mind muſt be aware of a diſtinction between the intellectual and the moral faculties, as to the rate at which they ſeverally move; for while the reaſoning power advances in a manner that might be likened to an increaſe according to the rule of arithmetical progreſſion, and which conſiſts in the adding of one propoſition to another, and in the accumulation of equal quantities; it is, on the contrary, the characteriſtic of the paſſions, and of all intenſe ſentiments, to riſe with an accelerated movement, and to increaſe at the rate, as of a geometrical progreſſion. Even the milder emotions of love and joy, and much more vehement ſenſations, ſuch as hatred, anger, jealouſy, revenge, deſpair, tend always toward this ſort of rapid enhancement, and fail to do ſo only as they are checked, either by a ſenſe of danger, connected with the indulgence of them, or by feelings of corporeal exhauſtion, or by the interference of the incidents and intereſts of common life. Eſpecially it is to be noticed that thoſe of the emotions

which kindle, or which are kindled, by the imagination, are liable to an acceleration ſuch as produces a phyſical excitement, highly perilous both to mind and body, and needing to be ſpeedily diverted. And although the purely moral emotions are not accompanied with preciſely the ſame ſort of corporeal diſturbance, nevertheleſs, when they actually gain full poſſeſſion of the ſoul, they rapidly exhauſt the phyſical powers, and bring on a ſtate of torpor, or of general indifference.

Now this exhauſtion manifeſtly belongs to the animal organization; nor can we doubt that, if it were poſſible to retain the body in a ſtate of neutrality, or of perfect quieſcence, from the firſt to the laſt, during a ſeaſon of profound emotion, then theſe ſame affections might advance much further, and become far more intenſe, than, as it is, they ever can or may. The corporeal limitation of the paſſions becomes, in truth, a matter of painful conſciouſneſs, whenever they riſe to an unuſual height, or are long continued; and there takes place then, within the boſom, an agony, partly animal, partly mental, and a very uneaſy ſenſe of the inadequateneſs of our ſtrongeſt emotions to the occaſion that calls them out. We feel, that we cannot feel as we ſhould: emotions are fruſtrated, and the affections which ſhould have ſprung upward, are detained in a paroxyſm on earth. It

is thus with the nobleſt ſentiments, and thus with profound grief; and the malign and vindictive paſſions draw their tormenting force from this very ſenſe of reſtraint, and they *rend* the ſoul becauſe they can *move* it ſo little. Does there not ariſe, amid theſe convulſions of our nature, a tacit anticipation of a future ſtate, in which the ſoul ſhall be able to feel unboundedly, and to take its fill of emotion?

Except among the inſane, no emotions are permanent, or invariably uppermoſt; but in ſurrendering a powerful emotion, or in allowing it to be diſplaced by intereſts and feeling of a more common claſs, we confeſs the preſent inferiority of our nature, which will bear ſo little; and we ſilently conſole ourſelves by the inſtinctive belief that a time will come when the paſſions ſhall take their high courſe, without pauſe or reſtraint. It is with a ſomewhat analogous feeling that, when the deſire of knowledge is thwarted, we remand this appetite of the ſoul to a future life. The neceſſities of the body, and its appetites, are the ruling powers of the preſent ſtate; while the paſſions and affections are acceſſories only, which muſt not have more than their ſeaſons of indulgence; and they muſt take a ſubordinate place, for this very reaſon, that it is their eſſence, if freely indulged, to abſorb the ſoul, and to exclude every other object and purſuit; whereas an indulgence of the intellectual

taſtes may be made to conſiſt much better with ſome regard to the ordinary intereſts of life. Now this characteriſtic excluſiveneſs of the moral ſentiments and paſſions, ought to be regarded as an indication of that ſupremacy which belongs to them, and which they muſt ultimately acquire. Thoſe powers of our nature which now are to be repreſſed, and confined to moments, becauſe, if let looſe, they would become maſters of the ſoul, in a manner incompatible with our bodily and ſocial welfare, will, we cannot doubt, at length reach their rightful aſcendancy, and give law, in an irreſiſtible manner, to the active and intellectual faculties. Theſe latter are but means to an end—the higheſt reaſon is no more; and the time ſhall come when what is inſtrumental ſhall give place to what is ſupreme and final.

And when the ſovereign faculties of the ſoul —its affections—ſhall have gained the ſway that belongs to them, they will no doubt put the inſtrumental faculties into a ſtate of much more energetic action than they ever reach at preſent, while impelled in an inconſtant and irregular manner, and often by motives of an inferior claſs. Far from ſuppoſing that, in a higher region, where the affections ſhall be more intenſe and more permanent, nothing ſhall be done or thought of, but to indulge theſe profound ſentiments, or that an invariable, inactive, unpro-

ductive ecſtaſy, is to fill the endleſs circle of ages, on the contrary, we aſſume it as certain that every active faculty, corporeal and rational, ſhall then come into play at a vaſtly enhanced rate, and with much more fruit and advantage, than at preſent:—the impulſe being greater and more uniform, the movement ſhall be proportionably accelerated.

CHAPTER XIV.

Correſpondence between the Preſent and the Future Employment of the Active Principles of Human Nature.

IF once we relinquiſh the principle of analogy, as applicable to the divine operations and government, we abandon all the means we have of extending our knowledge, and we are left in a ſtate of diſtreſſing incertitude, in relation to the moſt momentous ſubjects. But if the rule of analogy may really be relied upon, and if it be ſafe to conclude that a practical correſpondence of means and ends connects the training we are ſubjected to in the preſent life, with the employments of the life to come, and if the preſent is indeed to be regarded as an education for the future, then does it appear certain that an initiatory courſe, of which, when it is auſpiciouſly paſſed through, the product conſiſts in forming habits of patient and ſtrenuous exertion, of order, of ſelf-denial, and conſtancy, and in

cheriſhing the ſpirit of enterpriſe and courage, and in bringing both mind and body into a ſtate in which the utmoſt poſſible may be done and borne—we ſay ſuch a courſe will be followed by another that ſhall demand, and bring into exerciſe, theſe very ſame qualities and habits, and ſhall put them to work ſtill more intenſely. Can we believe that the precious and coſtly fruits of a long and painful culture, in the preſent ſtate, are all to fall to the earth, and periſh, juſt as they are ripened?

But it may be aſked, What ſcope can there be for the exerciſe of the ſtrenuous virtues, or what room for patience, conſtancy, courage, in a world of peace, love, and abſolute ſecurity? Now in replying to this natural inquiry, it might be allowable firſt to ſift a little the evidence on which our common notions of the future life are founded; and perhaps it might appear that in this, as in ſo many other inſtances, the *entire* ſcriptural evidence compriſes ſome counterpoiſed ſtatements, from a compariſon of which, and not from any one portion of it, our belief ought to be derived; but waiving any ſuch Biblical inveſtigations, a little attention to the ſubject will enable us to conceive of ſuch a ſubſtitution of one operation of the moral powers, for another, as may give exerciſe to the bold and arduous virtues without implying either poſitive ſuffering or perſonal danger. Let us make this

attempt to conceive of what we may call—
TRANSMUTED MORAL QUALITIES.

We may begin with that main element of terreſtrial virtue—pious reſignation to the divine will, and a calm fortitude, under circumſtances of privation, diſappointment, and ſuffering. How then, it may be aſked, can any ſuch habit of the mind, together with the ſentiments that attach to it, find place in a region of felicity? With the view of finding a ſatisfactory (or at leaſt a ſufficient) ſolution of this difficulty, we ſhould aſk ourſelves on what ground it is we conclude that the principles of the divine government, and the actual adminiſtration of thoſe principles, ſhall all be ſpread open to us, under a full light, at the moment of our entrance upon the upper world? No ſuch ſuppoſition can in fact be made good; and on the contrary, reaſon may be ſhown for thinking that thoſe practical and temporary trials of our implicit confidence in the divine rectitude and benevolence with which here we are exerciſed, are, in truth, preparations for ſome far more difficult acts and habits of ſilent reverential ſubmiſſion, than are as yet called for. The leſſon we learn in ſurrendering, for inſtance, the darling joys of life, one after another, may ſeem a mere ſchooling—an unreal play, when we come into a poſition of nearer concernment with the vaſt movements of the divine government; and then, even al-

though we ſhould not be expoſed to perſonal ſufferings or loſſes, yet with the more intenſe ſenſibilities belonging to a higher mode of exiſtence, and in view of tranſactions of which here we think little, or know nothing, we may be thrown back with force upon our already acquired ſentiments of loyal and devout acquieſcence in the meaſures of abſolute wiſdom and rectitude, and we may be compelled to confeſs that the habit of mind which had been forming on earth, was far from being ſuperfluous in relation to the events and duties of our after life in heaven.

A due conſideration of the eſſential, and therefore the *unalterable* diſparity which ſeparates finite and dependent minds from the Infinite Mind, will lead us to perceive that no future advancements, whatever, that may be made by the former, in knowledge or goodneſs, or intellectual power, can in any ſenſible degree leſſen the interval between the Creator and his creatures, even the moſt exalted of them. It is very true that a humble claſs of beings may at length overtake and outſtrip a higher claſs; and yet the higheſt ſhall never feel themſelves to be approximating to the Supreme Perfection. It is at once mathematically and metaphyſically certain, that the finite can never meaſure the infinite; and inaſmuch as it does not either meaſure or graſp it, the ſymmetry of the infinite can

never be ſeen, or be otherwiſe than hypothetically aſſumed, and devoutly confided in. The attributes of God muſt therefore always ſurpaſs the comprehenſion of his creatures; and if his attributes are incomprehenſible, the viſible acts too, which are the products of thoſe attributes, can be but imperfectly underſtood. At leaſt it muſt happen, in certain critical conjunctures of the univerſal ſcheme of things, that inſuperable difficulties will preſent themſelves, and that, as often as great epochs give place one to another, an abyſs will be opened, into which not the moſt exalted minds can dare to look with a ſteadfaſt gaze, and from the brink of which ſuch will retire trembling.

We may, indeed, ſometimes have perſuaded ourſelves, in the fondneſs of ſpeculation, that certain inveterate difficulties are now at laſt cleared up, and that the ſcheme of the moral univerſe lies all outſpread before us, as in a map. But the wiſe ſpeedily ſurrender any ſuch conceit, and return gladly to the only ground on which either men or ſeraphs can feel a footing —the ground of implicit ſubmiſſion to the Infinite Nature. It is, indeed, highly probable that certain *particular difficulties* which embarraſs our ſpeculative theology, and which now afflict us by their formidable aſpect, may utterly vaniſh at the moment when we reach a higher and more advantageous point of view; and we may

then wonder at the ſlenderneſs of thoſe modes of thinking which could allow of our being ſtaggered in any ſuch manner. But then at the very ſame moment in which we clear the miſts of mortality, the myſteries of heaven will open upon us; and theſe, we may be ſure, will involve difficulties of a firmer texture, and ſuch as ſhall try, to the utmoſt, the ſilent fortitude of the ſoul. It is not the vapours of earth, but it is 'thick clouds of the ſky,' that ſurround the throne of the Almighty.

Yet we muſt by no means imagine that this new call upon the religious fortitude of loyal minds will induce a comfortleſs or diſtracted ſtate of feeling; for as, in the preſent ſtate, that very ſame ſpiritual acquaintance with God, which gives occaſion to our perplexities, ſupplies us alſo with ſufficient means for holding them in abeyance, ſo that they do not ſmite the ſoul with diſmay and deſpair, in like manner doubtleſs, ſhall ſtill fuller diſcoveries of the Supreme Excellence and Goodneſs abundantly ſuſtain our confidence, animate our conſtancy, and give ſpring and warmth to our communion with Him, who, though 'paſt finding out,' is nevertheleſs always glorious in benevolence and wiſdom. We ſee it to be thus, even now, with the pious, who, although they may be exerciſed as they advance in their courſe more and more ſeverely, ſtill grow, not merely in fortitude, but

in peace and joy. And thus it is in common life, that the youth contemns the troubles of childhood, while he cheerfully encounters the more real difficulties of his entrance upon the world; and again, that the man forgets the ſmaller cares of his youth, and bears up beneath the multiplied anxieties of ripe age:—each new period, in relieving us from one burden, impoſes another, and a heavier, and calls into play whatever fortitude we had acquired in our preliminary courſe; and yet does not forbid our continued enjoyment of exiſtence.

Again: a paſſive fortitude is not the only virtue which the training we are under tends to cheriſh; for there is a manifeſt purpoſe in the conſtruction of the moral and ſocial ſyſtem to call forth the more active excellence of courage, and the ſpirit of enterpriſe; nor need we exclude (properly underſtood) the ſtirring ſentiment of ambition. Can we doubt that He, who in his word, is 'calling us to glory and virtue,' and who by the ſame channel, enjoins a manly and vigorous diſcharge of our parts, is alſo, in the actual circumſtances through which we are led, preparing the intellectual and moral powers for what they are to perform in another ſphere. In the caſe of certain individuals, this apparent purpoſe occupies the principal place in the ſcheme of providence toward them. It is clear,

too, that the nobleſt and moſt generous tempers —the very choiceſt minds, make the readieſt proficiency in learning this leſſon; while mean and inert ſouls—the ſelfiſh, the diffident, and the puſillanimous—although they may acquire ſomething of the *paſſive* virtues, almoſt totally fail in regard to the *active*. Adhering, then, to the rule of analogy, and confiding in the principle that a rational conſiſtency, and an adaptation of means to the end, runs through the divine proceedings, we conclude that the future life ſhall actually call into exerciſe a bold energy, and intrepidity, and ambition too;—an ambition not ſelfiſh or vain, but loyal.

In aſſuming ſo much as this, we are by no means obliged to ſuppoſe that thoſe who, in the preſent ſtate, ſhall have gone through their probation, and won immortal glory, are anew to become liable to loſs, injury or jeopardy of happineſs. Without admitting any ſuch ſuppoſition, we may readily conceive of a ſtate of things in which there may be ſervices to be performed, enterpriſes to be undertaken, and a promotion to be aimed at, ſuch as none but the bold and the ſtrong ſhall be equal to, and none but the aſpiring ſhall dare to attempt. Theſe ſervices may involve encounters with powerful and crafty opponents; or they may demand ſudden exertions of intelligence, and a ready recurrence to reſources, under circumſtances that would amaze

and baffle all but the calmly courageous. Moreover there may be high advantages to be ſnatched by the few whoſe flight can be the longeſt ſuſtained, and is the moſt ſteady; there may be dominations to be exerciſed which thoſe ſhall ſecure to themſelves who can prove, by ſervice done, that they are equal to the weight of the ſceptre. It is ſurely a frivolous notion (if any actually entertain it) that the vaſt and intricate machinery of the univerſe, and the profound ſcheme of God's government, are now ſoon to reach a reſting place, where nothing more ſhall remain to active ſpirits, through an eternity, but recollections of labour, anthems of praiſe, and inert repoſe. No idea can do more violence to all the principles on which we reaſon, than this does.

Not leſs unreaſonable is it to imagine that the future government of God, inſtead of being carried forward, as now, by independent and intelligent agencies, ſhall proceed by the interpoſition of his immediate power, while the creatures ſtand aloof, as idle ſpectators of omnipotence. Some ſuch baring of the arm of the Almighty may indeed mark particular epochs of the moral ſyſtem, and may come in to terminate one cycle of government, and to introduce another; but to ſuppoſe that the ordinary movements ſhall be of this kind, is a notion devoid of probability, and derogatory, as we muſt think,

to the divine wiſdom. If the two ſchemes were hypothetically ſtated, namely, that of a government by immediate interpoſitions of omnipotence, and that of a government the ends of which ſhould be ſecured by an all-pervading adjuſtment of the free agencies of intellectual beings, as well good as evil, the latter ſcheme muſt at once be preferred, as the beſt adapted to diſplay infinite wiſdom, and ſo to compel all at length to acknowledge, and to bow to the Sovereign Excellence, which, out of the refractory and chaotic materials of the moral world, has educed, not merely a predetermined reſult, but a good reſult—a reſult worthy of wiſdom, rectitude, and benevolence.

It would not be very difficult to ſhow in what way, probably, every one of the active qualities, moral and intellectual, which are now in training, may come into exerciſe within a future ſyſtem, even although that ſyſtem ſhould exclude the neceſſities and pains of the preſent ſtate. All the practical ſkill we acquire in managing affairs, all the verſatility, the ſagacity, the calculation of chances, the patience and aſſiduity, the promptitude and facility, as well as the higher virtues, which we are learning every day, may well find ſcope in a world ſuch as is rationally anticipated, when we think of heaven as the ſtage of life that is next to follow the diſcipline of earth.

Thus far we have thought of the future exerciſe of the active virtues, in relation chiefly to perſonal intereſts. But if we duly conſider the force, and the probable iſſue of thoſe intenſe emotions of good will to others, and of compaſſion toward the wretched, which are now at work within generous boſoms, and which yet are very ſlenderly or partially brought into play at preſent, we ſhall be impelled to think, nay, confidently to conclude, that theſe diſpoſitions are, in this world, only burſting the huſk, and germinating, underground, in preparation for free expanſion and fructification in the beams of a warmer ſun. With no other indication of the deſtinies of the univerſe than what may be furniſhed by thoſe ſwelling emotions of pity that are now working, pent up, in tender and noble hearts, we ſhould hardly fear to err in aſſuming that a ſphere will at length open upon ſuch ſpirits, wherein they ſhall find millions needing to be governed, taught, reſcued, and led forward, from a worſe to a better, or from a lower to a higher ſtage of life.

With the material univerſe before us, ſuch as we *now* know it to be in extent, our conjectures need not be put to much difficulty in imagining what may be wanting to fill out our idea of a future economy, where, what now we ſo ardently long to do, but are baffled in attempting, ſhall be practicable, and ſhall offer itſelf to our hands, on

the largeſt ſcale; and where the utmoſt which the moſt ambitious charity could deſire ſhall actually be granted. In admitting ſuppoſitions of this kind, we are not compelled to trench at all upon any article of our Chriſtian belief, or to bring into queſtion any of our ſerious convictions concerning the firmneſs of the divine adminiſtration of human affairs. All we do is, on the ſtrength of the principle of analogy, to conclude that a preparation of feeling ſhall find its expanſion; and that a commencement of moral qualities ſhall have its end and completion. If the inſtinctive yearnings of the human mind after immortality are allowed to furniſh a ſtrong preſumptive evidence (revelation apart) of the life to come, ſo aſſuredly muſt the inſtinctive and vehement deſire of the nobleſt minds to diffuſe truth and happineſs, and to relieve miſery, be allowed to foreſhow what is actually to be the employment of ſuch minds. If there be any ſoundneſs in the one ſort of argument, there muſt be an equal force in the other. For it is quite as eaſy to ſuppoſe that the Creator ſhould have imparted to human nature, the notion and the deſire of immortality, without intending to realiſe it, as that he ſhould have inſtilled a boundleſs benevolence, which is to have no more opportunity to expreſs itſelf than it may chance to meet with in the preſent ſtate: and how often are ſuch opportunities almoſt

wholly withheld! Some there are, who would barely care to live at all, if they may have no ſphere of charity, and whoſe notion of ſubſtantial happineſs conſiſts mainly, or entirely, in the idea of wide and ſucceſsful beneficence.

We conclude then, firſt, that the ſubſtitution of ſpiritual for animal corporeity, leaves the probabilities of increaſed happineſs or miſery evenly balanced; ſecondly, that the tranſition of human nature from one mode of phyſical exiſtence to another, ſhall not *of itſelf* affect the moral ſentiments, or perſonal character; thirdly, that emotions and paſſions, whether benign or not, ſhall probably be far more intenſe in the future ſtate, than they are at preſent; and fourthly, that the active principles of our nature, and our intellectual habits, ſuch as they are now in training, ſhall, in the future life, come into actual uſe.

CHAPTER XV.

Introductory to ſome Conjectures concerning the relation of the Material to the Spiritual Univerſe.

THE above-named concluſions bring our theory of another life to its intended iſſue, ſo far as it is to be drawn from a conſideration of the preſent ſtructure of human nature, bodily and mental; but it remains (if there be grounds for doing ſo) to purſue the indication of facts and of analogies, bearing upon the great ſcheme, material and ſpiritual, in the midſt of which this, our human nature, is evolving its deſtinies. In other words, we now wiſh to give ſome ſort of hypothetical conſiſtency to the ſeveral elements of our conceptions, in thinking of a future life, as related to the theatre upon which it is to take its courſe.

Alluſion has been made above to the extent of the material univerſe, and to our actual knowledge of its vaſtneſs; nor perhaps is it to be avoided in the preſent ſtate of aſtronomical

ſcience, that we ſhould deſire, in ſome manner, to connect our belief concerning the deſtinies of the human family, with our conceptions of the great ſyſtem, in the midſt of which we are moving. None need apprehend ill conſequences as likely to reſult from ſuch endeavours, who have well learned the prime principle of ſound philoſophy, namely, never to allow even the moſt plauſible and pleaſing conjectures to unſettle our conviction of truths which have been eſtabliſhed independently, and which reſt upon poſitive evidence. If there are any who will frown upon all ſuch attempts, as not merely fruitleſs, but reprehenſible and dangerous, they would do well to conſider that, although individually, and from the particular conſtitution of their minds, they may find it very eaſy to abſtain from every path of excurſive meditation, it is not ſo with others, who, almoſt irreſiſtibly, are borne forward toward the wideſt fields of contemplation—a region from which the human mind is not to be barred, and which is better taken poſſeſſion of by thoſe who reverently bow to the authority of Chriſtianity, than left open to impiety.

Fully perſuaded of the certainty, and the awful reality of the Chriſtian revelation, and prepared, always, to ſurrender whatever can be ſhown not to comport with its deciſions; and kept in check by thoſe methods of reaſoning

which the modern phyſical logic ſupplies, we advance a ſtep or two, in anxious curioſity, as if to ſurvey the vaſt realm of the Univerſal King, and to aſk what may be the relation in which we ſtand, or are ultimately to ſtand to our fellow-ſubjects of this unbounded empire.

Is it for no purpoſe that the human eye is permitted to traverſe the immenſity of ſpace? or is it with no moral intention that, now at length, and after five thouſand years of labour and conjecture, a true notion of the material univerſe has been attained, and has become diffuſed among all ranks, in every civilized community? At laſt, and in theſe times, man knows his place in the heavens, and is taught to think juſtly of the relative importance of the planet which has given him birth. During a long courſe of centuries it was to little purpoſe, or to little in relation to man, that the emanations of light had paſſed and repaſſed, from ſide to ſide of the univerſe; for until of late, that is to ſay, the laſt three centuries, it was not certainly known whether this earth (itſelf unexplored) were not the only ſcene of life, and whether the ſun, the ſtars, and the planets, were anything more than brilliants, floating in an upper ether.

A revolution in the intellectual world, affecting our notions and modes of thinking on many ſubjects, has been gradually produced by the

diſcoveries, and by the full eſtabliſhment of the modern aſtronomy;* and it may well be conjectured that certain momentous conſequences of this advancement of ſcience have not as yet been developed. Minds unfriendly to all religion, and to Chriſtianity eſpecially, confidently anticipate the ſhaking of popular belief by this very means; and it is juſt poſſible that a courſe of conduct on the part of the adherents of revelation, analogous to that which was purſued by the Romiſh church toward the firſt promulgators of true notions of the univerſe, might produce very lamentable effects upon the religious convictions of many. But that any ſuch courſe ſhould actually be adopted is barely to be ſuppoſed: on the contrary, it may be expected that, by the turning of thoughtful minds, again and again, to the ſubject, a happy coaleſcence of all great truths—phyſical and religious, will at length be brought about, and ſuch a combination of them effected as ſhall tend powerfully to enhance the ſerious influence of the latter, and accelerate the general prevalence of piety—the piety of the Scriptures.

When once religious principles have taken full poſſeſſion, as well of the underſtanding, as

* The eloquent and important Aſtronomical Diſcourſes of Dr. Chalmers ought here to be named, as having given as well an impulſe, as a direction, to religious meditation, in connection with ſubjects of this claſs.

of the moral faculties, we may with perfect tranquillity purſue ſpeculations of any kind that ſeem likely to enlarge our conceptions of the ſyſtem within which we are moving. Such ſpeculations can never either rob us of our firm property in the higheſt truths, or diſturb our enjoyment of them; but they may ſerve to deepen, tenfold, our ordinary impreſſion of the awful import of thoſe truths. Chriſtianity is not endangered, but it may be the more forcibly impreſſed upon all minds, in conſequence of the converging of truths, from all ſides, upon the one practical inference, which ſhould impel us, without delay, to conclude friendſhip with the Creator and Ruler of all worlds.

All truths ſhall at length be one; there ſhall be one philoſophy, and one religion, nor is it difficult to trace the actual progreſs of the human mind toward this deſirable conſummation. Would it not be unbecoming for religious men to attribute to chance thoſe ſignal improvements in the mechanic arts which have given certainty to our modern aſtronomy? Without the aid of the elaborate inſtruments of obſervation, now in uſe, the calculations and theories of abſtract ſcience could never have been put to the proof of a compariſon with facts, and therefore could never have poſſeſſed the authority of actual ſcience. Far from being inclined to boaſt, in theſe inſtances of the ſkill and ſagacity of man,

we devoutly admire that providence of God, which, after delays ſo long, has at length conferred upon mankind the means of obtaining a juſt, though incomplete knowledge of his vaſt dominion! and we now look with confidence for ſuch further extenſions of our philoſophy as are needed for bringing all our notions, from whatever ſource derived, into a happy uniſon.

The moment choſen for imparting Chriſtianity to the world, was that in which learning and civilization, in all kinds, had reached their higheſt point, and were more widely diffuſed than at any preceding time; nor is it unreaſonable to ſuppoſe that the happy moment predeſtined for the general promulgation and triumph of this ſame Chriſtianity ſhall be that in which the ſubſtantial and well-aſcertained ſciences, having paſſed their ſeaſon of debate and conjecture, ſhall be advancing, not as heretofore by revolutions and ſhocks, but by continual acceſſions; and when, having reached the popular mind, all men ſhall be prepared to admit, and to feel the force of, the great moral inference that is yet to be drawn from them. This ſort of coaleſcence of great principles is not indeed to be expected to take place in a moment, or as the conſequence of the diſcoveries or reaſonings of any one mind; but it may draw on by inſenſible means, and be promoted by this, that, and the

other, unnoticed agency. In expectation of it, we may be feeling our way onward a little, in advance of our actual poſition; and this muſt be done by entertaining ſuch hypotheſes as ſeem conſonant with known facts, and which hypotheſes will open up untrodden ground, and enable us to improve every new indication of things as yet unknown.

And in this place again, the author muſt urge the reader always to bear in mind what are, and what are not, the legitimate uſes of hypotheſes, in philoſophical purſuits. An hypotheſis then, however plauſible, is never to be ranged along with truths; or to be claſſed with things proved; nor ſuffered to fill a vacuity in our ſyſtems, until it may be diſplaced by a better theory, or by aſcertained facts. This was the fallacious practice of the ancient theoriſts; but it is now exploded. Hypotheſis is *a preparation for reaſoning*—a preparation which ſaves time, and prevents the overlooking of any facts that may hereafter preſent themſelves, and which, ſhould they occur, will inſtantly be noted and turned to the beſt account, as tending either to confirm, or to explode the ſuppoſition already advanced. To uſe a familiar illuſtration, well deviſed hypotheſes are labelled drawers, always ready for the reception of facts fortuitouſly preſented. In thoſe branches of ſcience which are open to experiment, it is hypotheſis that leads the way, in every inſtance.

In relation to our immediate ſubject, namely, the connection between the ſcheme of the material univerſe, and the deſtinies of the human, and of other rational orders, it may be ſtated as *poſſible* that ſome of thoſe revolutions and cataſtrophes which have, not unfrequently, in the courſe of ages, been obſerved to take place in the remoter regions of the heavens, ſuch as the ſudden combuſtion of ſtars, and their extinction, or the appearance of new ſtars, may, any day, take place nearer home, and within ſuch diſtances as ſhould allow of their being diſtinctly obſerved. Now, on the ſuppoſition of ſuch an event, it is poſſible that new views of the conſtitution and deſtinies of the univerſe might be thereby ſuggeſted; and in that caſe, the having entertained more than one hypotheſis on the ſubject, would be a preparation for turning the actual facts to the beſt account; and would alſo quicken and animate our obſervations.

There are two facts, each of which is ſignificant in relation to our preſent ſubject, and of which the firſt has long been underſtood, while the latter (only of late aſcertained) is every day receiving new illuſtrations, namely, That our planet is, in no ſenſe, of primary importance in the general ſyſtem, or entitled, by its magnitude, or by its poſition, or by its conſtitution, to be conſidered as exerting any peculiar influence

over others. This knowledge of our real place and value in the univerſe is a very important conſequence of our modern aſtronomy; nor ſhould it ever be loſt ſight of, in any of our ſpeculations. But then it is alſo now aſcertained that the great laws of our own planet, and of the ſolar ſyſtem to which it belongs, prevail in all other, and the moſt remote ſyſtems, ſo as to make the viſible univerſe, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, ONE SYSTEM—indicating, beyond a doubt, one origin, and ſhowing the preſence of one Controlling Power. Thus the law of gravitation, with all the various conditions it implies, and the laws of light, are demonſtrated to be in operation in regions incalculably remote; and juſt ſo far as the phyſical conſtitution of the other planets of our own ſyſtem can be either traced, or reaſonably conjectured, it appears that, amid many diverſities of conſtitution, the ſame great principles prevail in all. Hence it appears that our further conjectures, concerning the exiſtence of ſentient and rational life, in other worlds, are borne out by every ſort of analogy, abſtract and phyſical: and then this ſame rule of analogy impels us to ſuppoſe that rational and moral agents, in whatever world found, and whatever diverſity of form may diſtinguiſh them, would be ſuch as that we ſhould ſoon feel ourſelves at home in their ſociety, and able to confer with them—to communicate knowledge

to them, and to receive knowledge from them. Neither truth nor virtue can be local; nor can there be any wiſdom and goodneſs in one planet, which is not wiſdom and goodneſs in every other.

We muſt believe that rational and moral intercourſe would be practicable, even where phyſical correſpondence might be impoſſible; for while our animal organization demands a ſpecific temperament of the elements, and can act only within a very narrow circle, the intellectual faculties, on the contrary, and the moral emotions, are capable of adapting themſelves to every imaginable variety of circumſtance, and can always embrace, and coaleſce with, univerſal principles. Hence it might well happen that, in worlds where we could neither reſpire, nor ſtand upright, nor endure the heat, or the cold, in worlds where our bodies would inſtantly congeal, or would as ſuddenly be evaporized, we might yet, if freed from theſe accidental organic difficulties, make ourſelves one with the rational tribes of thoſe worlds. For the purpoſe therefore of bringing all ſuch tribes into correſpondence, and of blending them in a ſocial economy, nothing would be neceſſary but to give them, ſeverally, a corporeal conſtitution independent of all telluric peculiarities of temperature, denſity, and atmoſpheric influence.

Our involuntary impreſſion that other worlds

differ vaſtly from our own, in the modes of life they ſupport, is ſo ſtrong that, perhaps, if tranſported to ſome neighbouring planet, we ſhould feel more amazement in meeting there with beings preciſely like ourſelves, than in encountering the ſtrangeſt and moſt groteſque forms that have ever been dreamed of. Yet, whether brethren in figure and countenance, or not, it is not poſſible to doubt that all, in all worlds, who are capable of reaſon, and who are open to moral affections, are tending, though at different rates, toward the ſame eternal truths, and are made amenable to one law, and are ſubmitted to one principle of government.

But ſhall not thoſe who are brethren come ſome day to be companions; or at leaſt to know of each other's exiſtence and well-being? Many reaſons may be adduced, ſtrongly tending to ſuggeſt the belief that all races, holding to the ſame principles of reaſon and virtue, ſhall at ſome, perhaps remote, era of their exiſtence, be brought to compare hiſtories, and ſo to receive ſeverally the benefit derivable from their common experience. The preſent conſtruction of the material univerſe is plainly marked with the intention to prohibit intercourſe; but this vaſt framework is a means only to a higher end; and in the twinkling of an eye, it may give place to another order of things: or another order of things may, even now, although to us occult,

be actually in play; as we ſhall preſently have to ſtate.

The principle of inſulation may long prevail; and yet may at length give way to a higher and better principle—that of communion, and of free intercourſe. Such a change has actually come about within the human family. During many centuries the ſeveral tribes of men—remote in poſition, knew little or nothing of each other; nor did they maintain any extended or uſeful correſpondence. Extenſive empires remained ſecluded, during their long terms of wealth and power, and paſſed away, leaving barely a memorial of their exiſtence. But now, at length, all nations are drawing cloſe the bonds of brotherhood: there are no longer any vaſt unexplored regions, impriſoning their inhabitants: commerce, the ſpirit of adventure, and the ſpirit of benevolent enterpriſe, are faſt connecting all with all; and it is now within the proſpect of the human family to conſtitute—not, indeed, one political ſtructure, but one family, cheriſhing peace from a ſenſe of intereſt, and from a ſenſe of juſtice; and mutually promoting the advance, one of another, as the ſureſt means of proſpering ſeverally. Intercourſe and combination muſt be the ultimate condition of thoſe who are by nature capable of ſociety. Inſulation and variance are unnatural, and muſt be temporary.

Species that are incapable of entertaining abſtract notions, and which, therefore, are incapable of generalization, and of adapting themſelves to any new order of things, and incapable, for the ſame reaſon, of progreſs, can have nothing to gain, either from intercourſe with any other ſpecies, or from intercourſe with new maſſes of their own ſpecies. To ſuch, the reſults of individual experience can never become additions to a common ſtock of knowledge, or of ſkill. But herein the human ſpecies ſtands immenſely above the level of all the tribes of earth. Except by correſpondence with his fellows, man knows nothing, and can do nothing; but by the aid of this correſpondence, a common fund of intelligence is formed, which does, or which may, conſtantly increaſe, and increaſe without limit. And how much of improvement and of advancement may ſpring from the reſidence of an individual only, belonging to a more civilized community, among a leſs civilized community! Such a viſit, made under auſpicious circumſtances, may have the effect of raiſing the nations of a continent from ſemi-barbariſm, to the higheſt pitch of refinement.

So far as we ſee or know, correſpondence and interchange of knowledge, among races that have made unequal progreſs, is the one and only means of advancement, which the great princi-

ples of the intellectual ſyſtem admit of. The Ruler of all worlds does not *immediately* inſtruct any in what it moſt concerns them to know; and becauſe it does not conſiſt with the laws of his government to afford any ſuch direct information, tribes of men remain ignorant, from age to age, of the ſimpleſt and moſt neceſſary truths. But it *does* conſiſt with theſe laws to allow the better informed to mix with the ignorant, and to diffuſe the benefits of their acquirements.

It may reaſonably be doubted whether the higheſt and the moſt occult truths are in any way at all to be apprehended and made intelligible, except as they may ſlowly be gathered, in the way of induction, from a copious acquaintance with facts within the circle of which thoſe abſtruſe principles may be ſeen to work themſelves out. The hiſtory of only any one rational family cannot, probably, in the nature of things, carry us further than to the extent of a very partial knowledge of the laws of the moral univerſe. But the hiſtory and experience of *one other* ſuch family, would doubtleſs ſerve to expand vaſtly our conceptions, and to place the whole of our previouſly acquired moral notions in a new light, or to bring them into a new relative poſition. If permitted to take our ſtanding at *two* diſtant points, in the great circle of the ſocial ſyſtem, we ſhould gain a parallax, and thenceforward ſhould have the means of

meaſuring the diſtance between ourſelves and the centre of all, with ſome certainty.

The advantage accruing from correſpondence with *one* other race, would no doubt be proportionately multiplied in extending our acquaintance with many others. And yet even this accumulation of knowledge might long fall ſhort of its conſummation, and we might be conſcious of a want of ſymmetry in our notions, without the power to ſupply the deficiency. But in ſome remote quarter of the univerſe, and, perhaps, in ſome obſcure world, there may have been a train of events going on, altogether peculiar, and ſuch, that this ſingle hiſtory would ſerve to develop the MASTER PRINCIPLE of the divine government, and would ſupply the key to all difficulties. Until this one race has been converſed with, and its hiſtory peruſed, all races, perhaps, might vainly ponder the reaſons of the procedures of the Supreme Power; nevertheleſs the actual publication of this clearing inſtance may depend (as we ſpeak) upon an accident, and may be delayed, through cycles of ages.

Our general (and hypothetic) concluſion is this, and it may be expreſſed in two propoſitions, namely, firſt, That as beings endowed with the faculty of abſtraction and generalization are thereby made capable of indefinite improvement through the means of intercourſe, individually,

and alſo ſpecies with ſpecies, ſuch intercourſe is to be regarded as probably coming within the ultimate intention of the divine adminiſtration toward them; for otherwiſe theſe intellectual powers would fall ſhort of what is plainly their higheſt uſe: and ſecondly, That, as a comprehenſive knowledge of the principles of the moral ſyſtem is probably not to be obtained in any other manner than through a proceſs of extenſive induction from actual facts, even the moſt virtuous and rational minds muſt for ever remain bewildered and diſtreſſed, in relation to the divine government, unleſs intercourſe at large with other races of moral beings ſhould be allowed in a future ſtage of our exiſtence.

We have, then, before us, on the one hand, the very ſtrong abſtract probability that a race capable, by the faculties conferred upon it, of indefinite advancement, and of riſing to the very higheſt range of generalization, ſhall at length come into correſpondence with other rational orders, and perhaps with all. On the other hand, we have, not merely the inſtinctive expectation of another and a higher mode of exiſtence, but the divinely authenticated aſſurance that the rational univerſe compriſes a lower and a higher ſpecies of corporeity; and that a tranſition from the lower to the higher actually awaits the human family. Now when theſe two principles are combined, it is almoſt inevit-

able that we ſhould indulge ſome conjectures concerning the material univerſe, conſidered as the theatre of a great intellectual economy, and as framed mainly, though not excluſively, for the purpoſe of giving effect to the laws and ultimate intention of the moral world.

The various conjectures which offer themſelves to our choice on this ground, ſeem reducible to three diſtinct ſuppoſitions, each of which is ſuſtained by its own degree of probability; and, perhaps, after ſtating them in order, we may be inclined to think that a combination of the three is more likely to be near the truth than any one of them by itſelf.

CHAPTER XVI.

The firſt conjecture concerning the Material Univerſe, viewed as the Theatre of an Intellectual Syſtem.

HAVING before us the aſſumed, and indeed the atteſted fact, that there are now in the univerſe, two great claſſes of rational beings, both corporeal, but the corporeity of the one diſſoluble, while that of the other is incorruptible; and then taking a glance at the great ſidereal economy, conſiſting as it does of two claſſes of bodies, the one ſubordinate to, and wholly dependent upon the other; and this other apparently adapted to a much higher mode of exiſtence than the former, the ſuppoſition offers itſelf that, while the planets are the places of animal and corruptible organization, and the ſchools of initiation to all rational orders, the ſun, of each ſuch ſyſtem, is the home of the higher and ultimate ſpiritual corporeity, and the centre of aſſembly for thoſe who have already

paſſed their preliminary era upon the lower ranges of creation.

The ſuppoſition that the ſun of each ſyſtem is the mere lamp and hearth of the planetary band, or only the ſwivel of its revolutions, is ſurely not to be admitted! This were much the ſame thing as if, in viewing from a hamlet on a mountain ſide, the diſtant metropolis of an empire, the gilded domes of which are refulgent in the beams of noon, one were to imagine that the great world is not in that metropolis, but in the dozen of ſhepherds' huts, among which one ſtands.

Recent diſcoveries make it more than barely probable that the ſolar ſurface, ſhrouded from the vertical rays of the upper and phoſphoreſcent atmoſphere by an intermediate nebulous ſtratum, denſe enough to moderate the intenſity, as well of light as of heat, may ſuſtain life not leſs readily than the ſurface of Mercury; perhaps more ſo; in fact, the temperature may be lower on the former than it is on the latter. But even this probability is not neceſſary to our conjecture, inaſmuch as the aſſumption that any intenſity of light and heat, beyond a certain degree, muſt be incompatible with life, is altogether gratuitous.

But we muſt not fail here to point out one circumſtance, in which the ſolar ſurface is diſtinguiſhed from the planetary ſurfaces, conſidered

as adapted to the ſupport of corporeal life—a circumſtance ſo highly ſignificant and remarkable, as almoſt in itſelf to involve the very points of difference which we have ſuppoſed to diſtinguiſh animal from ſpiritual corporeity; and it is this—That whereas the ſurfaces of the planets, and all the vegetable and animal ſpecies thereon ſubſiſting, are liable to an alternation of heat and cold, of light and darkneſs, and, therefore, live through returning periods of *excitement* and of *repoſe*, and this both diurnal and annual; the ſurface of the ſun, with the ſpecies it may ſupport, is uniformly expoſed to its maximum of heat and light. That is to ſay, the ſolar tribes, vegetable and animal, inſtead of paſſing, at regular intervals, from ſtimulus to exhauſtion—from activity to reſt, ſuſtain (if we ſhould ſay *ſuſtain*) an equable impulſe, from the external elements. But ſtimulus and excitement are conditions of exiſtence which imply inertia and decompoſition; and where there is no ſuch alternation of action and inaction, we may reaſonably aſſume that there is neither a ſpending of forces, nor a diſſolution of ſtructure. The *phyſical idea* of ſolar life, followed out on the principle of the unintermitted intenſity of light and heat, and implying alſo the conſtant action of all powers dependent thereupon, will amount to little leſs than to a conception of incorruptibility, and immortality.

To exclude objections againſt our preſent hypotheſis, it ſhould be ſtated that, by the revolution of the ſun upon its axis, and by the inclination of its axis, all parts of its ſurface are expoſed to our obſervation; while at the ſame time, by the frequent breaking out of ſpots in all parts of its equatorial zone, the phyſical conſtitution of the whole is, to a certain extent, laid before us; nor is it hardly poſſible to ſuppoſe anything elſe than that the ſolar ſurface, although there may be, and probably are, *irregular* variations of temperature upon it, ariſing from the accumulation or the diſperſion of the intermediate reflecting ſtratum, is yet everywhere, and always, acted upon by ſo much of the phoſphoreſcent fluid as penetrates that ſtratum; nor can it be believed that there is anything reſembling a regular alternation of light and darkneſs—of cold and heat. The variations may be ſuch as we are conſcious of during a ſummer's day; but not ſuch as diſtinguiſh midnight from noon, or winter from ſummer.

The permanence, or incorruptibility of vegetable and animal life, on the ſolar ſurface, might indeed be inferred, by contraſt, from a conſideration of what we ſee to be involved, as it reſpects both kinds of organization, in the diurnal and annual alternations of light and temperature. An argument of this ſort can here be only very briefly ſtated, and muſt then be left with the

reader, to admit or reject it as he may pleaſe. The ſuppoſition may be placed on different grounds, as thus:—It is certain that a perpetual day, and a perpetual ſummer (other conſequences not now regarded) would very quickly exhauſt the forces of all terreſtrial orders, both vegetable and animal, and muſt bring all kinds of life, as conſtituted on this planet, to a ſpeedy cloſe. Life, conſtituted ſo as to endure an unvaried intenſity of light and heat, muſt be framed on a principle the very oppoſite of that which here prevails; and is this oppoſite principle any other than that of incorruptibility, and of an internal force, not dependent upon excitements, or renewable by an extraneous pabulum?

Or thus—and to confine our attention to the human ſyſtem: The relative forces of the mind and body, or what may be called the corporeal equipoiſe, is ſuch, as that the voluntary animal functions are never found to be commenſurate with the mental activity; and the diſparity between the two is made up by impoſing upon the mind a long, and a frequently recurring ſeaſon of inaction, in ſleep, during which, being reſtrained from making any demand upon the corporeal mechaniſm, the latter repleniſhes its ſtock of excitability, which again, and very ſoon, is to be ſpent. There is therefore, at preſent, a want of balance between the two combined powers—a want ſupplied by means of the col-

lapſe or confinement of the power which would outrun its colleague. But an eſſential inequality of this ſort can never be ſo exactly adjuſted as that the one force will not, by a little, ſurpaſs the other; and this daily increment, ſmall as it may be in each inſtance, muſt at length overthrow the equipoiſe entirely;—ſo that the defective power will at laſt give way, and be broken up. We conſider it as certain that death muſt enſue, ſooner or later, in the caſe of any being whoſe conſtitution combines two unequal forces, the inequality of which has to be adjuſted by impoſing frequent ceſſations upon the ſtronger of the two. The life, therefore, of all planetary ſpecies, that is to ſay, of all ſpecies expoſed to the alternations of light and darkneſs, and which, in conformity with this alternation, live by turns, waking and ſleeping, is a life neceſſarily tending to diſſolution. But the ſolar ſpecies are not expoſed to any ſuch alternation, and as they live without repoſe, they may be, and probably are —immortal.

Yet let this incorruptibility and immortality be thought of apart from thoſe religious aſſociations which the words are apt to call up. Incorruptibility and immortality, we are uſed to think of, only in connection with the Chriſtian hope of a better life, and as the reward of the good. But the exemption of life from corruption and diſſolution may *now* be enjoyed, as a

common thing, within the limits of the ſyſtem, of which our globe is a member. Diſorganization and death are accidents of life—accidents, unavoidable indeed upon the planetary ſurfaces; but not ſo perhaps upon the ſolar: and upon the latter it may be as unnatural to die, as upon the former it is unnatural long to live.

Moreover, as we ſeldom if ever think of incorruptibility and immortality except as the inheritance of human nature, and of the higher orders of beings, we may be led, by a conjecture ſuch as the one now in hand, to enlarge the range of our conceptions of the material univerſe, and to indulge the bright and happy ſuppoſition of fair fields of life and bliſs, in all gradations, from the loweſt ſpecies to the higheſt; and all freed from the law of preying one upon another, and of death. With theſe ideas before us, and on the belief that ſolar life, as compared with planetary life, is of this better and higher ſort, let the univerſe be contemplated, and let us admit the exhilarating conception that the millions upon millions of ſuns filling the immenſity of ſpace, are ſpheres, not only of perpetual day (as is manifeſt) but of undecaying life! During this our planetary ſtage of exiſtence, we have our lodging in the murky ſuburbs of creation; but yet a diſtant view of royal palaces and gardens of delight is afforded to us, nor are we left without ſignificant indications of what is there to be found.

There may be thoſe, perhaps, who would reſent it as a trivial and unworthy ſuppoſition that a heaven can be anything except a grave convocation of rational worſhippers, convened in perpetuity upon ethereal clouds, and occupied for ever in one and the ſame ecſtatic manner. But having this mundane portion of the creation under our eyes, we are impelled to conceive very differently of the univerſe, and of the principles which will be found to prevail throughout it. Is it not the ſtyle and mode of the Supreme Creative Intelligence to take the wideſt range, and to include endleſs varieties and interminable gradations of power and faculty in the circle of his works? Nothing of that ſtern purſuit of ſingle purpoſes which belongs to ourſelves, when intently moved, ſeems to attach to the creation. Man is abſorbed in his immediate object, if that object be important in his view; but God is always at leiſure, and while accompliſhing the ſtupendous purpoſes of the moral and ſpiritual ſcheme, finds time and means for repleniſhing the elements with inſect life, and for decorating all ſurfaces with gay vegetation.

How very far is it from being true, for example, within the vegetable kingdom, that no ends are kept in view beyond the mere ſubſerviency of each order and ſpecies to the uſes of the orders next above it! On the contrary, there is everywhere a free exuberance, a copiouſneſs,

a verſatility, and an unchecked love of embelliſhment and beauty, ſuch as put ſhame on the ſuppoſition that the rule of a dry utility has been followed as the law of a creation. In truth the *uſes* which any one ſpecies may be thought to ſubſerve, appear, moſt often, to be rather adjunctive than principal, and ſeem an accidental circumſtance, thrown in upon the main deſign. But if a rule ſo rich and free be indeed the law of the Creative Power, it will ſhow itſelf in all worlds; and moſt of all in thoſe warm and reſplendent ſpheres where the elementary conditions are ſuch as peculiarly to favour its development.

The prejudices (not perhaps very culpable) of a ſomewhat morbid ſpirituality, might perhaps lead us to diſtaſte the animated world around us, as God's work,* and impel us to be ſcandalized at ſome of its conditions; and thus it is conceivable that the realities of the upper world, when firſt they open upon minds imbued with

* The ancient Manichean doctrine gave a bold and diſtinct expreſſion to this order of prejudices; and it was plainly avowed, by the authors of that ſyſtem, that they could not admit the preſent world, with its animal ſpecies, to be the work of ſupreme benevolence, wiſdom, and purity. Nothing is more dangerous than to indulge notions which tend to make us think our taſtes and principles more refined and elevated than thoſe of the Creator and Ruler of the univerſe. Something of this infatuation very commonly beſets ardent and abſtracted minds.

prepoſſeſſions of this kind, may excite a recoil and an amazement, ſuch as may try the principles of piety. Let it juſt be conceived of that a ſpirit, born and trained in ſome pure ethereal region of reaſon and love, and where no orders of creatures inferior to itſelf had ever been ſeen or heard of, and where the attributes of Deity, in the moſt abſtract mode of their expreſſion, had alone been contemplated; let it be ſuppoſed that ſuch a ſpirit were told it ſhould be taken where the Creative Power had put itſelf forth in quite another manner; and then that it ſhould be brought, without further preparation, to this planet of ours, and be placed in the depth of a teeming wilderneſs of the torrid zone, and there left to examine, not only the luxuriance and beauty of the vegetable orders, but the forms, inſtincts, habits, of the inſect tribes, and of the reptiles, the birds, the quadrupeds, which people the ſultry foreſt. Now although ourſelves, with the preparation we have gone through, are in a poſition to admire theſe various orders, and in fact to derive from this very ſource, a main portion of the evidence of our natural theology, may it not readily be imagined that, to a pure ſpirit, ſuch a one as we have here ſuppoſed, the effect of the exhibition, and of all its details, would be to generate a ſort of wonder, not unmixed with perplexity, or even diſtreſs?

Something perhaps analogous to this may

await the human mind when, after having entertained abſtract notions of the Divine Nature, and in forming which we have conſulted our own narrow conceptions of what *ought to be*, rather than cooly conſidered what *is*, we are introduced into another domain of God's univerſal empire, where, inſtead of the meagre and colourleſs outline which had ſtood before our poor imaginations, we behold the rich and various products of the Infinite Intelligence; all indeed bright and good;—but good in a ſenſe related to the Infinite, not to finite reaſon. Now the products of infinite power and abſolute wiſdom not merely ſurpaſs our powers and our notions in *dimenſions*, but in *kind* alſo, and in their leading principles. That is to ſay, the univerſe is not only more vaſt than we can meaſure or conceive of; but it is probably more various than we are apt or willing to imagine; and moreover it involves and exhibits motives or reaſons of procedure, ſuch as would by no means have occurred to us, as natural, or as abſtractedly fit, conſidered in relation to what we aſſume concerning the divine attributes.

Now to revert a moment to our preſent conjecture, concerning the conſtruction and intention of the viſible univerſe, there are ſome perhaps, who, in the loftineſs of their religious conceptions, would reſent, as totally unworthy and grovelling, the ſuppoſition that the ſun of

our own ſyſtem, and that each ſun of each ſyſtem, is a home and heaven to its planetary tribes, and that this ſolar heaven is ſtocked with various orders of ſentient beings. Let then the ſuppoſition be diſcarded by thoſe who diſtaſte it; and aſſuredly no value is attached to it, otherwiſe than ſo far as it may ſerve a purpoſe which is in ſome degree important, namely, that of tending to bring our religious conceptions into definite alliance with the real world, and with nature, and to break up, a little, thoſe vague and powerleſs notions which place our religious expectations at a dim remoteneſs from whatever is ſubſtantial and effective. Let us try to perſuade ourſelves that the future and unſeen world, with all its momentous tranſactions, is as ſimply natural and true, as is this homely world of land and water, trees and houſes, with which we have now to do.

The opinion has been often advanced, and ſeems to be gathering ſtrength, that the ſun and other ſtars, that is to ſay, the entire celeſtial ſyſtem viſible to us, is in actual movement, in one direction; or that it is revolving around a common centre. But who ſhall calculate the dimenſions of a central maſs ſuch as may be adequate to ſuſtain the revolutions of all ſuns and worlds? This opinion is juſt named in this place, that we may point out its relation to our preſent

conjecture.—If each ſun be a place of aſſembly, and a home of immortality to the rational planetary tribes of its ſyſtem, the vaſt world around which all ſuns are ſuppoſed to be revolving, may be the home of a ſtill higher order of life, and the theatre of a ſtill more comprehenſive convocation of the intellectual community.

There remains, however, one point of geological and mathematical ſpeculation which ought to find a place in our preſent conjecture. It is then believed, on the ground of a calculation of forces, that our own planet, and others, are not ſolid globes, but hollow ſpheres, or ſpherical ſhells, including a perhaps irregular, but vaſt cavity, and this cavity occupied by ſome elaſtic fluid or gas. Does then this inner cavern ſubſerve any purpoſe connected with the deſtinies of thoſe who are treading, or who have already trodden the ſurface? or has the dim abyſs ſentient tribes of its own? We do not propoſe to purſue the conjecture; but yet we muſt juſt place it in appoſition with that very ancient, and, may we not ſay, Biblical claſſification of all intelligent orders, under the three heads of celeſtials, terreſtrials, and ſubterraneans; or as they are deſignated by St. Paul, the ἐπουράνιοι, the ἐπίγειοι, and the καταχθόνιοι.*

* Philippians ii. 10: where the univerſal ſovereignty of the Son of God is diſtinctly ſtated as including the three great orders of the intelligent economy—the heavenly, the earthly,

This claſſification of intelligent beings, it muſt be confeſſed, by no means correſponds with the diſtribution we are moſt accuſtomed to think of, namely, that which arranges all rational beings into the three claſſes of the inhabitants of heaven, holy and happy;—the inhabitants of earth, who are on their probation;—and the condemned and infernal ſpirits. For, on the one hand, certain claſſes of the celeſtials, the ἐπουράνιοι, are ſpoken of by St. Paul as being in open oppoſition to the divine government,* while, on the other hand, the infernals, or the inhabitants of the nether region, or of hades, are repreſented as the ſubjects of the Meſſiah's kingly function; and alſo (as in the paſſages mentioned in the note) as joining with the celeſtials and the terreſtrials, in an anthem of praiſe, to God and the Lamb.

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and the ſubterrene. This paſſage ſhould be compared with Romans xiv. 9; where the courſe paſſed through by the Saviour of men is declared to have had a reference to the due exerciſe of his deſtined ſway over the dead and the living: or, according to the opinion which the apoſtle may be held to adopt and ſanction, over the inhabitants of the ſuperficial world, and of the abyſs, or central cavern. Again, we ſhould refer to Revelation v. 3, and 13, where (which is eſpecially to be noted) the deſignation of the καταχθόνιοι is varied, and they are deſcribed as thoſe who are ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς, and where, moreover, they are aſſociated with thoſe who gladly render 'bleſſing and honour, and glory and power, to Him that ſitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb.'

* Epheſians vi. 12.

This, however, is not the place for purſuing any Biblical, or properly theological queſtion. All we now attempt is juſt to ſtate the fact that there is an apparent correſpondence between the Biblical claſſification of the intellectual community, and our hypotheſis concerning the three modes of exiſtence which ſeem to be provided for in the ſtructure of the material univerſe. If we rightly underſtand the affirmations and the intimations of the inſpired writers, man is deſtined to paſs through three ſtages of life; the firſt, upon the ſurface of the earth, and ſubject to the conditions of animal organization; the ſecond, if we do not miſtake the apoſtolic words, 'under the earth,' and in a tranſition-form, of attenuated and inactive corporeity; and the third, and ultimate, in a region of power, incorruptibility, and full activity. This our firſt conjecture then, concerning the material univerſe, conſidered as the frame of the intellectual economy, brings the viſible and the inviſible worlds into conjunction in that manner which, at a glance, offers itſelf to our acceptance as obvious and natural. Nevertheleſs, whatever may be the pretenſions of this hypotheſis, we advance it as nothing more than a conjecture; and go on to ſtate another, which may equally well conſiſt with what we are bound to believe, on better evidence.

CHAPTER XVII.

The Second Conjecture.

BUT we are now to hold in abeyance, or altogether to exclude the hypotheſis above ſtated, concerning the material univerſe, as apparently adapted to ſuſtain three orders of intelligent beings; and on the contrary, ſhall aſſume that planets and ſuns alike, and all worlds, viſible and palpable, are the theatres of animal life merely; and that whatever ſpecies may inhabit theſe ſpheres, they are all ſubject to decay and corruption.

This ſuppoſed; then our ſecond conjecture is —That, within the field occupied by the viſible and ponderable univerſe, and on all ſides of us, there is exiſting and moving another element, fraught with another ſpecies of life—corporeal indeed, and various in its orders; but not open to the cognizance of thoſe who are confined to the conditions of animal organization—not to be ſeen, not to be heard, not to be felt by

man. We here aſſume the abſtract probability that our five modes of perception are partial, not univerſal means of knowing what may be around us; and that, as the phyſical ſciences furniſh evidence of the preſence and agency of certain powers of nature which entirely elude the ſenſes, except in ſome of their remote effects, ſo are we denied the right of concluding that we are conſcious of all real exiſtences within our ſphere.

Something muſt preſently be ſaid with the view of looſening the firm natural prejudice which impels us to conclude that nothing *corporeal* can elude our ſenſes; but firſt let the conjecture now in hand be itſelf diſtinctly ſtated.

There prevails, throughout the ſyſtem of nature, a pervading of the denſe elements by the leſs denſe, or the fluid, or the gaſeous. Thus all ſolid bodies are penetrated, either by humidity, or by the elaſtic gaſes, or by the imponderable elements—light, heat, electricity, magnetiſm. Again, fluids are, in like manner, pervious to other fluids, with which they may combine; and alſo to elaſtic gaſes, and to the elements juſt named; and in its turn, the rareſt gas is traverſed by, and commingled with, other elaſtic bodies, and by light, heat, electricity, or magnetiſm. In ſome caſes the pervading element affects the element pervaded; thus heat expands metals, and at a certain point fuſes them;

and ſo galvaniſm puts into activity the chemical affinities of many ſolids and fluids. But in other caſes the pervading element takes its courſe through the pervading body without giving any indication, *upon that body*, of its preſence, or of its paſſage. Thus electricity may paſs, unnoticed, through a perfectly conducting ſubſtance; and the magnetic attraction takes its way through intervening bodies, which in no ſenſible manner it diſturbs; and thus too does the power of gravitation take effect at the greateſt diſtances, without rendering itſelf ſenſible in any other manner than that of effecting an approximation of maſſes.

But is this conſtant principle of the viſible world, ſhowing itſelf as it does, in a thouſand modes around us—is it exhauſted and done with, in the inſtances which our modern phyſical diſcoveries have brought to light? We ſhould confidently aſſume the contrary, and believe nothing leſs than that it has a ſtill further and higher play in relation to the ſentient and intellectual univerſe. That is to ſay, we inſiſt upon the abſtract probability of the exiſtence, on all ſides of us, of an inviſible element, ſuſtaining its own ſpecies of beings—ſome, perhaps, as ſlenderly endowed with rational faculties as are the inſect tribes of earth, and others, in gradation, riſing to the higheſt pitch of intelligence and moral dignity:—ſome accountable and immortal;

others ephemeral, and prompted only by inſtincts.

Our preſent conjecture reaches to the extent of ſuppoſing that, within the ſpace encircled by the ſidereal revolutions, there exiſts and moves a ſecond univerſe, not leſs real than the one we are at preſent converſant with; a univerſe elaborate in ſtructure, and replete with life—life, agitated by momentous intereſts, and perhaps by frivolous intereſts; a univerſe conſcious, perhaps, of the material ſpheres, or unconſcious of them, and firmly believing (as we do) *itſelf* to be the only reality. Our planets in their courſes do not perforate the walls of this inviſible creation; our ſuns do not ſcorch its plains; for the two collocated ſyſtems are not connected by any immediate relationſhip.

The fact is before our eyes, that the Creator works on a ſcale which, in a mathematical ſenſe, is greater than can be computed or imagined; and it is evident too that He advances toward the infinite in both directions; that is to ſay, toward the infinitely great, and the infinitely ſmall. We ſee alſo that the utmoſt range of variety, both in principle and in form, is taken in the conſtruction of the ſentient ſyſtem; and that the phyſical capacity of our own world for ſuſtaining life is indefinitely enlarged by the ſuffuſion of element upon element, and each peopled with its animated orders. We are, there-

fore, almoſt compelled to entertain the belief that the very ſame law goes on, as far as it can go on; and, therefore, muſt ſuppoſe that the inviſible orders are not leſs numerous than the viſible. Our ſight, and hearing, and touch make us acquainted with a certain ſtage of the creation, informing us of whatever is moving upon that ſtage; and there they ſtop. But is it to be thought that the eye of man is the meaſure of the Creator's power?—and has He created nothing which He has not expoſed to our ſenſes? The contrary ſeems much more than barely poſſible;—ought we not to think it almoſt certain?

In ſtating the conjecture that the two worlds, the viſible and the inviſible, may co-exiſt within the ſame ſpace, and yet be unconſcious of each other, and not related by any affinities, we aſſume what is abſtractedly poſſible; but we ſhould unqueſtionably conſider as more probable the ſuppoſition that the two orders of exiſtence, whether conſciouſly or not, on *both* ſides, are, nevertheleſs, really related one to the other, and that in fact the one is an after-ſtage to the other. Here again we have recourſe to the aid that is furniſhed in ſo many caſes by actual analogies.

Let it be conſidered, then, that while among many of the terreſtrial orders, there is ſeen a tendency to advance from a lower to a higher mode of exiſtence, and in all, a progreſſion from

the germ to the bud, and from the bud to the fruit, and from the embryo to the perfect animal; and while the human mind plainly indicates this ſame law in its deſire of advancement, in the general ſentiment of hope—the moſt permanent impulſe of our nature, and in its aſpirations after immortality;—while, we ſay, there is this upward and onward tendency in the ſentient and rational world, the deſires and propenſities of all orders impel them alſo, in the contrary direction, and lead all to ſeek their ſupport, and their gratification, rather beneath than above the level of their natures reſpectively. This downward tendency is in none ſo remarkable as in man, who is always ſeen (powerful corrective influences apart) to ſeek his happineſs in the lower range of gratifications. Man may indeed be deſtined to riſe on the ſcale of exiſtence; but his actual diſpoſition is to deſcend. In truth, even when moſt alive to the elevating motives of intelligence and piety, he is ſtill, by his conſtitution, and by the neceſſities of his nature, compelled to converſe chiefly with things of a lower order, and to be employed in affairs little accordant, apparently, with his high hopes.

Now ſomething akin to this habit of attachment of things beneath us, may be imagined to affect the inviſible orders; and they may, while in progreſs upward *by deſtiny*, yet, by actual inſtinct and impulſe, be looking downward: they

may crowd around the ſolid maſſes of the material univerſe—as birds in migration alight upon the ſails and maſts of ſhips in the mid ocean; they may concern themſelves with the intereſts of the planetary tribes, and make themſelves parties in the affairs of the lower world. All this may be, without ſuppoſing that ſuch ſupernal beings are actuated by motives altogether unworthy of their rank; for, as we ſee, entirely apart from any degrading ſentiment, or ſenſual taſte, the human mind delights itſelf in the order and beauty of the animal creation, and explores, too, the conſtitution of the inanimate world, and finds its recreation among the humbleſt varieties of the vegetable and animal ſpecies, and eſpecially draws the moſt refined gratifications of its rational taſtes from the purſuit of the mere relations of extenſion and number!

We would not wiſh to take up a too abſtruſe idea, and yet are inclined to believe that the very law of dependent natures, which, apart from the conſtant energy of the Divine will, would reduce them to nothing, actually operates ſo far as to produce a ſort of *intellectual gravitation* of all rational beings, toward the lower ranks of exiſtence; ſo, as that, while there are impulſes which are bearing us upward and onward; there is alſo a uniform tendency downward, toward that nihility out of which we ſprang.

The conjecture concerning an inviſible, ſentient, and rational economy, co-exiſtent with the viſible univerſe, and occupying corporeally the ſame field, comports well enough, as we ſhall preſently ſee, with the intimations of Scripture regarding the ſpiritual world; and it conſiſts alſo with every analogy of the phyſical ſyſtem, as underſtood by modern ſcience; for it has been aſcertained—that ponderable elements pervade one the other—that the imponderable pervade all—that different kinds of emanations or vibrations are always paſſing and repaſſing, in the moſt intricate manner, through the ſame ſpaces, without in the leaſt degree diſturbing each other; and finally, that the moſt powerful agencies are perpetually in operation around us, of which we have not the fainteſt perception, and which we detect only by deductions from circuitous experiments. Nevertheleſs, our preſent conjecture, although ſo far ſuſtained by various analogies, infringes, we confeſs, upon certain natural prejudices, which impel us, contrary to the diſcoveries of ſcience, to aſſume that when we perceive nothing, there can be nothing near us; or that our ſenſes bear upon, and reveal, all ſpecies of corporeal exiſtence that come locally within their range. But a little attention to the ſubject will ſuffice to ſhow that this confidence in the extent of our perceptions is nothing better

than a prejudice; and that it ought to be ſet off entirely from our philoſophic ſpeculations;—it is in fact wholly deſtitute of foundation in reaſon.

Nothing is eaſier than to conceive of human nature as deſtitute of ſome one of its faculties of ſenſation; and in truth the inſtances are frequent in which one of the ſenſes is totally wanting. Now in ſuch caſes the mind is cut off from a poſſible and real relationſhip to the material ſyſtem, and it goes about converſing with the exterior world, utterly unconſcious of thoſe properties which ſhould affect the ſenſe it is deprived of; and in ſuch a caſe, this individual mind, unconſcious of light, or of ſound, or of taſte, or of odours, is in a poſition preciſely analogous to that in which we aſſume all human minds, within the limits of animal organization, to be; that is to ſay, ſurrounded by properties or powers of which they have no kind of perception, and of which they can form no idea.

In relation to ſmell and taſte, which are the leaſt conſtant, or the moſt *occaſional* of the ſenſes, and the leaſt extenſive in their range, we may readily conceive ourſelves as deſtitute of them; and we may alſo eaſily grant that there may be many properties around us, analogous to thoſe made known to us by the guſtatory and olfactory organs, of which we have no perception. We never deem it incredible that there may be

effluvia, or ſapid ſubſtances, ſuch as altogether eſcape detection by ſmell and taſte; on the contrary, the exiſtence of ſome ſuch unperceived qualities or ſubſtances is very frequently aſſumed as probable. We are perhaps ſomewhat leſs ready to imagine that there may be modulations of the atmoſphere of a *kind* which the tympanum does not catch; although it may be proved that the undulations of ſound, like other undulations, may ſo interſect, as to annul each other. It is therefore credible, not only that there may be ſounds too delicate to affect the human ear, but alſo that there may be ſounds of a *ſpecies* of which the auditory nerve is inſenſible. Sound is conveyed, not by the atmoſphere only, but by every other elaſtic body; and by ſome much more rapidly and perfectly than it is by the air; as, for example, by water, ice, and timber. In fact, the atmoſphere, although the moſt uſual, is one of the moſt ſluggiſh of the conductors of ſound.

With theſe facts in view, our conjecture comes near to be verified, when we ſuppoſe that there may be an elaſtic ether, ſuſceptible of ſonorous vibrations in a ſtill more delicate manner, and capable of conveying theſe vibrations much further, and more inſtantaneouſly, than any of the bodies actually known to us. Or we might go a ſtep further.—The ſenſation of light is now believed to reſult from the undulations, not the

emanations, of an elaſtic fluid of ether; but why may not this ſame element be capable of another ſpecies of undulations? or the electric, or the magnetic fluids may be ſuſceptible of ſome ſuch undulations; or an element, as univerſally ſuffuſed as light, through the univerſe, may be the medium of ſonorous undulations, equally rapid and diſtinct, and ſerving to connect the moſt remote regions of the univerſe by the conveyance of ſounds; juſt as the moſt remote are actually connected by the paſſage of light. Yet the ſonorous vibrations of this ſuppoſed element may be far too delicate to awaken the ear of man; or in fact they may be of a *kind* that is not perceptible by the human auditory nerve.

We refuſe to allow that a conjecture of this ſort is extravagant, or deſtitute of philoſophic probability: on the contrary, we muſt conſider it as borne out by the diſcoveries of modern ſcience. Might we then reſt for a moment upon an animating conception (aided by the actual analogy of light) ſuch as this, namely, that the field of the viſible univerſe is the theatre of a vaſt ſocial economy, holding rational intercourſe, at great diſtances? Let us claim leave to indulge, a while, the belief, when we contemplate the ſtarry heavens, that ſpeech, inquiry and reſponſe, commands and petitions, debate and inſtruction, are paſſing to and fro: nor need it be denied to us to imagine the pealing anthem of praiſe at

ſtated ſeaſons ariſing from worſhippers in all quarters, and flowing on, like the noiſe of many waters, until it reach the courts of the central heavens!

But the natural prejudice which ſtands in the way of theſe, our analogical conjectures, is firmer in relation to the objects of ſight, than in the inſtance of any other of the ſenſes. The vaſtneſs of the field over which the faculty of viſion gives us a command, the preciſion and permanence of this claſs of our perceptions, and eſpecially the conſtant relation ſubſiſting between the ſenſes of ſight and touch (in themſelves the moſt conſtant of the ſenſes) ſo that whatever affects the latter, does, or may, affect the former, and the converſe—we ſay theſe conditions of the viſual faculty impel us almoſt irreſiſtibly to ſuppoſe that nothing corporeal can eſcape it, and that where NOTHING IS SEEN, NOTHING EXISTS.

But is this inſtinctive perſuaſion at all better founded, in relation to ſight, than we have admitted it to be in relation to the other ſenſes? We are compelled to grant that there may be properties analogous to thoſe which are the objects of taſte and ſmell, and which entirely elude our powers of perception; nor can we deny the probability of there being ſonorous vibrations inaudible (in degree or in kind) to the human ear. What, then, are our perceptions of colour and form, but the conſequences of the emanations or the

vibrations of a certain elaſtic element, juſt as the perceptions of ſmell are the conſequences of the emanations of another elaſtic element? Theſe vibrations of light are repelled, or repeated, by all bodies which alſo affect the ſenſe of touch; and by this double means we aſſure ourſelves of the preſence, the forms, the diſtances, of ſolid and fluid bodies. Meantime, by other means, we aſcertain the preſence of ſome elements that are not perceptible by the touch, and of ſome that are not perceptible by the eye; and we have moreover indirect, or inductive evidence of the preſence of ſome that are in *no way* immediately perceptible, or otherwiſe to be known than by their ultimate effects. Thus the preſumption that the eye ſees whatever is material, utterly fails when we come to examine it; nor can we, with reaſon, allow it to influence our concluſions or conjectures.

The magnetic influence or ſtream is not palpable, as is a current of water, or of air; nor is it viſible, like the former: nevertheleſs it proves its reality plainly enough by giving a regular figure to looſe particles of iron, and by ſuſtaining a maſs of ſteel in contact with the magnet. In this inſtance touch and ſight go no further than to make us acquainted with the remote product of an occult power. On the table before us a needle, nicely balanced, trembles, and turns, as with the conſtancy of love, towards a certain

ſpot in the arctic regions; but a maſs of iron placed near it, diſturbs this tendency, and gives it a new direction. We aſſume, then, the preſence of an element univerſally diffuſed, of which we have no direct perception whatever. Now let it be imagined that the ſheets of a manuſcript, ſcattered confuſedly over the table and the floor, are ſeen to be ſlowly adjuſting themſelves, according to the order of the pages, and that, at laſt, every leaf, and every looſe fragment, has come into its due place, and is ready for the compoſitor. In ſuch a caſe we ſhould, without any ſcruple, aſſume the preſence of an inviſible rational agent, juſt as in the caſe of the oſcillations of the needle, we had aſſumed the preſence of an inviſible elementary power.

Now although, in the one inſtance, we are thinking of nothing but what is natural and ordinary, while in the other, we muſt attribute the facts ſuppoſed to a ſupernatural agent, and are therefore more ſtartled or perplexed by the one than we are by the other, is there any ground whatever for conſidering the one as abſtractedly incredible and impoſſible, while the other is known to be real and ordinary? It is true that the one has never happened to ourſelves, and that the other frequently, or conſtantly, occurs; but if the ſenſes, all of them together, totally fail to detect the magnetic power, until, by the accident of a balanced needle, it makes itſelf

known in one of its effects, may not theſe ſame ſenſes alſo fail in detecting a ſentient and rational power, near to us; and whether or not this rational power ſhall give us any palpable evidence of his preſence? Our concluſion is that our inſtinctive perſuaſion of the non-exiſtence of that, concerning which none of the ſenſes afford us any intimation, is a prejudice not entitled to any reſpect, when it ſtands in the way of a belief that is ſuſtained by independent reaſons.

But the poſſibility and the probability of the exiſtence, near us, of inviſible ſentient beings, may be ſtated in another manner. Senſation may be conſidered as the product of two powers, combined, and acting one upon the other: that is to ſay, on the one ſide there is the material property—the emanation or the vibration of ethereal and elaſtic elements; and on the other ſide there is the percipient faculty, or the power of being wrought upon by theſe material vibrations. Now it is only fair to ſuppoſe that theſe correlative powers are ſo far analogous, or ſimilar, as that if the one be inviſible, impalpable, and imponderable, the other may be ſo too. If it be a fact that the exciting principle, although preſent, and active, may elude detection in every way, except that one in which it affects the ſingle ſenſe; why may not the percipient principle be equally inviſible and impalpable? To

adduce a familiar illuſtration, the ſcent of muſk, powerful as it is, may fill a chamber, and yet it is totally imperceptible by the eye, and the touch, and the ear, and the taſte; nevertheleſs it is a very energetic influence, although attenuated in a degree inconceivable; for it will remain attached to walls and apparel for many years after the ſubſtance of the perfume has been withdrawn. Why, then, ſhould not the olfactory ſenſe itſelf be capable of exiſting in an equally impalpable and inviſible condition? or why may it not be attenuated in an equal degree, and yet retain its power and reality? The ſcent emanates indeed from a ſolid and tangible ſubſtance; and the ſenſation alſo is attached to a ſolid and tangible organ; but as the actual emanation is inviſible and impalpable, ſo may be the perception and the perceptive being.

The readineſs with which we admit the belief of a ſentient and rational univerſe, exiſting on all ſides of us, although unſeen, or the reluctance we feel in admitting any ſuch ſuppoſition, will be affected by the notion that is entertained of the mode in which the mind occupies, and operates within, the animal organization; and eſpecially by our opinion concerning the functions of the brain, and of the nervous ſyſtem. The hypotheſis which has been briefly ſtated in the third and fourth chapters of this volume, concerning the muſcular power, and the limita-

tion of perception in the organs of ſenſe, is open, as the author is well aware, to objections on the ground of the commonly received theory of the generation of muſcular motion, and of the office of the ſenſorium; and he is aware, too, that a full explanation of his own views on theſe ſubjects, to do any juſtice to them, and to ſet them clear of apparent difficulties, would demand, not merely ample ſpace, but an elaborate examination of the animal ſtructure, ſuch as might place the two theories on a ground of fair compariſon. But neither do the limits of the preſent eſſay admit of any ſuch diſcuſſion, nor would it well comport with the general ſtrain of the work; nor indeed could it eaſily be made intelligible to readers not converſant with phyſiology. Nevertheleſs a conciſe ſtatement of his opinion ſeems almoſt neceſſary to ſuſtain the author's conjectures and aſſumptions in more than one or two inſtances.

The brain is ordinarily ſpoken of, as well by anatomiſts and phyſiologiſts as by metaphyſicians, as being not merely the ſeat of the mind, and the organ of our intellectual operations, but as the emanating centre of thoſe volitions which precede muſcular motion, and as the receptacle of impreſſions from the ſeveral ſenſes. It is only within the brain, we are told, that the mind converſes with the notices of the external world, conveyed to it by the nervous chords

from the external organ of each ſenſe; and it is alſo within the brain that the determination takes place to move the limbs, in this or that direction; which determination, when it has been formed, flows down, by the channel of the nerves, to the particular muſcles, the agency of which is demanded to produce the required line or circuit of movement.

Now it muſt be granted, in the firſt place, that, in the above ſtatement, very much more is aſſumed than can be ſupported by any ſort of proof; and therefore very much which is fairly open to queſtion: and, in the ſecond place, that this ſame theory of ſenſation and muſcular action, inſtead of its being the involuntary dictate of our conſciouſneſs, contradicts our impreſſions, and our inſtinctive ſuppoſitions; and therefore is not entitled to our aſſent until it has been eſtabliſhed by ſome ſatisfactory evidence.

The author muſt not be underſtood as intending that our conſciouſneſs, whether mental or animal, ought to be received implicitly, as an indication of what takes place in occult proceſſes; for ſeveral familiar inſtances might be mentioned in which it is unqueſtionably fallacious: nevertheleſs ſome degree of regard ſhould certainly be paid to thoſe involuntary impreſſions that ariſe from our organic ſenſations; and theſe impreſſions are entitled to be conſidered as probably juſt, until proved to be untrue. Now, on the

very ground of theſe ſpontaneous convictions, let it be granted that the brain is indeed the ſeat and centre of all purely intellectual operations—the organ of memory, of conception, of imagination, of reaſoning, and of moral ſentiment; excluding, perhaps, certain of the emotions, in relation to which our conſciouſneſs does not ſo deciſively refer them to the brain.

We may, therefore, leave the brain in undiſturbed poſſeſſion of its preſcriptive honours, as the organ and reſidence of the mind; but the very reaſon of this belief, that the higher faculties perform their part within the cranium, if it be allowed to influence alſo our opinion concerning ſenſation and muſcular movement, would lead to a very different ſuppoſition; and aſſuredly it would never ſuggeſt the notion, either of our deſpatching orders from the brain, down the ſpinal chord and crural nerve, to certain muſcles of the leg, or of our feeling the pinch of a tight ſhoe—not in the toe, but near to where we feel the pinch of a tight hat.

Inſcrutable as is the principle of animal life, and difficult as are all queſtions relating to the connection between the mind and the body, it yet does not appear to be by any means a hopeleſs endeavour to trace that principle a ſtep further than at preſent it is known. The doing ſo, in a ſatisfactory manner, muſt involve both a patient examination of the viſible mechaniſm of

the body, and a ſagacious purſuit of every clue afforded by the innumerable accidents and peculiarities which ſo often, in an unexpected manner, reveal the long hidden ſecrets of Nature. Meantime different and oppoſite theories ſhould be entertained, ſo that we may be in readineſs to avail ourſelves, at a moment, of any ſuch fortunate indications.

As for inſtance, let us take a glance at the nervous ſyſtem, firſt, with the ſuppoſition in view, that it is the medium through which *ſpecific* volitions are conveyed from the brain to the muſcular mechaniſm. Now although it would be unwarrantable to affirm that the conveyance of diſtinct volitions through a ſyſtem of interlaced chords, ſuch as we find the nerves of muſcular motion to be, is abſolutely impoſſible; yet it becomes in the higheſt degree difficult to maintain our belief of any ſuch conveyance, while we are tracing the intricacies, and examining the actual arrangement, of theſe chords. Let the axillary plexus be ſpread out, in its multiform combinations, and the anaſtomoſing branches, and the ſubſidiary twigs of the leading chords be followed; eſpecially let the peculiar ſtructure of the ganglia, as diſcovered by the aid of the microſcope, be underſtood. Within the plexuſes, and in the very ſubſtance of the ganglia, the fibrillæ, conſtituting the contributory chords, are intermixed in the moſt intimate and intricate

manner that is conceivable; and the entire conſtruction is ſuch as would ſeem fitted, not for the tranſmiſſion of volitions in a diſtinct manner, from the brain to the limb; or for the return of ſenſations from the limb to the brain; but rather for confounding, effectively, all ſuch ſuppoſed tranſmiſſions. Scores of inſtances might be ſpecified in which, very remarkably, proviſion is made, as if for commingling and confuſing the lines of communication between the brain and the extremities; and it may boldly be affirmed that, if the office of the nervous network were totally unknown, and unſuſpected, the very laſt ſuppoſition that would be ſuggeſted by a view of its ſtructure would be, that it is contrived to convey particular volitions to particular muſcles.

If the ſcheme of the nerves be ſpread out, and be compared with the ſcheme of the arteries, or of the veins, expoſed in a ſimilar manner, it appears that there is even more, in the former, of anaſtomoſis, and more of involution and intricacy, by plexus and ganglia, and by retrograde ramifications, than in the two latter. That is to ſay, in the former, more than in the latter, proviſion is made for an uninterrupted tranſmiſſion of whatever is tranſmitted at large, to all parts of the extremities, and for its indiſcriminate, or *promiſcuous conveyance.* It is plainly a matter of ſecondary importance to the limbs whether they receive the requiſite ſupply of blood through

one trunk, or through another, ſo that it does but come in ſufficient quantity, and with a ſufficient force; or whether the expended fluid be returned through one, or through another canal. And in like manner, and even more clearly, the main intention of nature in the arrangement of the nervous ramifications appears to be, the affording an unfailing ſupply of ſome neceſſary influence, or ether, to all parts of the muſcular apparatus, by any means, and by all means; and ſo as that if one medium of conveyance ſhould be accidentally cut off or compreſſed, the emanation may yet reach the parts by ſome circuit that is not expoſed to the ſame obſtruction.

We aſſume then that, as our conſciouſneſs informs us of no ſuch proceſs as that of the deſpatching of volitions to the muſcles, ſo neither does the conſtruction of the nervous ſyſtem indicate its adaptation to a proceſs of this kind; but the contrary, and in a very deciſive manner.

But now let it be ſuppoſed (thinking only of muſcular motion) that the nervous ſyſtem, connecting the brain and ſpinal proceſs with the entire muſcular apparatus, ſerves the purpoſe of conveying, from the former to the latter, a copious ſupply of (ſhall we ſay) galvanic power; which power it is the office of the cerebral maſs to generate. We then conſider the muſcles, thoſe of the arm, for inſtance, as conſiſting only

of flectors and deflectors; or we may imagine a ſingle pair of antagoniſts, of which the one bends, and the other extends the limb. On our preſent ſuppoſition, then, the brain, by the medium of the brachial nerves, ſupplies *both* theſe muſcles, evenly and perpetually, with the contractile excitement, whatever it may be, which ſhall enable each, whenever called upon, to become denſe and tumid in the requiſite degree.

What then is volition, but the mental influence, immediately preſent in the arm, and determining it to bend, or to ſtraighten? The mind is not, as we ſuppoſe, the priſoner of the attic ſtory; but is the occupant, at large, of the entire animal organization, acting in each part of the ſtructure according to the purpoſe of each:—in the arm and leg, willing the limb hither or thither, by its inherent power over matter;—in the ſkin, in the eye, the ear, the tongue, the naſal membrane, receiving immediately the impreſſions of external objects, by its inherent ſuſceptibility of the properties of matter; and, let it be granted, within the cranium, carrying on the proceſſes of thought.

This ſuppoſition concerning muſcular motion, requires only an adaptation of terms in order to apply it to ſenſation. Inſtead, for example, of aſſuming that the picture falling on the retina has to be tranſmitted, in ſome inconceivable manner, by the optic nerve to the ſenſorium, and that

there, undiſturbed and unmixed, it delivers itſelf to the percipient faculty, we imagine that the optic nerve merely ſupplies the retina with a copious and conſtant ſtream of the exciting influence—let it be galvaniſm—and that the mind, preſent upon the very bed of the nerve, and where the actual picture, in all its vivid colours reſts, converſes with it, and that it does ſo becauſe it is originally capable of converſing with light and colours; although while lodged in the animal body, it is reſtricted from holding any ſuch converſe, except upon the highly excited expanſion of the optic nerve.

We muſt, however, go a ſtep further, and inquire what probably may be the uſe, or whence is the neceſſity of the (galvanic) influence generated in the brain, and thence conveyed to the muſcles and organs of ſenſe. Now our theory involves the ſuppoſition that the inherent percipient faculty of the mind (and the ſame of its mechanical power) is ſo impriſoned within the ſolid ſubſtance of the animal body as to be totally ſcreened from impreſſions of the external world, except juſt ſo far as this ſolid ſubſtance may be vehemently ſtimulated, commoved, and rendered impreſſible by the powerful action of the (galvanic) fluid. The very ſame irreſiſtible agent which compels earths to yield their metallic baſes, and which decompoſes what nothing elſe

can move, brings, as we ſuppoſe, the animal fibre and the reticular expanſions of the nerves into a ſtate of excitability, ſuch as enables them to correſpond to the vibrations of light, or of ſound, or to the chemical properties of ſapid or odoriferous bodies. All that the mind needs for ſenſation is that the external material vibrations, as of light, ſound, &c. ſhould be reſponded to by an internal vibration, or commotion, of the animal ſubſtance: but this demands a highly charged (galvanic) condition of the organ of ſenſe. It is as if a ſtretched wire, which faintly correſponds to a muſical note, might be made to do ſo more delicately and more forcibly, by making it the channel of a galvanic current. It is not that the MIND needs this excitement; but it is the fleſhy organ which needs it, in order to its admitting the external vibratory impreſſion.

The powerful (voltaic) apparatus which fills the cranium has relation, as we now ſuppoſe, to the inertneſs and the inelaſticity of the animal body; and if the mind were imagined to be corporeally combined with a highly elaſtic fluid, or an ether, ſuſceptible of the moſt delicate vibrations, there would then be no more occaſion for the galvanic ſtimulus: a mind thus embodied would need no brain, no nerves, no organs of ſenſe, and no contractile fibres.

The well-known effect of galvaniſm upon the limbs of a dead animal may, at firſt, appear

not to comport with the theory we are now propounding; for in theſe inſtances muſcular motion, which we attribute to the directive influence of the mind, reſident in the limb, is ſeen to be produced—*not by mind*, but by the mere electric ſtream. We, however, gather a very remarkable confirmation of our conjecture, from theſe very facts; which indeed, on due conſideration, can hardly, if at all, be made to conſiſt with the common ſuppoſition of the tranſmiſſion of volitions from the brain to the muſcles, through the nerves. If the office of the nerves is to tranſmit the will of the mind, diſtinctively, to the muſcles, we ſee them, in the caſe of a ſeparated limb, tranſmitting ſomething very different from ſuch volitions—namely, a galvanic ſtream; and yet, although the cauſe is totally unlike, the effect is the ſame as if a volition had been conveyed.

But upon our preſent ſuppoſition, what happens in applying the galvanic wire to the ſciatic nerve of a frog, is preciſely what we ſhould, according to our hypotheſis, expect to happen. That is to ſay, the nerve, in this caſe, conveys the very ſame element or energy which it has been wont to convey during the life of the animal: this exciting agent, namely, the galvanic fluid, is inſtantaneouſly ſuffuſed through the *whole limb*, and is diſtributed, in its accuſtomed proportions, to the entire ſyſtem of muſcles.

But inaſmuch as the mind of the animal has been withdrawn from thoſe muſcles, which, while it was preſent, either retained them all at reſt, or employed one ſet of them at pleaſure, this ſudden chemical excitement, acting ſimultaneouſly, and *without direction*, upon *all together*, nothing elſe can take place but that the moſt powerful muſcle of the limb ſhould carry it againſt the ſmaller and the feebler; and thus, in the inſtance of the frog, the limb is forcibly projected from the glaſs that had contained it. Its leap, is the frog's moſt powerful muſcular action; and, therefore, by neceſſity, the limb, when ſtimulated to action without the mind—leaps.

An analogous effect follows in all caſes of the application of galvaniſm to bodies recently dead: —thus the rabbit jumps, and the human countenance is frightfully contorted, in conſequence of the contraction of the *ſtronger* muſcles of the face. If the weaker ſet of muſcles could, in this artificial manner, be acted upon, apart from the ſtronger, placid and pleaſing expreſſions would no doubt be produced. In the caſe of convulſive affections of the face, in the living body, the *diſtortion* ariſes plainly from this very cauſe, namely, that there is a ſuffuſed muſcular excitement, uncontrolled by the mind, and therefore taking effect upon all the ſtronger muſcles; while the weaker, inſtead of being held in that

ſtate of eaſy counterpoiſe which the mind, when not diſturbed, maintains, yield to an unwonted violence; and, therefore, do not fill out the general contour, as they do when all are under the command of the will; but give way, with a tremulous ineffective reſiſtance.

Spaſmodic or convulſive muſcular contractions ariſe, as we ſuppoſe, from the withdrawment of the mind; while the chemical ſtimulus continues to flow to the parts affected. On the contrary, paralytic diſtortions we attribute to a partial ſuppreſſion of the excitement furniſhed by the brain: —partial, and yet juſt enough to allow the larger and ſtronger muſcles to act.

That which happens among the muſcles when their contractility is ſtimulated, apart from the control of the mind, may be rendered familiarly intelligible by conſidering what takes place when a maſt or bulk, fixed perpendicularly, is ſupported in three directions by cords, one of theſe cords being five times the ſize of the other two together. Then if the three are equally moiſtened by a ſudden ſhower, the maſt is immediately drawn from the upright, by the large rope; while the two ſmaller, its antagoniſts, either looſen their attachments, or are ſnapped. This mechanical effect differs little, as to its proximate cauſe, from what is obſerved in caſes of epileptic fits, locked jaw, and mortal convulſions; for the directive and commanding influence of

the mind having been diverted, or withdrawn, while the contractile galvanic ſtimulus continues to flow, in full ſtream from the brain to the extremities, it inevitably happens that, in each ſet of antagoniſts, the more bulky, or what is equivalent, the more excitable muſcles, prevail over their feebler partners; and a rigid contraction is the conſequence. Thus the fingers are indented into the palms, and the temporal and maſſeter muſcles, the natural power of which vaſtly exceeds that of the digaſtricus and platyſma myoides, hold the lower jaw, as if iron bound, in contact with the upper. But when the mental diſturbance is remedied, and the voluntary principle returns to its ſeat and office, then *this ſame force* of the temporal and maſſeter muſcles, equal to 500 lbs. weight, and by no means counteracted by an equal force in the antagoniſts, is held in equilibrio, and in fact is ſo delicately balanced by the mental authority, as not only to act its part with preciſion in the mechanical operation of maſtication, but to play in with the exquiſite movements that govern the modulations of the voice. The part performed by the temporal and maſſeter muſcles, in ſpeaking and ſinging, might be compared to the ſervice rendered by a powerful and well-trained horſe, required to pull within the ſixteenth of an inch, and in combination too with the power of a dog or of a child: his whole force is always in readineſs;

but it is ſo under control as to reach the preciſe limit required, and yet not to ſurpaſs it.

All the facts connected with the aſcertained difference between the voluntary and involuntary muſcles, readily fall in with the theory that the function of the brain, in relation to the muſcular ſyſtem, does not conſiſt in ſending forth volitions; but ſimply in maintaining a copious ſupply of contractile excitement (whether galvanic or not); that the nerves convey this chemical energy, and diſperſe it *promiſcuouſly*, among the muſcles, and that the actual employment of this force reſts with the mind, preſent, not in the cranium, but in the limb.

A muſcle, the antagoniſt of which is *another muſcle*, comes neceſſarily within the control of the voluntary principle; for nothing elſe can command it; and if this be withdrawn, a ſpaſmodic contraction of the ſtronger of the two is inſtantly the conſequence. But if the antagoniſt force be merely mechanical, as it is in the heart, the ſtomach, and the inteſtines, there will take place an alternation between the two unlike powers: that is to ſay, the ſupply of excitement from the brain being limited in quantity, or coming only at a given rate, it will be expended in overcoming the mechanical force, which, for a moment, gains upon it; but during the interval of relaxation, the galvanic excitement has again accumulated, and in its turn overpowers

the mechanical reſiſtance, and muſcular contraction enſues.

A too long continued exertion of the voluntary muſcles produces a painful ſenſe of the overthrow of the natural equipoiſe of the powers. That is to ſay, the mind has been demanding motion at a greater rate than that at which the brain, in its ordinary ſtate, can furniſh the contractile chemical excitement; and the limb drawing this pabulum, as it can, from the nerves of ſenſation, and from the ſurface, a ſenſe of pain follows: at the ſame time the animal ſpirits fail. But it is manifeſt that the mind, as ſeated in the brain, has a power of rouſing it to an extraordinary effort, ſo as to develop a more than uſual amount of the electric element. Thus a powerful motive for continued exertion, as when a man, to ſave his life, is running from his enemy, diſperſes for a time the ſenſe of fatigue. Nevertheleſs, this power of extraordinary galvanic development has its limits; and the brain indicates afterwards the violence which it has ſubmitted to, and refuſes, for a while, to furniſh even its ordinary quantum of chemical power.

The functions of the brain, in relation to the INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES, is a ſubject far too difficult and copious to be entered upon in this place; nor is it in fact ſo nearly connected with our proper ſubject as is the theory of ſenſation

and muſcular motion. In reference to theſe, we cannot allow it to be hopeleſs that ſome ſatiſfactory concluſion ſhould at length be arrived at. The proper path of experiment, it would not be very difficult to mark out; and there are ſome means of bringing the queſtion to the teſt of facts which, as the author believes, could hardly fail to decide it. Let it be granted for a moment that the function of the brain, in relation to ſenſation and muſcular motion, is ſimply chemical, and that it has reſpect to the inertneſs of the animal ſubſtance, and to its low degree of elaſticity; and then the way will be open for readily conceiving of other ſpecies of corporeity —impalpable, and inviſible; but not leſs ſenſitive, or leſs potent, than *animal* corporeity; on the contrary, more ſo.

If the functions of the brain be only *conditionally neceſſary*, in relation to ſenſation and motion, we may eaſily believe that they are only conditionally neceſſary in relation to the more purely intellectual operations; or, in other words, that there need be no voltaic pile where the material vehicle of the mind is *in itſelf* in a high degree elaſtic, and is reſponſive to every kind of vibration. Let it only be ſuppoſed that there is about us a fluid, the counterpart of that ether, the vibrations of which give us the ſenſation of light—a fluid in an equal degree capable of receiving and of tranſmitting undulations in-

calculably minute and rapid. Mind, amalgamated with ſuch a fluid, might be immediately converſant with all the properties of matter; and even much more intimately and extenſively converſant with them than it can be while it depends for its ſenſibility upon the conſtancy and the amount of the galvanic element.

This imperfect ſtatement of a conjecture concerning the office of the brain and nerves, although it may ſeem a digreſſion from the immediate ſubject of the preſent chapter, is not really ſo, ſince it opens the way for our readily conceiving of what, on the ground of ſcriptural evidence, we have reaſon to think is real—namely, the repletion of the viſible univerſe with inviſible corporeal beings; and it may incline us the more readily to admit the belief that the creation, beſide its ſentient orders, connected with animal organization, abounds with tribes, ſentient and rational, whoſe corporeity is impalpable and inviſible, and who are the tenants of what, in an accommodated ſenſe, may be called, a quinteſſence.

Theſe inviſible orders, beſides the impulſe of their inſtincts and their intereſts, may, by phyſical neceſſity, and perhaps, by their liability to gravitation (however attenuated their ſubſtance) be gathered around the ſolar and planetary bodies; ſo that each world may have its own ethereal nations, as well as its terreſtrial, or

rather, its *animal* ſpecies: each planet, as well as our own, may have its ἐπουράνιοι, its ἐπίγειοι, and its καταχθόνιοι.

In collating theſe ſpeculations with the general tenor and the particular teſtimony of the Scriptures, it is proper to keep in mind a principle which ſeems pretty well ſuſtained:—That the inſpired writers always hold cloſe to *mundane affairs*, and intend to ſpeak only of the hiſtory and deſtinies of the families of earth; ſeldom, if ever, opening to us any wider proſpect. On the ſtrength of this principle, we may then aſſume the probability that the ſpiritual beings, good and evil, that are ſpoken of in the Scriptures, are all, or moſt of them, of mundane origin; and although ſome may now have come to move in a wider circle, that they have all ſprung from this ſoil. Are there reaſons for ſuppoſing that the ſolid materials of our planet have ſerved purpoſes in a period long anterior to the birth of the Adamic family? Such a belief we do not regard as contradictory to any ſcriptural doctrine; or to the Moſaic hiſtory of the creation. But if ſo, then theſe pre-adamic families, like their ſucceſſors, may have acquitted themſelves variouſly during their term of animal exiſtence, ſome having broken their allegiance to the Supreme Power, while others have preſerved virtue and loyalty. Yet both may

(whether conſtantly or not) attach themſelves to the ſcene of their early hiſtory, and mingle themſelves with the deſtinies of the modern race. Hence, perhaps, thoſe conflicts and thoſe commotions, thoſe beneficent agencies, and thoſe malignant influences, to which the inſpired writers are ſo often making alluſion. But this great ſubject, conſidered as a matter of Biblical inquiry, urgently demands a new inveſtigation, under the guidance of the careful, and yet free principles of interpretation which have lately been coming into operation. This, however, in the meantime, may be ſaid, that, ſhould a rational and laborious examination of the ſcriptural evidence, relating to inviſible orders, lead to a revival of the belief of Chriſtians, and to the refreſhment of their fading impreſſions—fading, becauſe, in their original ſtate ſuperſtitious and exaggerated—ſhould this take place, and in connection with a better underſtood theory of intellectual exiſtence, very important conſequences might be the reſult; and all religious minds, awakened to a ſenſe of the ſimple reality of the ſpiritual dangers we are expoſed to, as tenants of this haunted planet, would be impelled, with undiverted anxiety, to ſeek ſafety where always, and only, it is to be found.

But we muſt return upon our path for a moment, and briefly ſtate the bearing of this branch

of our general theory upon the notions we may entertain concerning the condition of the human ſoul upon the diſſolution of the animal ſtructure; and concerning the ſtate of that vaſt congregation which has been ſwelling, with its new thouſands daily, during the courſe of nearly ſixty centuries.

The belief of the ſurvivance of the living principle and conſciouſneſs, after the diſſolution of the animal organization, the author, for his own part, would always derive from thoſe moral and religious conſiderations, and from that explicit divine teſtimony, which appeal to our higheſt and pureſt ſentiments. As to the pretended demonſtration of immortality, drawn from the aſſumed ſimplicity and indeſtructibility of the ſoul, as an immaterial ſubſtance, they appear either altogether inconcluſive; or, if concluſive, then ſuch as muſt be admitted to apply, with ſcarcely diminiſhed force, to all ſentient orders; and it muſt be granted that, whatever has felt, and has acted ſpontaneouſly, muſt live again, and for ever. We have the beſt reaſons for the confident expectation of another life; nor are we driven to fortify our convictions by arguments which, if valid, prove immenſely more than we can deſire to ſee eſtabliſhed, or could perſuade ourſelves to think in any degree probable.

There is not in the ſtructure, or the inſtincts,

or the tendencies of any one of the inferior animal ſpecies, the fainteſt indication of a renewal of life, after the extinction of the vital principle. But it is altogether otherwiſe with man; and we believe him immortal, not becauſe, as it is pretended, thought and conſciouſneſs cannot be annihilated; but becauſe the human intellectual and moral ſtructure is ſuch as to imply an after ſtage of expanſion.

This then, on higher grounds, being granted as certain, that man is to ſurvive his animal body, it is not difficult, in following out the ſeveral principles of our phyſical theory of another life, to conceive of an inſtantaneous tranſition of the conſcious principle—the LIFE, from the animal body, to a body impalpable and inviſible; and yet not at all leſs alive to the material world, but probably more ſo. The evidence of the inſpired writings apart, it might eaſily be ſuppoſed that the human mind, at death, immediately enters upon its higheſt and ultimate ſtage of ſpiritual corporeity. But we are not at liberty to aſſume ſo much as this, if the doctrine of the New Teſtament, on this ſubject, has been rightly underſtood; for it directs us to look forward to a future and diſtant epoch, as the deſtined day in which human nature is to put on corporeal incorruptibility; and we are alſo taught to think of the ſtate of ſouls, as a ſtate, not of unconſciouſneſs indeed, but of comparative inaction,

or of ſuſpended energy :—it is, ſo far as we may gather its conditions from the ſcattered intimations of Scripture, a tranſition ſtate, during the continuance of which the paſſive faculties of our nature, rather than the active, are to be awake; and throughout which, probably, thoſe emotions of the moral nature that have been overborne or held in abeyance, by the urgent impulſes of animal life, ſhall take their free courſe, and reach their height, as fixed habits of the mind.

On this ſuppoſition then, if it ought to be called a *ſuppoſition*, which reſts with little ambiguity upon ſcriptural evidence, it is plain that a more attenuated corporeity may be held to belong to the intermediate tranſition ſtate of human nature, than ſhall befit its ultimate condition of full energy and activity. Powers latent do not need a ſtructure which has relation to the exertion of powers upon an exterior world. The chryſalis period of the ſoul may be marked by the deſtitution of all the inſtruments of active life, corporeal and mental. And this ſtate of inaction may probably be alſo a ſtate of ſecluſion, involving, not improbably, an unconſciouſneſs of the paſſage of time.

Suggeſtions ſuch as theſe ſhould be made no other uſe of than that of preparing us to catch, at all points, the evaneſcent indications of the inſpired writers, which, in relation to the ſpiritual and unſeen world, are ſo given as entirely

to eſcape the notice of thoſe who liſtleſſly read what they have been reading from childhood, under the guidance of notions accidentally formed. It is not until the mind has been quickened by an intelligent curioſity, and has obtained alſo more than one clue to inquiry, by the aid of hypotheſis, that the actual extent to which the unſeen world is open to us in the Scriptures, comes to be ſuſpected or underſtood. Let an hypotheſis be utterly at variance with truth, it will yet have rendered us an important ſervice—and a legitimate ſervice, if it ſhall have prompted us to purſue, aſſiduouſly, and eagerly, any path of Biblical inquiry. It is on this very ground that the author would reſt his apology for advancing the ſeveral conjectures that find a place in theſe pages.

A condition of ſuſpended powers, and of deſtitution, ſuch as we now attribute to the human ſoul, through its intermediate period, may very naturally be imagined to involve, perhaps a ſtrong tendency, or appetency, toward the open world of power and action:—there may be a yearning after the loſt corporeity, or after the expected corporeity:—there may be a preſſing on toward the buſy frequented walks of active exiſtence. Now let it be juſt imagined that, as almoſt all natural principles and modes of life are open to ſome degree of irregularity, and admit exceptive caſes, ſo this preſſure of the innu-

merable community of the dead, toward the precincts of life, may, in certain caſes, actually break through the boundaries that hem in the ethereal crowds, and ſo it may happen, as if by treſpaſs, that the dead may, in ſingle inſtances, infringe upon the ground of common corporeal life.

At leaſt let indulgence be given to the opinion that thoſe almoſt univerſal ſuperſtitions which, in every age and nation, have implied the fact of occaſional interferences of the dead with the living, ought not to be ſummarily diſmiſſed as a mere folly of the vulgar, utterly unreal, until our knowledge of the ſpiritual world is ſo complete as ſhall entitle us to affirm that no ſuch interferences can, in the nature of things, ever have taken place. The mere ſuppoſition of there being any univerſal perſuaſion, which is totally groundleſs, not only in its form and adjuncts, but in its ſubſtance, does ſome violence to the principles of human reaſoning, and is clearly of dangerous conſequence. An abſolute ſcepticiſm on this ſubject moreover, can be maintained only by the aid of Hume's often refuted ſophiſm—That *no* teſtimony can be held ſufficient to eſtabliſh an alleged fact, which is at variance with common experience; for it muſt not be denied that ſome few inſtances of the ſort alluded to, reſt upon teſtimony in itſelf thoroughly unimpeachable; nor is the import of the evi-

dence in theſe caſes at all touched by the now well underſtood doctrine concerning ſpectral illuſions, as reſulting from a diſeaſed condition of the brain. There is a ſpecies of diſbelief, flattering indeed to intellectual arrogance, but out of harmony with the ſpirit and the admitted rules of modern philoſophy. Whether ſuch and ſuch alleged facts happen to come to us mingled with groſs popular errors, or not, is a circumſtance of little importance in determining the degree of attention they may deſerve:—one queſtion only is to be conſidered, namely—Is the evidence that ſuſtains them in any degree ſubſtantial?

Nor in conſidering queſtions of this ſort ought we to liſten for a moment to thoſe frequent, but impertinent queſtions, that are brought forward with the view of ſuperſeding the inquiry:—ſuch, for example, as theſe—What good end is anſwered by the alleged extra natural occurrences?—or, Is it worthy of the Supreme Wiſdom to permit them? and ſo forth. The queſtion is a queſtion firſt, of *teſtimony*, to be judged of on the eſtabliſhed principles of evidence; and then of *phyſiology;* but neither of theology, nor of morals. Some few human beings are wont to walk in their ſleep, and during the continuance of profound ſlumber perform, with preciſion and ſafety, the offices of common life, and return to their beds, and yet are totally unconſcious, when they awake, of what they have done. Now in con-

ſidering this, or any ſuch extraordinary claſs of facts, our buſineſs is, in the firſt place, to obtain a number of inſtances, ſupported by the diſtinct and unimpeachable teſtimony of intelligent witneſſes; and then, being thus in poſſeſſion of the facts, to adjuſt them, as well as we can, to other parts of our philoſophy of human nature. Shall we allow an objector to put a check to our ſcientific curioſity, on the ſubject, for inſtance, of ſomnambuliſm, by ſaying, 'Scores of theſe accounts have turned out to be exaggerated, or totally untrue:'—or, 'This walking in the ſleep ought not to be thought poſſible, or as likely to be permitted by the Benevolent Guardian of human welfare?'

Almoſt all inſtances of alleged ſupernatural *appearances* may eaſily be diſpoſed of, either on the ground of the fears and ſuperſtitious impreſſions of the parties reporting them; or on that of that now well underſtood diſeaſed action of the nervous ſyſtem, which, in certain conditions, generates viſual illuſions of the moſt diſtinct kind. But no ſuch explanations will meet the many inſtances, thoroughly well atteſted, in which the death of a relative at a diſtance has been conveyed, in all its circumſtances, to perſons during ſleep; nor again to thoſe inſtances in which ſome ſpecial information, buried in the boſoms of the dead, has been imparted, in ſleep, to the living. In theſe caſes, the ſingularity of the facts con-

veyed, and the impoſſibility of their coming through any ordinary channel, ought, on every principle of philoſophical and of forenſic evidence, to be admitted as furniſhing proper proof of an inviſible interference. The time will come when—in conſequence of the total diſſipation of popular ſuperſtitions, and the removal too of the prejudice which makes us aſhamed of ſeeming to believe in company with the vulgar, or to believe at the prompting of fear—it will be ſeen that facts of this claſs ought to engage the attention of phyſiologiſts, and when they will be deliberately conſigned to their place in our ſyſtems of the philoſophy of human nature. Notwithſtanding prejudices of whatever ſort—vulgar and philoſophic—facts of whatever claſs, and of whatever tendency, will at length receive the reward due to them, as the materials of ſcience; and the era may be predicted in which a complete reaction ſhall take its courſe, and the true principles of reaſoning be made to embrace a vaſtly wider field than that which may be meaſured by the human hand and eye. A reaction of this kind is likely to be put in progreſs, or to be accelerated, by the making ſome bold conjectural excurſions beyond the range of animal ſenſation; the conſequence of which may be—not indeed the adoption of any of thoſe particular conjectures, as true; but the concentration of philoſophic minds upon the facts and the evi-

dence, that actually come within our range of obſervation.

Without entering upon the field of Biblical criticiſm, which the author, in this eſſay, purpoſely avoids, it would not be poſſible, ſatisfactorily, to bring into relation with our theory, the Scripture teſtimony concerning inviſible orders. There is, however, a particular branch of that teſtimony to which alluſion may properly be made;—namely, that which concerns dæmoniacal poſſeſſion. Not able in this place to engage in the argument, as a Biblical queſtion, the author aſſumes, what he fully believes may be made good, that the goſpel narratives, in theſe inſtances, are of a kind not to be diſpoſed of by the hypotheſis of accommodation; but are of a plain hiſtorical complexion, ſuch as that if they are rejected as untrue, we are bound to withdraw our confidence altogether from the reporters, as competent and truſtworthy witneſſes of facts.

Taking it, then, for granted that theſe narratives actually involve what they ſeem to involve, and that they imply ſomething totally different from all caſes of lunacy, madneſs, or delirium, we then come into poſſeſſion of ſeveral highly ſignificant facts, concerning a ſpecies or order of mundane beings, whom, unleſs there be other evidence to that effect, we are not to identify with the human race, and whom we are taught,

by the careful phraſeology of the inſpired writers, not to confound with the fallen angelic orders—the colleagues and companions of Satan.

The leading ideas ſuggeſted by theſe narratives are ſuch as the following, and they comport well with the conjectures we have entertained in the preceding pages.

Firſt, there is the familiar and ready intermixture of inviſible and impalpable beings, with human ſociety; ſo that, within any given boundary, there may be corporeally preſent, the human crowd, and the extra human crowd; and the latter as naturally and ſimply preſent, as the former—the latter as vividly conſcious of the material world as the former, and as energetically prompted by intereſts and paſſions, by deſires and fears. Secondly, it is to be noticed that theſe beings had not, as it ſeems, the phyſical power to make themſelves heard, or to give any mechanical evidence of their preſence, except while uſurping the animal corporeity of another ſpecies, namely, the human. Thirdly, theſe poſſeſſions ſeem to give evidence of a principle we have above hinted at, namely, the yearning or appetency of inviſible and ethereal natures toward animal organization. It would appear as if, during that era in the hiſtory of man in which ſuch irregularities were permitted, that the ſpiritual ſpecies eagerly caught at every opportunity of tenanting the terreſtrial ſpecies.

In the fourth place, we cannot but note, what is not obſcure in its expreſſion, however obſcure it may be in its import, namely, the horror of theſe dæmons at the thought of being conſigned to the nether cavern or abyſs. Laſtly, the highly ſignificant effect of the adding of mind to mind, within one and the ſame body, is to be eſpecially noticed. This temporary compounding of intelligences, which (were it allowable on ſo unuſual an occaſion to coin a term) might be called a ſtate of mental ſuperentity, diſcovers itſelf by multiplying the mechanical force of the muſcular ſyſtem; and as it ſeems, in ſome proportion to the actual numbers of the foreign minds. The inherent power of mind over matter, to generate motion, was, in theſe inſtances, we might almoſt ſay, mathematically exhibited, by ſhowing the accumulated force of ſeveral minds, acting as in a focus, upon a ſingle muſcular mechaniſm.

Whoever feels himſelf obliged, by every principle of ſound criticiſm and interpretation, to conſider the goſpel narratives and dæmoniacal poſſeſſions as ſimply true, will find that theſe extraordinary inſtances, differing as they do in every ſenſe from the Satanic ſeductive influence, elſewhere affirmed in Scripture, involve juſt what has been aſſumed in the conjectures propounded in the preſent chapter. On all ſides, aſſuredly, it would be admitted that *one* well atteſted and

diſtinctly reported inſtance of the preſence and intelligent agency of an inviſible being, would be enough to carry the queſtion of an inviſible economy, pervading the viſible univerſe. Are not then the goſpel narratives well atteſted, and are not the circumſtances ſimply and diſtinctly reported? But if ſo, they furniſh us with all we want for the determination of the general queſtion.

The reader will bear in mind the important diſtinction, already adverted to, between the Satanic influence, and any caſe of dæmoniacal poſſeſſion; the one being purely moral and ſpiritual, and applying alſo univerſally to human nature, and being in no ſenſe naturally ſenſible, or viſible, or diſtinguiſhable from the ordinary workings of the mental faculties. The other, on the contrary was, in an equally excluſive ſenſe, purely phyſical or natural, and always made itſelf known by viſible and palpable effects, and was confined to individuals, and came within the range of hiſtory, as matter of fact, in the moſt ordinary ſenſe of the phraſe. Happily, we have reaſon to conclude that human nature is no longer liable to the ruffian violence of an impure and reprobate ethereal race; but alas! we have the ſtrongeſt reaſons for believing that men, univerſally, and in every age, are expoſed to ſilent malignant ſeductions, which indeed never trench upon the natural liberty of the mind,

much leſs infringe that of the body; but which too often, like the influence of profligate companions, prevail over the better principles of our nature, and the influence of education.

In diſmiſſing our firſt conjecture, concerning the viſible univerſe, conſidered as the abode of intelligent orders, we lightly deal with it, as a *conjecture merely*, which might be entertained or rejected at pleaſure. But we are not free to treat with equal unconcern the general principles involved in this our ſecond hypotheſis; for although everything adjunctive or ſpecial in ſuch a ſpeculation may be unreal, theſe principles, if adjudged to be falſe, are ſuch as muſt carry with them a large portion of our Chriſtian faith; and the ſurrender of them would leave us in poſſeſſion of only the bare ſkeleton of religious belief.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Third Conjecture.

IN our firſt conjecture it was ſuppoſed that room might be made for the ſeveral ranks of being—whether animal or ſpiritual—not only within the bounds, but upon the open ſtage of the viſible univerſe. The ſecond, involved the belief of an inviſible economy, ſuffuſed throughout the viſible creation, and conſtituting that higher ſyſtem toward which the rational orders of the lower and viſible world are tending. But our third conjecture embraces the remote revolutions of time, and ſuppoſes (without however denying, what we are not at liberty to deny, namely, the reality of an unſeen ſpiritual economy) that the viſible univerſe, replete everywhere with various forms of animal life, is to fill one period only in the great hiſtory of the moral ſyſtem, and that it is deſtined, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, to diſappear, and to return to its nihility, giving place to new elements and

to new and higher expreſſions of omnipotence and intelligence.

For this, our third conjecture, it would be difficult to find a form of expreſſion more diſtinct, than that ſupplied by certain well-known paſſages of Scripture, which, whether they are to be underſtood literally, or in a tropical ſenſe only, yet may well ſerve to convey our preſent idea of an inſtantaneous vaniſhing of one form of the creation and a ſubſtitution of another; as thus—"The heavens and the earth—they ſhall periſh; all of them ſhall wax old like a garment; as a veſture ſhalt thou change them, and they ſhall be changed." "And all the hoſt of heaven ſhall be diſſolved, and the heavens ſhall be rolled together as a ſcroll, and all their hoſt ſhall fall down as the leaf falleth off from the vine, and as a falling fig from the fig-tree." "Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath, for the heavens ſhall vaniſh away like ſmoke, and the earth ſhall wax old like a garment." "Behold, I create new heavens, and a new earth, and the former ſhall not be remembered, nor come into mind; and the new heavens and the new earth ſhall remain before me, ſaith the Lord." "Heaven and earth ſhall paſs away, but my word ſhall not paſs away." "The day of the Lord ſhall come as a thief in the night, in which the heavens ſhall paſs away with a great noiſe;—nevertheleſs, we look for a new heaven

and a new earth." "And from the face of Him that ſat on the throne the earth and the heaven fled away, and there was found no place for them." "Behold, I create all things new!"

Now it may ſeem that, with predictions ſuch as theſe before us, there can be no room to ſpeak *conjecturally* of the deſtiny of the material univerſe, or of the new creation; and, on the contrary, an explanation may properly be demanded of the ſenſe in which that is treated of as uncertain, which appears to be diſtinctly affirmed in ſo many places of Scripture. Let it then, in the firſt place, be obſerved, that, as the author, in the preſent eſſay, abſtains entirely from Biblical interpretation, he is not entitled to underſtand the paſſages quoted above, in a literal and univerſal ſenſe, apart from that ſort of enquiry concerning the meaning of phraſes, and the import of the context, which may fully juſtify the belief that they ought ſo to be underſtood. The theologian, perhaps, would refuſe aſſent to a literal and unreſtricted interpretation of theſe predictions, and would affirm that they are of ſpiritual import only, or are applicable ſimply to national and eccleſiaſtical revolutions.

Then, in the ſecond place, it muſt be remembered that, ſuppoſing the literal and univerſal import of theſe paſſages were granted to us by the Biblical interpreter, yet, in following out our conceptions, even a ſingle ſtep beyond a bare

affirmation of the fact, we tread upon uncertain ground, that is to ſay, upon the ground of analogical reaſoning, not upon that of Scripture teſtimony; and nothing can be much more important than always to obſerve the broad diſtinction between thoſe mere facts, which are matters of religious perſuaſion, and thoſe enlargements of ſuch facts which may be the fruit of philoſophical ſpeculation. This diſtinction forgotten or contemned, and then philoſophical ſpeculation becomes dangerous and pernicious;—remembered and reſpected, it may yield us a ſervice not to be ſpurned.

Rejecting, as we muſt, every modification of the atheiſtic doctrine concerning the eternity of the material univerſe, or its inherent independence, and, on the contrary, viewing it as nothing more than the product of the creative will and power, exiſting, while it exiſts, only as a means to an end beyond itſelf, we then gain a poſition whence with eaſe we may contemplate this vaſt and goodly framework, permanent as it ſeems, as ſtanding only during pleaſure, and as diſſoluble, in any moment, when its uſes are fulfilled. The material univerſe has no indefeaſible rights —has no inherent claim to be perpetuated. Nothing abſtract would be compromiſed by its return to nihility. If it be a ſtage of life to innumerable ſpecies, another ſtage of life may

come in its room; or if an admirable exhibition of the divine power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, thoſe ſame attributes may ſhine forth with ſtill more clearneſs on the fields of a new creation.

But our natural impreſſions, or phyſical prejudices, offer ſome reſiſtance to the ſuppoſition of the utter and inſtantaneous diſſipation of the ſolid maſſes of the material ſyſtem; and it is only by doing a ſort of violence to the mind, that ſuch an idea is admitted. And yet thoſe who diſtinctly entertain the belief of the *creation* of matter out of nothing, ought not to think the *return* of this ſame matter to its nothingneſs, at all incredible. We ſay the return of matter to its nothingneſs ought not to be regarded as a paradox, even when matter is conceived of according to our ordinary notions of it, which impute to its particles, or ultimate atoms, a real, impenetrable, and indiviſible, and inſoluble ſolidity. For, in whatever manner this ſolidity ſprang from the divine will, it cannot be greater than the will whence it ſprang; nor poſſeſs any principle of permanence not dependent upon that will. It is not to be admitted that God has made anything which, once exiſting, exiſts like himſelf, neceſſarily and eternally.

We do not, therefore, hold it to be at all requiſite, with the view of making way for our preſent conjecture, to undermine (if we might ſo ſpeak) the reality of the material world. Let

it be as real and ſolid as it may, it is no more than the product of omnipotence, and poſſeſſes no permanence, irreſpectively of omnipotence, conſtantly in act to ſuſtain it. And aſſuredly we ſhould not endeavour to ſhake the ſtability of the viſible and palpable univerſe by the aid of the metaphyſical hypotheſis or demonſtration, which denies its reality, and which allows nothing to exiſt actually, or even poſſibly, but Mind.

Metaphyſical ſcepticiſm as well as material ſcepticiſm, renounced, and the premiſes laid down, that the material world, conceived of according to our natural impreſſions, as ſolid and (relatively) indeſtructible, ought yet to be regarded as diſſoluble every moment by the ſovereign word of the Creator; this admitted, it may yet be not altogether uſeleſs to analyze a little our notions of matter, and to follow them ſo far as may ſerve to ſhow that a genuine belief in the reality of the external world may conſiſt with more than one hypotheſis concerning its occult conſtitution.

Between the idealiſm of Berkeley, and the ſcientific theory of Boſcovich, there is no real connection or affinity; although, popularly, the two ſyſtems may ſeem to amount to the ſame thing. The former is as purely metaphyſical, as the latter is ſimply phyſical: the one is a mere adjuſtment of abſtract notions; the latter

a ſtatement of aſſumed facts, ſupported by reaſons and evidence proper to a ſcientific argument; and if the one hypotheſis, as well as the other, leaves everything where it found it, ſo far as our concernment with the external world is involved, yet the latter may actually promote the ſciences to which it ſtands related; while the former is, in every ſenſe, a barren ſpeculation.

In now propounding his conjectures concerning the occult conſtitution of matter, the author would deem it an inexcuſable omiſſion not to have alluded to the "Theoria Philoſophiæ Naturalis," of Boſcovich; and yet in doing ſo, he muſt not be underſtood either as entirely adopting the principles of that ingenious writer, or as pretending to interpret his ſyſtem. In fact, notions, ſimilar to thoſe ſo elaborately maintained by Boſcovich, can hardly have failed to preſent themſelves to all minds accuſtomed to purſue abſtruſe ſpeculations; and every ſuch mind will give to them a modification of its own.

Our acquaintance with matter, as every one knows, is nothing more than an acquaintance with its properties; or rather with thoſe of its powers which affect our ſenſes. But theſe properties of matter reſolve themſelves into ſo many ſpecies of motion—emanative, or vibratory, and the motion implied in chemical combination. The reſiſtance offered to the touch by ſolid

bodies may ſeem an exception to this ſtatement; but it is not ſo in fact: for the reſiſtance of a ſolid ſurface is nothing but a *propulſion*, operating within the minute ſphere of that atomic force which prevents the actual or mathematical contact of bodies. We know ſolid bodies, therefore, *only by the rebound* which prohibits approximation within a certain limit. It is then a ſpecies of motion that conveys to us the idea of ſolidity.

In other words, for ſuſtaining all the phenomena of the material world, mechanical and chemical, we need ſuppoſe nothing more than an infinite congeries of mathematical points of attraction and repulſion—attraction and repulſion of ſeveral kinds. This ſuppoſition fully anſwers all the purpoſes that are anſwered by the notion of hard indiviſible atoms. That which is ſuperadded to the very ſimple idea of a centre of attraction and repulſion, in order to bring it up to the notion of a ſolid atom, adds abſolutely nothing ſerviceable to it, or even, perhaps, intelligible, and is altogether ſuperfluous. The hard ultimate atom performs no office which the mathematical centre will not perform. But then theſe infinite centres are only ſo many ſtarting points of motion—motion in ſeveral directions, or motion of ſeveral ſpecies.

It only remains, then, to bring this idea of the material world into connection with the

principle that motion, in all caſes, originates from mind; or in other words, is the effect of will—either the Supreme will, or the will of created minds. Motion is either conſtant and uniform, obeying what we call a law, or it is incidental. The viſible and palpable world then, according to this theory, is MOTION, conſtant and uniform, emanating from infinite centres, and ſpringing, during every inſtant of its continuance, from the Creative Energy.

The inſtantaneous ceſſation of this energy, at any period, is therefore, abſtractedly, quite as eaſily conceived of, as is its continuance; and whether, in the next inſtant, it ſhall continue, or ſhall ceaſe, whether the material univerſe ſhall ſtand, or ſhall vaniſh, is an alternative of which, irreſpective of other reaſons, the one member may be as eaſily taken as the other: juſt as the moving of the hand, or the not moving, in the next moment, depends upon nothing but our volition. The annihilation of the ſolid ſpheres—the planets, and the ſuns, that occupy the celeſtial ſpaces, would not on this ſuppoſition be an act of irreſiſtible force, cruſhing that which reſiſts compreſſion, or diſſipating and reducing to an ether that which firmly coheres; but it would ſimply be the non-exertion, in the next inſtant, of a power which has been exerted in this inſtant:—it would be, not a deſtruction, but a reſt; not a craſh and ruin, but a pauſe.

Yet, as we have already ſaid, the ſuppoſition of the inſtantaneous vaniſhing of the preſent material univerſe, is not at all dependent upon the theory above ſtated, which ſuppoſes matter to be conſtituted of ſeveral ſpecies of motion, ſpringing conſtantly from an infinitude of points. And indeed, diſmiſſing this theory, the deſtiny of the celeſtial mechaniſm might be inferred, with ſome degree of probability, on the ground of facts that are now generally admitted. Thus, for example, if an ether be a reſiſting medium, diffuſed through ſpace, a medium which, rare as it may be, is denſe enough to deduct ſomething in each revolution from the onward force of comets, and ſo to accelerate their revolutions and to diminiſh their orbits, the ſame retarding yet accelerating power is in operation alſo upon the planets: ſo that the entire ſyſtem muſt be *winding up*, and ſlowly in progreſs toward that conſummation which the inſpired writers ſpeak of as a 'rolling up the heavens like a ſcroll.' If ſuch be the actual and inevitable tendency of the planetary economy, we may ſuppoſe that the dire cataſtrophe will be anticipated by an inſtantaneous changing of the things that are 'ſeen and temporal,' and an introducing of the things that are 'not ſeen and eternal.'

In connection with our preſent conjecture, we ought to conſider what is that all-pervading

principle which is the characteriſtic of the preſent material ſyſtem, or at leaſt of ſo much of it as comes within our means of knowledge — and it is this, namely—That the conſtitution of nature includes the colliſion of unlike and unequal forces, ſo acting one upon another, as that the whole can ſubſiſt and preſerve its form only by running round a perpetual circle of combination and decompoſition, of organization and diſſolution. In no department of nature within our obſervation, is there, or indeed can there be, a ſtate of abſolute reſt; for thoſe elements which have reached a condition of repoſe, by perfect combination, and which, left to themſelves, might enjoy that repoſe, are inceſſantly acted upon by other elements, which, though they by themſelves might alſo reſt, cannot reſt in juxtapoſition with any compound, but muſt decompoſe it. Thus it is that the moſt ſolid maſſes are giving way, ſlowly, perhaps, to decompoſition, or to a change of chemical form; while the leſs ſolid, or the more *expoſed* maſſes, are rapidly running the round of their ſolid, fluid, and gaſeous ſtates;—yielding up their conſtituents, to be conſorted anew in ſome totally different manner. And thus, too, the powers of life, vegetable and animal, which, within ſo many thouſand fixed types, are perpetually gathering to themſelves the crude elements, are alſo, without a moment's pauſe, paſſing on to-

ward their ſtage of decay and diſſolution. The balance of forces, in the material world, is of ſuch a kind as that it can be perpetuated only by inceſſant revolutions and tranſitions; ſo we keep a pole perpendicularly on the finger, by giving it a gyration.

But there certainly comes within the range of our abſtract notions of what is poſſible, another ſort of counterpoiſe, namely, one in which either equal forces ſhould be balanced, or unequal, on a principle of adjuſtment, ſuch as ſhould involve no inequality. In the actual world, light, heat, and electricity (to look no further) as they are ſuſceptible of a latent, or a leſs active ſtate, as well as of a ſtate of irreſiſtible energy, and as, during their latent ſtate, they are imbedded in the inert and diſſoluble maſſes formed by the ponderable elements, it muſt happen that, as often as they paſs from the latent to the active ſtate, theſe maſſes are either decompoſed, or to ſome extent affected. But inſtead of this, it is ſurely conceivable, either that the energetic principles, ſuch as light, heat, electricity, ſhould be excluded from a latent combination with the inert elements; or that they ſhould not leave that ſtate, and that the inert ſhould retain what they poſſeſs, unalterably. In ſuch a conſtitution of elements there could, as it ſeems, be no formations, no tranſitions, no growth, and no decay—no death. A world ſo conſti-

tuted, would be, during the ſovereign pleaſure of the Creator, unchangeable and eternal; or if it were allowable to apply to the phyſical world inſpired language, intended probably to apply only to the ſpiritual world, the ſcheme of things we have imagined might be deſcribed as 'incorruptible, undefiled, and not fading away.'

Such, as we ſuppoſe, muſt be the conſequence of eſtabliſhing a *real* counterpoiſe between the active and the inert elements of the material world. In the ſyſtem around us, three great principles are reciprocating their influences; firſt, the inert elements; ſecondly, the active elements—light, heat, and electricity, which however may be ſo many modifications merely of one element; and thirdly, the principle of life, vegetable and animal, which we aſſume to be nothing elſe but MIND. From the interaction of the two former reſults the circle of changes, within which all bodies are revolving, through their ſolid, fluid, and gaſeous ſtates. From the action of the third upon the firſt and ſecond, reſults organization, with its various functions; but organization, in combining theſe two unequal forces, ſubmits to the inevitable condition of that combination, and begins to decay, almoſt as ſoon as it reaches its perfection. At preſent, the principle of life ſeems to attach itſelf more intimately to the inert elements, and leſs ſo to the active; and, therefore, it lies ex-

poſed to all the power of the one over the other. But let the principle of life take on to the active elements—let it, itſelf eſſentially active, be balanced againſt the active, and be ſo adjuſted therewith as to form a permanent combination, and then life might continue at its point of reſt for ever.

Not forgetting the caution, once and again mentioned, we might yet, conditionally, make a reference to thoſe paſſages, heretofore quoted, which affirm the future diſſolution of the material world by fire; and aſſuming, for a moment, the literal ſenſe of thoſe predictions (and it is not proved that the literal ſenſe ſhould be rejected) then it will ſeem to be intimated that the unequal and reſtleſs counterpoiſe which had ſo long ſubſiſted between light and heat, and the inert elements ſhall at laſt be overthrown; the former breaking through all reſtraints, and overcoming the latter, and ſo overcoming it as that it ſhall no more be capable of retaining the active force in a latent ſtate.

But the principle of life—that is to ſay, Mind, is not diſſoluble by any other principle; nor can it give way before any intenſity of a merely material energy; and although doubtleſs dependent upon the pleaſure of the Creator, and immortal only by his will, who ſuſtains that which he has produced; yet muſt it be thoroughly independent of all co-exiſtent and inferior forces.

We may at once be ſure, on the one hand, that life will endure only ſo long as He ſhall pleaſe who is the giver of life; and on the other, that it is a principle ſtanding beyond the reach of all other influences, and inherently ſuperior to every other. Let then the material univerſe vaniſh, ſilent and unnoticed as a dream; or let it melt with fervent heat, and paſs away, as in a painful convulſion, with "a great noiſe;" in either caſe, all minds, rational and moral, ſhall emerge from the mighty ruin, and float clear and untouched above the terrors and the tempeſt of nature's dying day. Mind ſhall ſhake itſelf of the corruptible and diſſoluble elements, and ſhall put on incorruption: it ſhall lay down the diſhonour of its union with the inert maſſes of the material world, and put on the glory of a purely active and uncompounded corporeity: it ſhall take leave of death, and be clothed with immortality.

It is nothing elſe but an anticipation of this riſing of mind over the level of matter, that is now going on within the human ſyſtem. Mind, in its firſt ſtage of combination with matter, exerciſes only the loweſt of its faculties, and is long little more than merely paſſive; but it gains every day upon the conditions of animal life, exerts more and more of its inherent powers, mechanical and rational; and at length, not only governs, in a high ſpontaneous manner, its im-

mediate body, but ſo diverts and controls the powers of the material world as to make itſelf, in a ſenſe, maſter of nature, and to ſerve itſelf of her laws. The arts of life are preciſely ſo many conqueſts of mind, and ſo many inſtances of the yielding of matter to the pleaſure of mind. Again, by its powers of abſtraction the moſt abſtruſe relations of the material world are maſtered and reduced to a practical ſubſerviency; and then, by the aid of theſe ſame relations, the vaſtneſs of the material univerſe is ſo far graſped, by our methods of reaſoning, as to yield itſelf in degree to our conceptions, and to come within the range of our calculations. Man, although not yet lord of the viſible univerſe as an adult, is lord of it as an heir; and he exerciſes an authority becoming the minority of one for whom vaſt poſſeſſions are in reſerve. This is not the language of empty pretenſion: modern ſcience and art make good, in detail, all that is here affirmed at large.

But as we go deeper and deeper into the receſſes of our nature, and duly conſider the dignity and the powers of the moral life, and the vaſt compaſs of the affections, we ſhall feel, in far greater force, the truth—a truth of unbounded import—that the moſt excellent forms of matter are as nothing in compariſon with the worth and deſtinies of the ſpirit. The affections of the ſpirit, and their power of intimate com-

munion with the Infinite Spirit, not only raiſe the mind immeaſurably above the level of the viſible world, and carry it clear of the fate of that world; but raiſe it even above the range of the merely intellectual faculties, ſo that a ſtate may be conceived of, far better and higher than that of the higheſt exerciſe of reaſon.

In truth, what is it that leads us to attach the value we do attach to intellectual labour and achievement?—not the mere practical reſult of thoſe engagements; nor the mere labour, in itſelf conſidered; but the EMOTION, the ſentiment, the moral power, connected with it, and by which it is prompted, animated, and rewarded. Within the entire circle of our intellectual conſtitution we value nothing but emotion;—it is not the powers, or the exerciſe of the powers, but the fruit of thoſe powers, in ſo much *feeling*, of a lofty kind, as they will yield. Now that toward which we are conſtantly tending, as our goal—that which we reſt in when it is attained, as ſufficient—is that which ſhall be ultimate, and ſhall ſurvive whatever has been mediate, or contributory, or acceſſory. Everything ſhort of the affections of the ſoul is a means to an end, and muſt have its ſeaſon: it is temporary; but the affections of the ſoul are the end of all, and they are eternal. Let the univerſe periſh or be changed, the ſoul ſhall live.

CHAPTER XIX.

The general Ground of Conjectural Reaſoning concerning what is Unſeen or Future.

THE ſuppoſitions we have followed, in the three preceding chapters, although ſeparable and independent, are not irreconcilable; but, on the contrary, may well conſiſt one with the other, or may each be true in part. Thus it may be the fact that the widely-diſſimilar phyſical condition of the ſolar and the planetary ſurfaces, as adapted to the ſupport of living ſpecies, may, in our own ſyſtem, and in others, conſtitute a broad ground of diſtinction as to the modes of exiſtence ſeverally found there; and that while the planetary ſpecies, of all ranks, are neceſſarily corruptible and mortal, and are permanent only by reproduction, the ſolar ſpecies may enjoy an individual permanency; and even if liable to transformations, may yet be exempt from diſſolution. Or if we ſcrupled to admit this bold conjecture, in its whole extent, yet it

is almoſt impoſſible to reſiſt the belief, firſt, that the father-world of the ſyſtem, itſelf, the fountain of light, heat, and vital energy, is vaſtly more than a deſert—a naked and terrible wilderneſs of tempeſtuous combuſtion; and ſecondly, that if actually peopled with various orders, the phyſical law of their life is more excellent than that which prevails in the planets. The known and viſible phyſical difference between the ſun and the planets, goes near to making it certain, that the powers of life in the one, muſt be more ſteadily balanced where ſtimulus is perpetual, than where it is intermittent.

At the ſame time, and while it is ſuppoſed that palpable and viſible organization, whether mortal or immortal, makes its home upon the ſurfaces of the ſolar and planetary bodies, it may be quite true (nor indeed, without doing violence to the language of Scripture can we believe otherwiſe) that each world, of every ſyſtem, includes, or is ſurrounded by, inviſible orders, of ſeveral ſpecies, ranks, and qualities; corporeal indeed, but imponderable, and attached to an element not open to cognizance by the animal ſenſes. This belief, conſidered as a matter of philoſophy, and not of religion or of faith, needs only that our notions of the corporeal part of the mental conſtitution ſhould be defined and cleared up a little more, and it would then take its place among truths imperfectly known, but

rationally admitted; and it might receive enlargement and confirmation by means of a more exact attention to innumerable facts, that have been ſuffered to paſs unnoticed. On this ſubject ſomething will be advanced in the next and concluding chapter.

But while the actual univerſe, as now conſtituted, is ſuppoſed to include great inequalities of the corporeal economy, and to have its local diſtributions of life—life corruptible, and life incorruptible, and alſo to compriſe within each locality the difference of palpable and impalpable corporeity, it may yet be true (and the apparent meaning of the inſpired writings conveys the belief) that the entire framework of nature has its limited era, and ſhall, after fulfilling an introductory purpoſe in the great ſcheme of the creation, give place to a new and higher order of things, and to a conſtruction of elements ſuch as ſhall better conſiſt with thoſe ultimate moral ends for the ſake of which all things are. "We," according to the divine promiſe, "look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein is to dwell righteouſneſs."

Thus may our three conjectures be combined, and made to conſiſt, one with the other. But then, in reviewing the whole, as ſo adjuſted, we owe it to our reſpect for the divine teſtimony (each one owes it to his own ſenſe of piety) very clearly to ſeparate from the maſs ſo much

as ſhall ſeem involved in the language of the inſpired writers. This portion, whatever may be its amount, and on this point there will be a diverſity of opinion, is to be ſet off; and then ſo much as remains is to be accounted conjectural ſimply, and as ſuch to be dealt with. But then, while taking due care not to confound mere ſpeculation with ſerious articles of belief, we ſhould alſo take care not incurioufly to diſmiſs, undiſtinguiſhed, the entire maſs of what is called —conjectural; for although a portion of this hypothetical matter may be nothing better than ſheer ſuppoſition, and may be ſuſtained only by ſome general agreement with what is known, another portion may, perhaps, claim to be conſidered with a cloſer attention, and may juſtly invite examination, as not unlikely to lead to ſome real advancements of certain branches of philoſophy. On this point, alſo, ſomething more may preſently be ſaid; meanwhile, let us, on broad grounds, endeavour to embody the principles that juſtify conjectures, ſuch as thoſe that have been above propounded.

Reaſoning from analogy, is only the aſſuming that a certain power, or law, or principle, which is ſeen to take effect, in a given manner, under conditions ſpecified, will alſo operate in the ſame, or in a ſimilar manner, *elſewhere*, under conditions nearly the ſame. Thus whatever is found

to belong to the general principle of gravitation, and to motion through reſiſting mediums, in this earth of ours, is confidently ſuppoſed to belong to the ſame principle, and to motion in other planets, and other ſyſtems, when once it has been aſcertained that gravitation actually extends to thoſe ſyſtems, and regulates their revolutions. We conſider it as certain that the law is the ſame, although the effects may be varied by the difference of the conditions under which it operates. As for example, if the denſity of Saturn, as compared with that of the earth, be not much greater than cork, then, his bulk alſo conſidered, the tendency of bodies on his ſurface will proportionately differ from the tendency of ſimilar bodies on the ſurface of the earth: or again; the velocity of the equatorial regions of Jupiter being vaſtly greater than that of the earth's equatorial band, and the bulk of the two planets alſo differing, the reſpective variation between the weight of bodies, at different latitudes, between the poles and the equator, in the two planets, will vary accordingly;—the one law holding good *invariably* in both. In drawing inferences of this ſort, it would be a falſe diffidence to call them conjectures, for we tread on ſolid ground, although the path be far extended.

Now our reaſoning is not much leſs firm in texture, or much leſs entitled to confidence in

its concluſions, when we conſider this portion of the univerſe, which is our home, and with which we are familiarly acquainted, as an exhibition, be it on a very ſmall ſcale, of the leading principles of the creation, itſelf the product of unchanging intelligence and goodneſs. The univerſe is not the work of chance; and, therefore, will not be found to contain any boundleſs irregularities, or mere freaks and inconſiſtencies of plan and principle. The univerſe is the work of mind, and the expreſſion of fixed moral attributes; it will, therefore, amid all its diverſities, keep cloſe to principle and law. We could not indeed, *à priori*, ſay what theſe principles muſt be; nor can we, apart from actual knowledge, fix a boundary upon the ſcale that meaſures the extreme inſtances of diverſity: nevertheleſs, we may conclude that whatever is found to conſiſt with theſe ruling motives, or to come within the circle of theſe great reaſons, in our own world, muſt conſiſt with them elſewhere; and moreover, that every ſingle principle which here manifeſts itſelf in a copious and unexhauſted manner, is probably the diſplay of a univerſal energy, that muſt find exerciſe, not in this world merely, but in all.

Thus, for inſtance, it is uſual to argue, with confidence, from the fact of the incalculable multiplication of animal life under ſo many forms on the ſurface of this planet, that an unbounded

diffuſion of life is the univerſal intention of the creative power; and then, when we find the heavens to be filled with innumerable worlds, as if in harmony with this very ſame productive energy, and find too, ſo far as our obſervation reaches, that theſe worlds are all governed by the ſame phyſical laws, we conclude, not ſurely very uncertainly, that all worlds, or moſt worlds (for there may be ſingle exceptions) are abodes of life; and not leſs variouſly or copiouſly ſo than our own. If this often-repeated argument from analogy is to be termed (as to the concluſion it involves) a conjecture merely, we ought then to abandon altogether every kind of abſtract reaſoning; nor will it be eaſy afterwards to make good any principle of natural theology. In truth the very baſis of moral reaſoning is ſhaken by a ſcepticiſm ſo ſweeping as this.

To ſet the rule of analogical reaſoning, as now employed, clear of all objections and difficulties, would demand a volume; but at preſent, taking it as generally received, and uſing it a little further than can here be fully made good in its details, yet not any further than, as the author believes, might be ſtrictly juſtified, we apply it to the conjectures lately propounded, as follows:—

The univerſe, as actually known to us, is very clearly ſuſceptible of being conſidered in a threefold aſpect; that is to ſay, firſt, as extended

through *ſpace;* ſecondly, as extended in *kind*, or by diverſity of ſpecies and modes of exiſtence; and thirdly, as extended through duration, or in *time*. Thus, and without logical refinement, we think of the creation, or of any ſingle region of it, as *mathematically* meaſurable; as *phyſically* open to deſcription, and as demanding to be *hiſtorically* recorded, in reſpect of its commencement, and the epochs and revolutions it may have paſſed through.

Now bringing the rule of analogy—analogy, including a belief in the univerſality of the divine attributes — into its application to the above-named threefold view of the creation, we ſeem warranted in ſuppoſing that there will be a proportion or a ſymmetry, ſo connecting theſe three modes of extenſion, as that not one of them will immeaſurably ſurpaſs the others. This aſſumption may eaſily be explained, and its reaſonableneſs illuſtrated, by ſtating ſome contrary ſuppoſitions, as thus:—

Let us imagine ourſelves to have come up to the exterior wall of a vaſt palace, which already we have ſeen to cover many acres; but on entering the outer gate, and in paſſing through its courts, we find that the enormous ſtructure riſes only one ſtory from the baſement, that its chambers are all of uniform dimenſions, are all alike in embelliſhment and furniture, and that, in ſeeing the firſt of its thouſand halls, we have

ſeen all. And what if an unvarying ceremonial, an endleſs round of dull manœuvres, repeated day after day, through the year, and year after year, compriſes the hiſtory of the perſonages of this palace! The very idea is inſufferable. Now to apply our illuſtration to the argument in hand, we conſider it inevitable, or nearly ſo, to conclude that the material univerſe, this palace of the great king, is as various and vaſt in the *ſpecies* and modes of life it includes, as it is vaſt in mathematical extent; and alſo, that it is proportionately vaſt and various in the deſtinies and the revolutions of which it ſhall be the theatre.

The viſible extent of the creation *throughſpace*, we take as an indication, by the rule of ſymmetry, of the incalculable compaſs of the *varieties of being*, now actually occupying the abodes that conſtitute the celeſtial ſyſtem; and again, this ſame viſible extent of the creation ſeems to beſpeak a correſponding vaſtneſs of range in *the changes and revolutions*, the tranſitions and the fortunes, that ſhall conſtitute the hiſtory of the entire ſyſtem.

But freely admitting the hypotheſis of this ſort of proportion, as involved in the ſymmetry of the univerſe, and as placing its extent in ſpace, its extent in ſpecies, and its extent in time, on a footing of equality, we ſeem to have gained an idea of the whole, ſuch as comports with the notion we muſt entertain of the infinite perfections of Him whoſe work it is.

Will then the reader go forward with the author upon the ground of this ſuppoſition, as not unreaſonable—That the vaſtneſs of the viſible univerſe, ſo far as it actually comes within our means of knowledge, may be taken as a ſort of guage of the vaſtneſs of that range of intellectual and moral exiſtence of which the viſible univerſe is the platform? If this rule of meaſurement be granted, it will imply a correſponding vaſtneſs, or unbounded range of fortunes, as attaching to the intellectual economy, and as yet to be developed in the lapſe of time. Preſuming upon the reader's willingneſs to grant the premiſes now demanded, it will be proper to endeavour to define a little our conceptions of the actual extent of the material ſyſtem: not, indeed, as if the ſtarry fields were to be meaſured by the line of human calculation; or as if the mere multiplying of figures would enable the mind to graſp the quantities they repreſent. Nevertheleſs, there is ſomething which may be done, the doing of which is highly important to the purpoſe we have immediately in view. In dealing with a theme ſuch as this, wherein the objects ſpoken of immeaſurably tranſcend as well the powers of the conceptive faculty, as the powers of arithmetic and of language, the very plaineſt ſtyle, and the very homelieſt terms, are the moſt appropriate; inaſmuch as while em-

ploying ſuch a ſtyle and terms, the illuſion is avoided of ſuppoſing, either that our ideas, or our mode of expreſſing them, bears any ſort of proportion to the things ſpoken of. We will then ſpeak of the probable dimenſions of the heavens, as we ſhould of the width and height of a building.

Methods of computation (as every one knows) which are not uncertain, afford us the means of advancing a negative propoſition, to this effect, that the neareſt of the fixed ſtars is more remote than the diſtance already mentioned, or about twenty billions of miles, a diſtance which would be traverſed by light (paſſing ninety-five millions of miles in 8 min. 7 ſec.) in three years and 216 days. But there are millions of ſtars ſo much more remote than thoſe that have been ſuppoſed to afford a parallax, that they may actually have ceaſed to exiſt three thouſand years ago, and yet may appear in their places;—their laſt ray not having reached our ſyſtem: theſe facts every one is familiar with.

But now, in ſuppoſing ourſelves to paſs on beyond the nearer ſtrata of the ſtarry expanſe, and towards the moſt remote which powerful teleſcopes diſcover, have we any reaſon to imagine that we are approaching the confines of creation? or ſhall we conclude that, beyond the reach of the human eye, and the teleſcope, nothing remains? This were ſurely a greater preſumption than to admit as probable, the contrary ſuppoſition, well

as it confiſts with what we actually know. What is it that encircles the creation, ſo far as ſeen? certainly not any limit of the creative power. But the material world is not *infinite:* and yet infinitude allows that the viſible heavens ſhould be multiplied, or repeated, millions of times, and ſtill that it ſhould lie far within the limits of the infinite. The apparent probability is that the univerſe has no ſuch limits as thoſe which the human eye extends to. The inference we are warranted in drawing is of the ſame ſort as that we ſhould adopt, concerning the expanſe of the ocean, in looking at the horizon from ſucceſſive elevations:—we firſt meaſure the watery field from the deck of a ſhip; and thence we behold a billowy line, not much exceeding a radius of a league or two: but we aſcend the ſhrouds, and at the height of the main-yards or croſs-trees perceive that a much evener horizon marks a diſtance at which the waves ceaſe to be diſcernible, or to preſent a ſerrated line; and we accordingly extend our calculation to the diſtance of eight or ten leagues: thence we climb to the topmaſt, and again ſtretch our circle to a double diameter, or more; and if we could borrow the wings of the eagle, and ſoar to the clouds, we ſhould ſtill gaze upon a widening proſpect, and find that the dim diſtance enlarges at every ſtage of our aſcent, and at a rate ſurpaſſing the ſcale we had aſſumed at the firſt.

It is thus that every extenſion of our means of knowing the ſtarry field, has only ſerved to open to us a vaſtly wider proſpect, without giving any indication of our diſcerning a limit: on the contrary, new nebulæ, ſimilar to thoſe that have been found to conſiſt of innumerable ſtars, are revealed, and new viſtas of worlds are dimly opened before us. Thus we have every reaſon to ſuppoſe the creation to be immenſely more extenſive than the ſpace reached by the teleſcope: and yet this ſpace, in the mode in which it offers itſelf to our conceptions, ſuggeſts a ſuppoſition, tending to give conſiſtency, as well as enlargement, to our notions of the univerſe.

The galaxy, aſcertained to conſiſt of innumerable ſtars, and forming, as ſeen from our ſyſtem, a ſomewhat irregular band, encircling the heavens, obliquely to the ecliptic, gives to the general figure of the ſtarry expanſe, the form of a flat parallelogram, about the midſt of which is placed the ſun of our ſyſtem. Laterally, and looking towards the ſides of this parallelogram, the ſtars are comparatively ſcanty; but looking in any direction, longitudinally, or towards the extremities, we include, of courſe, a vaſt perſpective, and ſee a thickened brightneſs, conſtituted of the countleſs worlds that are ranged within the general figure.

But now, in adhering to the analogy of the celeſtial mechaniſm, can we conceive of this

parallelogram as being ſuch indeed, and as ſtretching itſelf, in obedience to no rule of ſymmetry, through ſpace, like a raft, floating in the ocean? or ſhall we not rather believe that the portion of the field of ſpace which we ſee repleniſhed with ſuns, conſtitutes really a ſegment of a ſphere, ſo immeaſurably vaſt, that the ſuns ranged in the *oppoſite ſides* of the hollow globe are far beyond the range of viſion, or even beyond the paſſage of light? In fact, the diameter of this ſuppoſed ſphere muſt be ſuch that, if light could traverſe it, countleſs ages muſt elapſe before it could reach us. The ſuppoſition we now propound may be readily conceived of by any one who imagines a hollow globe, we will ſay, of three feet diameter, formed of a cruſt of glaſs, two inches thick; and this cruſt containing, pretty plentifully, grains or ſpangles of gold and ſilver, evenly diſtributed in its ſubſtance. Now if we think of the eye as ſtationed at any one of theſe grains, as its point of view, the ſpeckled glaſſy cruſt would preſent an appearance not very unlike that offered by the ſtarry heavens; that is to ſay, laterally, to the right and left, the ſubſtance would be comparatively clear of grains; but in every direction, longitudinally, and when the eye follows the courſe of the ſubſtance, the grains would ſeem ſo thickly ranged as to give a ſhining opacity to its appearance. At the ſame time, the oppoſite ſide of the globe

would be too remote for its grains to attract the eye.

This ſuppoſition, conſiſting as it does with the law which impoſes a ſpherical figure upon all the celeſtial maſſes and motions, and ſo recommending itſelf as probable, and as agreeable to the analogy of known facts, implies that the portion of the heavens ſeen by us, bears but a ſmall proportion to the part which is unſeen; ſuch a proportion, for example, as is borne by the Auſtralian continent to the entire ſurface of our globe. To preſent the appearance which it actually does, this viſible portion can hardly exceed the extent of fifty degrees of the circle.

And yet, when we have conceived of a hollow ſtarry ſphere, ſuch as has been deſcribed, are we to conclude that we have compaſſed the material univerſe? If there be *one* ſuch ſphere, there may be, in remoteſt ſpace, another; and if another, many. This world of ours is not the univerſe; —the ſolar ſyſtem is not the univerſe:—but do our teleſcopes of twenty feet long ſweep the field of the univerſe? The probability that they do not is nearly as ſtrong as any probability can be: every reaſon is on the other ſide; and, with the infinity of ſpace, as the field, and the infinite creative power and will of the Supreme Being, as the means, the belief that this energy reaches its boundary within any circle that created minds will ever be able to meaſure, or to conceive of,

is not to be entertained. On the contrary, we may far more reaſonably ſuppoſe, not only that the divine perfections of power and wiſdom, abſtractedly, will always ſurpaſs the comprehenſion of finite beings, but that the *products* of thoſe perfections will ſtretch out beyond the longeſt line of created minds; and that not the loftieſt ſeraph ſhall ever be able to reach a ſpot whence, with even a ſeraph's ken, he may be able to deſcry the lone boundaries of the creation, and to look out beyond the circle of productive power. Rather let us believe that creatures—the higheſt of them, let them wander where they may, and as far as they may, and let them hold on their courſe with unwearied curioſity, age after age, and in what direction they may pleaſe—ſhall yet find themſelves in the very heart of the populous dominions of the Almighty, and ſurrounded, in all directions, by worlds, and by ſyſtems of worlds.

Whoever takes the ſimple facts now aſcertained, and which form part of our aſtronomy, and, with laborious and continued effort of the mind, follows them out, and brings them within graſp, even faintly, of the conceptive and rational faculties, will find it far more eaſy to go the length we have now gone, in our hypotheſis of the material univerſe, than to ſtop ſhort of it, at any point, and to conceive of a limit, or a ceſſation of the creative energy. Such a limit, place

it where we may, offends reaſon; but the unbounded conception gives us the liberty we want in thinking of God and of his works.

Whatever may be the ſpeculations we indulge concerning the vaſtneſs, or the form, of the viſible univerſe, it manifeſtly tranſcends all our powers of conception and calculation. The ſtars of heaven are as the ſands upon the ſea ſhore—innumerable: and they are planted through ſpace at diſtances, one from the other, exceeding all means of meaſurement:—this is enough. But now in conſidering the vaſt ſtructure as THE WORK OF MIND, and as the product, not of power merely, but of wiſdom, we are abſolutely compelled to aſſign to the whole ſome purpoſe, proportionate to the mechanical preparation for life which it furniſhes. The vaſtneſs of the platform aſſuredly implies a correſponding grandeur of intention, as ample in its compaſs as the neceſſary conditions of finite being may admit. That is to ſay, in looking at the heavens, we aſſume that a theatre ſo ſtupendous does and ſhall ſuſtain the utmoſt amount of life, not merely in *numbers*, but in *kinds*, which it might abſtractedly ſuſtain. The Creator having, as we ſee, put forth His power unboundedly, in relation to ſpace, ſhall He not put it forth unboundedly alſo in relation to the *ſpecies*, and modes of exiſtence?

The ſtrength of an inference ſuch as this will be differently eſtimated by different minds; but there are few, if any, who would not admit it to ſome extent. For example; none could tolerate the idea, and eſpecially ſeeing what we do ſee in our own planet, that the innumerable ſpheres around us are totally untenanted, and that the ſtupendous celeſtial mechaniſm, is a mechaniſm merely. Not much more admiſſible is the idea that, our own planet excepted, the loweſt forms of life only, as of vegetables and zoophytes, are to be found in all the wide fields of creation. Nor, again, can the mind ſatisfy itſelf, or get free from a diſtreſſing ſenſe of diſproportion, in ſtopping ſhort of the belief that intellectual and moral life, on a ſcale at leaſt equal to that which has place in this world, has alſo place in other worlds.

But this is barely enough; or it is the loweſt ſuppoſition that can at all be entertained; and the idea which the author would fain ſet at work in the reader's mind involves a principle that carries us much further. It is not merely that we involuntarily expect to find, within ſo vaſt a ſcheme, beings higher in faculty and power than man; but that a wider range ſhould be taken as to the modes of exiſtence. In all worlds is there, then, nothing to be found except animal organization, and nothing more excellent? Is the creative energy ſo hemmed in as that the human

ſtructure is the higheſt and the beſt that can be accompliſhed? If nothing reſtrains it, as we ſee it is not reſtrained, in reſpect of dimenſions or numbers, is it reſtrained in reſpect of the means and elements of life? We conclude it is not; and on the contrary muſt profeſs to believe that the ſuppoſed reach of power, in the one reſpect, is fully borne out by its reach in the other; and that the univerſe is not more amazing in a ſimply mechanical or mathematical ſenſe, than it is in what we muſt call its phyſiology.

The divine attributes, as we have already had occaſion to obſerve, are not to be conceived of like the faculties or the impulſes of human nature, as ſo many diſtinct and ſeparable qualities or powers, any one or more of which may come into play, while the others remain inert. Nothing leſs can be admitted, concerning the infinite and abſolute Being, than that He is ONE in eſſence, in a ſenſe excluſive of all partial modes of procedure, or ſingle exertions of particular attributes. We muſt by no means think that the divine power is put forth in any inſtance, not accompanied by the divine wiſdom; or theſe again apart from goodneſs and juſtice. God is not, in any act, juſt only, or good only, or wiſe only, or almighty only; but always, and in every particular act, he exhibits, or, if not exhibits, really exerciſes, the complement of his awful perfections: and as we muſt not think

that any one of thoſe attributes which we, from the limitation of our powers, are compelled to ſpeak of diſtinctively, comes into act alone, ſo neither muſt we ſuppoſe that any one attribute is ever, or in any caſe, latent; for the latter ſuppoſition, as well as the former, implies what muſt never be granted—a parting, or a diviſibility of the divine nature. This belief of what muſt be termed the ſimplicity and integrity of the Infinite Being, which is of the utmoſt importance in relation to every branch of theology, carries with it the belief that, if God creates at all, he will create in the plenary exerciſe of his undivided perfections.

Now what we actually ſee of the celeſtial ſyſtem goes little further than to diſplay infinite power. Our ſcientific deductions, indeed, give evidence of intelligence in the equipoiſe of the planetary revolutions; but at this point we ſtop. And yet, although deprived of the means of immediately aſcertaining, or of witneſſing, the exertion of the other attributes of Deity, ought we to doubt, or can we, with any conſiſtency, doubt, that power and intelligence, thus boundleſſly put forth, under our eyes, are moving alone? Rather we conclude, and with a rational confidence, that bare power and intelligence are ſubſidiary to the exerciſe of the moral perfections; and that therefore, on the theatre of the material univerſe, the greateſt range poſſible is

taken for putting in movement thoſe loftier attributes.

It is on this ground then that, while we attach little importance to any hypotheſis concerning the univerſe, which is not diſtinctly ſuſtained by ſcriptural evidence, or actual facts, we challenge a ſerious importance for the PRINCIPLE on which all ſuch conjectures proceed, and can by no means admit that the refutation of any one ſuch particular hypotheſis involves a rejection of the theory of which it may be an individual expreſſion.

What has now been ſaid concerning that range and variety in the modes of exiſtence which ſeems implied, by the rule of ſymmetry, in the mere vaſtneſs of the material univerſe, is plainly applicable alſo, as we have aſſumed it to be, to that range and variety of *fortune* which the lapſe of time ſhall develop. If we cannot admit the belief that a low uniformity prevails through all worlds, neither can we imagine a dull monotony to be the law of all.

In truth, the very attributes which have given birth to variety, at any one moment, muſt give birth to variety, ſucceſſively, or through the eras of time. That ſame power and intelligence which expand in the one direction, will expand in the other, by neceſſity: nor can we aſſign any value to our argument in its bearing upon ſpace and ſpecies, which will not attach to it, in an equal degree, in relation to time.

Moreover, high faculties involve high deſtinies, whether for the better or the worſe: a faculty is a germinating power; and the more profound or expanſive it is, the greater will be the difference between its early and its later developments. A being endowed with complex faculties will never fail to create to itſelf A HISTORY. Two ſuch beings aſſociated, will generate a courſe of events indefinitely various; and a large community of beings, each gifted with active powers, and impelled by various and contrary impulſes, muſt impart a complexity to the courſe of events ſuch as is not to be unravelled, or brought round to its ſimple elements, within any brief period. Or, perhaps, we ſhould rather ſay that a courſe of events, complicated as it muſt be by ſpringing from the interaction of beings themſelves complex in powers and deſires, will perpetually involve itſelf deeper and deeper with the great principles of moral government; and thus will accumulate its demands upon futurity, wherein laws are to be vindicated, and irregularities are to be reduced to ſyſtem.

To bring, then, our preſent argument to a concluſion, and ſummarily to ſtate its import, we look upon the viſible univerſe, its immeaſurable ſpaces, and its innumerable ſpheres, as a fully expreſſed ſymbol of POWER, and as a partially expreſſed ſymbol of WISDOM;—we ſay partially,

becauſe it is hardly at all by the eye, and only in degree by the inferences of ſcience, that the conſtruction of this ſtupendous work is at preſent cognizable. But we do not forget that it is by accommodation to our own modes of thinking that we ſpeak of the power and wiſdom of God *diſtinctively*, and that, in truth, theſe attributes are relations only of the one Undivided and Infinite Nature. This ſame celeſtial ſtructure, therefore, could we examine it throughout, would be found to exhibit every other attribute, in act, with an equal or proportionate intenſity. The power has not gone further than the wiſdom has gone; nor theſe further than the goodneſs, or the rectitude; and the univerſe is doubtleſs as great in every ſenſe, as it is great in mere dimenſion, and in number of parts. It is as if, upon the palace wall of the Supreme, a hand were ſeen writing—and already it has written, in our view—'Power,' and partly Wiſdom; but knowing whoſe name it is, of which this writing is the initial portion, we well know that the entire inſcription muſt run on much further.

Let every one then—every one capable of holding correſpondence with the Creative Mind—let every one read, in the viſible heavens, a dim, and yet not fallacious preſage of the vaſtneſs, and depth, and height, of that unſeen economy, with which he ſhall find his deſtinies in-

volved; and let him believe that, when this now unſeen economy comes to be known, the vaſtneſs of the material theatre ſhall ceaſe to attract regard, in compariſon with the ſtupendous movements and deſtinies which it ſuſtains.

CHAPTER XX.

On the Advancement of Pneumatology.

THE two pioneers of phyſical philoſophy are Accident and Hypotheſis; and ſo it has been that ſcience, while profeſſing to care for nothing but what is certain, has actually owed the extenſion of her domain very much to chance, and not leſs to conjecture. This humiliating fact, if indeed it ſhould be thought of as humiliating, is forcibly felt, and freely acknowledged, during the ſpring ſeaſon of any ſingle branch of ſcience; for then the particular inſtances are freſh in every one's recollection; but afterwards, and when the new truths have acquired firmneſs and conſiſtency, and when they have ſettled down into the form of an aſcertained ſyſtem, and when this ſyſtem begins to exact ſubmiſſion, inſtead of aſking for patronage, then is it apt to ſhrink diſdainfully from its early helps, and to frown upon hypotheſis, and to think itſelf beyond the reach of any further acceſſions from accident.

This feeling and practice, however, ought not to be admitted; and philoſophy, in its ripeſt ſtate, ſhould ſtill favour the means of its early triumphs, and freely yield itſelf to every new chance of advancement.

All this is eſpecially true in relation to the ſeveral branches of intellectual philoſophy; and yet the very difficulty of the ſubject, which ſhould incline thoſe who purſue it to admit and invite every poſſible aid, ſeems rather to inſpire a prudiſh jealouſy, as if what is felt to be held in an uncertain and precarious manner, were ſecure only while guarded againſt every rudeneſs.

Among the expreſſions of this ſort of latent fear, the following may be named; and firſt, a ſtern deciſion, in relation to certain natural ſubjects of curioſity, concerning the phyſical conſtitution of man, that they lie hopeleſſly beyond the reach of the human faculties; and that it is a proof of ignorance, and preſumption, and of an incapacity to diſcern the real limits of mental philoſophy, ſo much as to moot theſe queſtions, or to indicate a wiſh to purſue them: juſt as it is held to be the ſign of a ſmattering acquaintance with mathematical principles, to go in queſt of a perpetual motion. Again, this ſame unacknowledged feeling would reſtrict us, not merely in relation to the ſubjects of inquiry, but as to the mode of conducting thoſe inquiries

which, in themſelves, are granted to be legitimate.

Mental philoſophy muſt be cultivated, it is ſaid, with clean hands; that is to ſay, in a rigid avoidance of any proceſs of inveſtigation not ſtrictly analytic and metaphyſical; or ſuch as would ſeem to bring theſe high themes down from their elevation, and ſet them upon the common level of phyſiological reſearches. All we can know of MIND (as we are taught to believe) is to be found in an analyſis of our perſonal conſciouſneſs:—the mental philoſopher need never leave his ſtudy. Mental philoſophy is granted to be inductive; but the materials of the induction are all in the boſom.

Once more; the very ſame freedom in admitting conjectures which, within the circle of the phyſical ſciences, is allowed and encouraged, on the well underſtood principle that ſuch conjectures (never confounded with aſcertained facts) may lead the way to diſcovery, and keep the mind alert, and ready to avail itſelf of happy accidents—this ſame freedom of conjecture, which has been ſo fruitful a ſource of important advancements, is ſomewhat ſupercilioufly diſcarded from the precincts of Intellectual Philoſophy, as worthy only of vulgar and empirical minds. But before conjecture or hypotheſis is thus excluded from the range of mental ſcience, it ſhould be proved, that the occult conſtitution of rational

and ſentient beings is to be explored by the method of analyſis alone; for it is manifeſt, that if the mental, like the animal ſtructure, may poſſibly become better known than it is by a collation of various claſſes of facts—facts aſſembled under the guidance of a previouſly aſſumed theory—then it will follow that it is to the aid of hypotheſis we ſhould look for further advancements in this, as well as in other lines of phyſical inquiry. And in truth, by ſo much as this ſubject is obſcure, and remote from immediate obſervation, the more need have we of ſuch aſſiſtance. Do we not poſſeſs mental firmneſs enough to ſecure ourſelves againſt the danger of putting mere conjecture in the place of real ſcience? If we do not, then let us abſtain altogether from philoſophic purſuits.

But it may be aſked, what room is there for hypotheſis, or in what direction are conjectures to be hazarded, in relation to the proper objects of mental philoſophy? In reply, we grant at once, that there is little room for admitting theſe pregnant methods of inquiry in relation to that ſort of mental philoſophy which turns upon the adjuſtment and exact expreſſion of abſtract notions, and which is properly termed METAPHYSICS. But we look wider when we think of intellectual ſcience, and think of it as a branch of phyſiology. Thus underſtood, it not merely embraces more objects, but comes under me-

thods of inveſtigation that are more diverſified. Metaphyſics is analytic ſimply; but Intellectual Philoſophy, while it employs analyſis, reſts mainly upon induction (in the phyſical ſenſe of the term) and muſt employ as well hypotheſis as obſervation and experiment.

Metaphyſical mental philoſophy is the knowledge of MIND; but Phyſical mental philoſophy is the knowledge of MINDS; and this diſtinction opens before us, at once, a wide and various field. The knowledge of *minds* we might conſent to deſignate by the term Pneumatology, comprehenſively underſtood; and it will then lead us to make inquiry, not merely concerning the laws of mind, as diſcoverable by an analyſis of our perſonal conſciouſneſs; but concerning thoſe often-recurrent varieties of mental conformation (within the human ſyſtem) which aſſume very nearly the diſtinctneſs and the regularity that conſtitute *ſpecific* differences, and which might properly give riſe to a claſſification by orders, genera, and ſpecies. If any ſuch claſſification were effected, it is manifeſt that a compariſon of the differences on the ground of which it was made would immenſely extend and advance our knowledge of mind in the abſtract; for it is only by ſetting off the differences, one after another, that any generic body or claſs of things can be known.

But this is not all; for, on the one hand, with the many indications, ſome indeed obſcure, and ſome explicit, of the exiſtence of rational orders, other than the human, and, on the other hand, with innumerable ſentient and voluntary ſpecies around us, partaking with ourſelves, in the fulleſt manner, of all the rudimental faculties of mind, and exhibiting proofs alſo of the germs, or faint characteriſtics, of ſome of the higheſt faculties, it can never be aſſented to that mental philoſophy ſhould be reſtricted within the limits of the human ſyſtem.

Even if it were true that we may know much more of the human mind, than of any other claſs, and that the knowledge of the human mind is of more practical conſequence than the knowledge of any other, it will not follow, if we regard the ſpirit and rules of our modern phyſical ſciences, that we ſhould ſo narrow the range of our curioſity. But in truth, it may be made to appear, that the knowledge of the human mind is more likely to be advanced, in relation to what ſtill remains obſcure, by purſuing theſe difficulties on other ground than that of the *human* mind, than by arrogantly and pertinaciouſly continuing to fix our attention upon the facts of our perſonal conſciouſneſs. Let us leave our cloſets, forſake our dim ſecluſions, and our lamps, and open our eyes upon the wide world of animated beings.

In relation to the *ſupernal* branch of pneumatology, alluded to above, it is granted that *ſcience* can go but a little way, with its merely natural means of information; nor is it deſirable that an intermixture of philoſophical inquiries, and Biblical deductions, ſhould be encouraged. On this very principle the author, in the preceding pages, has avoided everything beyond a mere paſſing reference to facts known to us only through the medium of the inſpired writings. The ſubject is a Biblical one, and might well engage the attention of thoſe qualified to purſue it, in the legitimate methods of interpretation and criticiſm. And yet, in placing this obſcure ſubject in a clearer light than at preſent falls upon it, little probably would be done by any who ſhould reſolve to entertain none of thoſe mere conjectures which ſuggeſt themſelves to us in hours of unreſtricted meditation. Thoſe numerous paſſages of Scripture which affirm or imply the exiſtence and agency of ſuper-human and of extra-human orders, are manifeſtly imperfect alluſions merely to ſingle points of a vaſt ſcheme, veiled from our view; and unleſs we court the aid of hypotheſis—and of more than one hypotheſis—in expounding theſe ſcattered notices, it is not probable that we ſhall ever advance a ſtep beyond the mere literal interpretation of ſingle texts. On the contrary, it might happen, that a ſeries of ſuppoſitions, well deviſed,

might at length lead to ſome ſuch general notion on the ſubject as would give conſiſtency to all parts of the evidence, diſſipate many difficulties, and even lead to our entertaining more expanded and more affecting notions of that ſcheme within which our own deſtinies are involved.

In advancing the conjectures which, in the preſent work, he has hazarded, the author has briefly ſtated ſome of thoſe ſuppoſitions he has been accuſtomed to entertain, in reading the Scriptures, with the very view of catching every faint indication of things unſeen, and which often are of a kind ſo obſcure as to eſcape notice entirely, except when the mind is quickened, in an unuſual manner, by the incitement of ſome general and conſiſtent conception of the unſeen economy. No ſound mind is ſeduced from its ſobriety longer than a few minutes by any ſuch conception, how plauſible ſoever it may ſeem. But although not beguiled, the mind may be ſubſtantially aided by thus entertaining an hypotheſis. Let, for example, ſome one ſuch theory be diſtinctly digeſted, and the mind filled with it; and let it be compared with whatever we know of the ſyſtem of the univerſe, whether by analogy or obſervation; and then let the entire chain of ſcripture evidence, critically examined, be gone over, with a view to this particular ſuppoſition. The conſequence will be, perhaps, its abſolute rejection: or perhaps it

may ſo adjuſt itſelf with ſpecial points of the evidence as to forbid its total rejection, and ſo as may lead to its being held in reſerve, to be compared with the reſults of inquiries conducted on ſome other principle.

But are ſuch inquiries altogether futile, and vain? Will thoſe venture to ſay ſo who entertain a due reverence for the canon of Scripture, and who believe that every ſeparate portion of it is placed where it is found with a ſpecific intention, and for an important end? Let it rather be believed as probable that, if our Chriſtianity is to recommend itſelf more extenſively than hitherto it has done, to mankind at large, it will be, in part, by our obtaining ſome more enlarged conceptions of the great ſpiritual economy—conceptions ſuch as may impart the vividneſs of reality to our faith in things unſeen.

But we turn, at preſent, from this more obſcure and difficult branch of pneumatology, which muſt always come rather within the range of theology than of ſcience; and advert to that other branch of the ſame ſubject, in relation to which all the materials are under our eye, and the methods of proceeding are ſtrictly and ſimply inductive.

Now whatever may be the prejudices that ſtand in the way of ſuch a courſe of inquiry, it appears that, if our object be to analyze the mind, and to learn the conditions and laws that

attach, ſeverally, to its faculties, a ſcrutiny of our perſonal conſciouſneſs is but one of the means to be employed; and, indeed, it is now acknowledged, by ſome of the authorities in this department of philoſophy, that an attention to the multifarious developments of the intellectual and moral powers, in individual minds, is advantageous, or indiſpenſable, for completing intellectual ſcience; and that it is by comparing theſe various facts with our own conſciouſneſs, that either is to be underſtood. Thus while the method of analyſis and abſtraction interprets the facts collected by obſervation, theſe enlarge and define the reſults of analyſis.

But what principle, admitted as good in any other department of ſcience, will juſtify our confining our view to *human* nature, while mind is exhibiting itſelf under ten thouſand modifications around us? All the rudiments of the mental conſtitution, as more fully developed in man, meet our eye, and invite our curioſity in the inferior ſpecies; and it would ſeem to be the moſt natural, and the moſt auſpicious courſe of inquiry, to begin at the lower part of the ſcale of intelligence, and to make ourſelves familiar, *firſt*, with the ſimpler forms of the percipient, voluntary, and reaſoning principle. A mere arrogance ſurely, as if intellectual philoſophy were degraded by taking its firſt ſteps on ſo low a path, ſhould not be allowed to have its influence with

thoſe who have learned the logic of modern ſcience. Shall the chemiſt purſue his inquiries, only ſo far as may be done by examining the nobler elements — heat, light, electricity, the precious metals, and the diamond — but ſtop when it would be neceſſary to ſoil his hands with earths?

There is, however, a branch of intellectual philoſophy, or we would rather ſay of pneumatology, in relation to which an extenſive and laborious examination of the corporeal mental ſtructure of the various ſentient tribes — our fellows in animal organization — ſeems to be imperatively demanded, and promiſes to yield very important reſults. Once and again, in the courſe of this eſſay, the author has had occaſion to refer, incidentally, to the ſubject which he will now endeavour, ſomewhat more diſtinctly, to expreſs.

It is well underſtood that mental philoſophy ſhould be purſued irreſpectively of any theory we may entertain concerning the ſtructure or functions of the brain; and that the deductions and the diſtinctions which conſtitute this ſcience muſt be preciſely ſuch as they are, whatever opinion we may adopt in reference to the purely phyſical queſtion of the dependence of the mind upon animal organization. This granted, it is yet certain that we muſt return to the ſubject of animal organization when the important controverſy is entered upon concerning the independent

reality and immateriality of the mind, and when we have to deal with the opinion, that mind is nothing but a function of the animal ſtructure; or that thought and perception are products of the medullary maſs, juſt as the bilious ſecretion is the product of the liver.

In oppoſition to any ſuch opinions, we may either take the courſe of metaphyſical argument, and ſhow that the ſoul muſt be a ſimple, indiſcerptible ſubſtance, immaterial, and immortal; or we may take the moral and religious courſe of argument, and prove, from the inſtincts, the anticipations, and the grandeur of the human mind, that it muſt be altogether ſuperior to the body, and muſt be its ſurvivor. But now, in purſuing the firſt of theſe lines of argument (and, indeed, the ſecond in part) we find ourſelves entangled in ſome conſequences not eaſily avoided or diſpoſed of, in relation to the inferior tribes of the animated world, inaſmuch as the reaſoning we employ, and the principles we aſſume, will almoſt inevitably ſtretch an inference as far as to include every ſpecies of beings that perceives, and acts, and that is wrought upon by emotions allied to thoſe we call moral. It muſt, indeed, be confeſſed that the argument of the immaterialiſt, as ſometimes conducted, if puſhed to its conſequences, would go near to imply the immortality of birds, beaſts, and fiſhes, of inſects, and of zoophytes!

Happily, however, there is another courſe open to us; and in the firſt place (which we may well afford to do) let us get completely clear of all the embarraſſments alluded to above, by ceaſing to ſeek for any aid in eſtabliſhing the *immortality* of the human ſoul, from the doctrine of its *immateriality*, or ſpirituality, or independence of matter. Man we believe to be immortal (revelation apart) not becauſe his mind is ſeparable from animal organization; but becauſe his intellectual and moral conſtitution is ſuch as to demand a future development of his nature. Why ſhould that which is immaterial be indeſtructible? None can tell us; and on the contrary, we are free to ſuppoſe that there may be immaterial orders, enjoying their hour of exiſtence, and then returning to nihility.

But now, taking up the hypotheſis that animal life, in all its kinds—every being that has conſciouſneſs, perception, and voluntary motion—poſſeſſes a principle totally diſtinct from the animal tiſſue, and the animal functions—a principle ſtrictly immaterial (although, perhaps, always in fact combined with ſome kind of corporeal congeſtion of elements) then it will remain to bring this doctrine to the teſt of facts; and, perhaps, we may be able to bring it to the teſt of experiment. In doing ſo it is clear that our methods of inquiry will be the moſt exempt from exception, and our concluſion the moſt deciſive, if we carry on the inveſtigation, chiefly,

on the field of inferior animal life. If on *this* field we make good our ground, everything will be ſecured, as by anticipation, or *à fortiori.*

And not merely will there be an argumentative advantage in eſtabliſhing the doctrine of the independence of mind, on the broader and lower baſis of merely animal exiſtence, but the almoſt infinitely varied ſtructures of the animated tribes around us will be found to offer many inſtances of ſo ſtriking and deciſive a kind, as will hardly allow of a choice of opinions, but will compel us to adopt a belief ſuch as muſt utterly exclude the opinion of the materialiſt. If the *human* animal ſtructure may leave us in doubt, we ſhall ſcarcely find it poſſible to heſitate when we come to examine the ſtructure and phyſiology of inferior ſpecies: we may, perhaps, be perplexed in conſidering the queſtion of the immateriality, or rather independence, of the *human* mind, but ſhall be relieved of all difficulty in examining the animal mechaniſm of inſects and worms.

There are thoſe, probably, who would not wiſh even to ſee the materialiſt confuted, if it muſt be on the ſtrange and offenſive condition —a condition ſo derogatory to the dignity of man—of our acknowledging a brotherhood of mind, ſuch as ſhall include the polypus, the ſea-jelly, and the animalcule of a ſtagnant pool. But ſcience knows of no averſions, and muſt hold on its way, through evil report and good report.

Truth, in the end, will not fail to juſtify itſelf, in all its conſequences and relations.

The line of inveſtigation neceſſary for doing juſtice to our preſent hypotheſis, it would not be difficult to mark out. Let the muſcular power be firſt conſidered, and a copious compariſon of ſtructures be inſtituted, ſuch as ſhould ſupport a rational concluſion concerning the proceſs, and the mechaniſm by which it is effected:—as thus—

In all caſes of muſcular movement, a connection, either with the brain, or with a ganglion ſuſtaining the ſame office, by means of the nervous chords, is indiſpenſable:—except when the limb is ſupplied with galvanic excitement in an artificial manner, in which caſe motion enſues; but it is motion of one ſort only—namely, a convulſive contraction of the ſtronger muſcle, or muſcles, in each antagoniſt ſet. Now this exceptive caſe, accidentally made known to us, ſuggeſts the belief that, what the brain ſupplies is —galvanic excitement merely; or a ſtimulus, of whatever kind, equivalent to that which in this inſtance is furniſhed by galvaniſm. What we are to ſeek for then, is—the cauſe of *diſcriminative* motion; that is to ſay, the cauſe of thoſe movements in which the ſtronger muſcles may remain at reſt, while the weaker are called into action. The queſtion is, Does the brain ſupply, not only the chemical ſtimulus of contractility, but alſo the directive or diſcriminative power,

which acts upon certain muſcles, and holds others in ſuſpenſion? Now beſide the abſtract improbability of any ſuch double function, belonging to the ſame viſcus, we find, upon examining the ſtructure and arrangement of the nervous chords, in all ſpecies, that while they are admirably fitted for diſcharging the office of conveying a ſtimulus *indiſcriminately* to the limbs, they cannot, without the higheſt difficulty, be conſidered as the channels of diſtinct volitions to particular muſcles. The one purpoſe ſpeaks itſelf in their conſtruction, while the other is as plainly contradicted and excluded. Eſpecially does this ſeem to be the caſe in the nervous economy of certain of the inferior claſſes of the animated world.

In the general ſcheme then of muſcular motion, there are clearly before us the ſeveral conſtituents—*all but one*. There is the bony fulcra or leverage, with its hinges, and the muſcular fibre, banded together, ſecured to its attachments, and ſupplied with blood; and there is the nervous net work, conveying, from the brain or ſpinal proceſs, the ſtimulus which produces the vehement contraction of the fleſhy tiſſue. But in all this we yet want the principal agent—namely, that power which determines the kind of motion, and the direction of the movement that in each inſtance is to enſue. Does then this agency come from the brain? The concluſion we anticipate is that it does not;

inaſmuch as the line of connection is not at all adapted to any ſuch purpoſe. But does there remain within the animal apparatus, any ſyſtem of veſſels, or any gland, or any fluid, not otherwiſe occupied, to which we may probably aſſign the office of determining motion? There is none; and we therefore attribute the determination immediately to a power diſtinct from, and independent of, the viſible ſtructure—that is to ſay, the MIND, preſent throughout the body, and acting and feeling, wherever preſent, by its inherent faculty in relation to matter.

It need hardly be ſaid that our hypotheſis is open to a ſpecial mode of atteſtation, or refutation, by the means of the various accidents that affect the muſcular power, in conſequence of diſeaſe. Thus all the facts connected with convulſive and ſpaſmodic affections, on the one hand, and with paralyſis and leipothymic ſtates of the ſyſtem, on the other, or with delirium, and inſanity, and febrile excitement, will, if fairly conſidered, either confirm or exclude the theory we adopt. Beſides theſe methods, it is eaſy to imagine experiments, ſuch as ſhould be almoſt of a deciſive kind.

From the examination of the muſcular ſyſtem, we ſhould advance to conſider the mechaniſm of ſenſation. The organ of ſenſe and the brain are connected by a chord: there is, therefore, doubtleſs a communication going on from the one to the other. But what is it that is conveyed;

and in which direction does the current flow? It is ſaid that ſenſations are tranſmitted from the organ to the brain—the ſtream, therefore, is in a direction *contrary* to that which takes place in effecting muſcular motion; for, in that caſe, the volition flows down from the brain to the extremities.* But, according to our hypotheſis, the courſe of the current is the ſame in both caſes; and the influence conveyed is alſo the ſame. That is to ſay, we aſſume that the brain ſupplies the organ with galvanic excitement, and nothing elſe; juſt as it ſupplies the muſcular fibres with galvanic excitement, and nothing elſe, and that, as the mind, *in the limb*, determines motion, ſo the mind, *in the organ*, admits ſenſation. Senſation, as we ſuppoſe, takes place at the tangential point or ſurface, where the external vibration gives riſe to a vibration upon the nervous expanſion.

With a view of determining the queſtion, as here ſtated, we ſhould firſt examine the ſenſe of touch; and ſurely it muſt be granted that the arrangement and reticulation of the nerves of feeling are ſuch as to render the ſuppoſition of the conveyance of diſtinct local ſenſations, from the ſurface of the body to the brain, in the higheſt degree ineligible; while the hypotheſis of a mere conveyance of excitement, from the

* It is not forgotten that the nerves of muſcular motion, and the nerves of ſenſation are different.

brain to the ſurface, and of the immediate preſence of the percipient faculty, at the point of ſenſation, is rendered almoſt certain.

If, on an extenſive compariſon of facts, permanent and accidental, this were admitted, the ſame hypotheſis would not be denied in relation to the other organs of ſenſation; and thus, inſtead of an organ deſpatching volitions, and receiving ſenſations, we ſhould have, in the brain, a ſecreting viſcus merely; and we ſhould then attribute ſenſation, volition, conſcioufneſs, and power, not to an animal organ, but to the MIND, natively fraught with power, active and paſſive —to the mind, linked indeed to the animal ſtructure, but ſuffuſed throughout it, and conſtituting the LIFE.

The hypotheſis we have here ſtated is ſurely ſuſceptible of being brought to the teſt of facts, in the ordinary modes of ſcientific inquiry. Its conſequences, perhaps, if eſtabliſhed, might be more extenſive and various than at firſt they may appear. At leaſt they would not fail to place Pneumatology on a firmer and a broader baſis; and ſo to open the way for enlarged and definite conceptions of the great Spiritual Economy of the univerſe.

THE END.

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